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ABSTRACT

WOMEN DON'T ASK: BUT WHY AREN'T THEY WILLING TO LEARN HOW?
VALIDATING A FOUR FACTOR MODEL

By
Jared Simmer
August 2013

Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Schreiber
It has long been suspected that the general reluctance of women to negotiate their
salaries may be one factor that contributes to the gender wage gap. While there has been
significant research on the reasons for this reticence to ask for more money, there has
been no prior exploration of the reasons why women might be reluctant to avail
themselves of opportunities to learn how.
The intent of this mixed methodology study was to explore male and female
graduate students’ feelings about negotiation in general, and willingness to study
negotiation in particular, and to identify those attitudes and beliefs that might serve to
inhibit them from enrolling in elective coursework designed to improve their negotiating
skills.
Because this study focused primarily on women’s feelings about negotiation, a
literature review of prior research on women and negotiation was conducted, and from
this analysis four primary beliefs, along with twenty-one underlying attitudes about
iv

negotiation, emerged. This research was used to construct a hypothesized model that
attempted to explain the reasons behind men and women’s reluctance to study
negotiation. An on-line survey based on the model was then administered to over 1100
male and female graduate students enrolled in twenty-two top-ranked U.S. graduate
schools of public policy.
Using confirmatory factor analysis, the model was tested for goodness of fit and
found to be acceptable. Results confirmed previously assumed notions that doubts about
usefulness, the need to maintain interpersonal relationships, an external locus of control,
and concerns about what might be expected of them in class serve as the primary
demotivators to enrollment in this coursework. In further support of the model, seventeen
of the twenty-one attitudes were shown to positively correlate with women’s nonenrollment, as opposed to thirteen for the men.
Results are discussed in terms of their implications for public policy and
education, a deeper understanding of the reasons for underrepresentation of females in
certain fields of study, and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter One
Introduction
It becomes apparent when one thinks of education not only as formal pedagogy
but as the entire process by which a culture transmits itself across the generations;
when one is prepared to see great variations in the role of formal institutions of
instruction…when one sees education in its elaborate, intricate involvements with
the rest of society, and notes its shifting functions, meanings, and purposes
(Bailyn, 1960, p. 14).
For decades, policy makers have struggled to address gender inequities in the
workplace, including the wage gap (substantial differences in average pay between men
and women employed full time), the glass ceiling (the inability of women to advance into
senior management and executive positions), and female underrepresentation on boards
of directors. In spite of women’s increased levels of education and work experience, and
heightened awareness of and lower tolerance for workplace discrimination, these
problems persist. So, it’s clear that the emphasis on equal employment opportunities,
women’s increased labor force participation rates, and significant investment in their
human capital have not, in and of themselves, resolved these disparities.
Significance of the Problem
It is important to realize that these workplace inequities are not only of academic
interest, but involve concepts of fundamental fairness, quality of life, standard of living,
and even our country’s ability to compete in the global marketplace. For the past forty
years public policy makers have primarily focused on legislative solutions including
passing equal pay laws and outlawing discrimination in the workplace. Ironically, some
studies have suggested that strong anti-discrimination legislation may even create the
“law of unintended consequences.” For instance, in one study it was shown that women
1

were offered lower starting salaries than men when the employer had a strong, fair
employment practice policy in place (Rosen & Mericle, 1979). And, as part of a broadbased approach to these problems, other initiatives have covered the gamut from contract
compliance monitoring, affirmative action, work-life balance initiatives, minority-owned
business preferences, public service announcements, and government set-asides
(Gunderson, 1989). However, in spite of these efforts, these workplace inequities remain
both pervasive and stubbornly resistant to remedy.
While the reasons for the gender wage gap, glass ceiling, and underrepresentation
on boards of directors are most assuredly varied and complex, rather than continuing to
focus on environmental factors, perhaps it is time to turn our attention to addressing
needed changes in individual behavior, particularly helping women to overcome their
inability or unwillingness to negotiate salaries and job opportunities.
The Glass Ceiling
The term “glass ceiling” characterizes that invisible, impenetrable barrier that
impedes women’s advancement into senior management and executive positions in
organizations. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) officially defines the glass ceiling as
follows:
… those artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent
qualified individuals from advancing in their organization into upper management
positions. These artificial barriers may exist in seemingly neutral hiring criteria,
or in the selection criteria used for advancement and professional development
opportunities. These same barriers may also prevent minority men and women of
all races from being given assignments that can lead to the development of
expertise and credibility. The existence of the glass ceiling ultimately results in
reduced participation by minority men and women of all races in executive
management positions in corporations. Where the glass ceiling exists, white
women - and minority men and women in greater numbers - are relegated to
lower paying positions. This is costly to corporations both economically and in
2

terms of damaging morale. It can lead to an inability to recruit talented
professionals, increased turnover and the loss of highly skilled talent in which
many corporations have made major investments (U.S. Department of Labor
[USDoL], n.d.).
A Department of Labor report (USDoL, 1992) asserted, “America is at a
crossroad. Over fifty percent of its workforce is made up of minorities and women, yet it
appears that their advancement is oftentimes hindered by artificial barriers – glass
ceilings” (p. 1).
The glass ceiling is not limited to women’s lack of advancement into the
managerial and executive ranks but also women’s underrepresentation on corporate
boards of directors. One study illustrated how women hold only a small proportion of
leadership positions in U.S. business (Catalyst, 2007d).

Figure 1. The catalyst pyramid of U. S. women in business.
Note. Retrieved from http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/metricspyramid.shtml.
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In addition to the dearth of women occupying executive suites, a second study by
the same organization illustrates how the placement of women on boards of directors
dramatically lags behind their representation in the workforce (Catalyst, 2007a) (see
Figure 2).

Figure 2. Women in management.
Note. Retrieved from http://www.catalyst.org/publication/206/women-in-us-management.

A recent report by another research firm (Spencer Stuart, 2006) reveals more
sobering news. In spite of the efforts of many companies to achieve greater diversity in
the boardroom, representation of women on boards lacks uniformity and varies by
industry, ranging from a low of 10% of female directors in capital goods industries, to
20% in the consumer non-cyclical goods industries. Further, women remain
underrepresented in board leadership positions, chairing only 17% of
4

nominating/governance committees, 7% of audit committees, and 11% of compensation
committees (Madrick, 2004, p. 8).
A survey of the proxies of the top 200 of the S&P 500 (representing the 500
largest publicly traded U.S. companies) found that only 16% even had one female board
member, 9% had all-male boards, and only 19% of new board members added in 2007
were women.

Figure 3. Distribution of women directors.
Note. Retrieved from
http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/Board_Diversity_Report_2006.pdf.

The trends do not seem to offer much hope that female participation on boards
will be changing anytime soon. A recent study reported that only about 21% of new
members named to boards of companies on the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index in
5

2011 were female, a decline of 9% over the past five years (Spencer Stuart, 2011).
Another study revealed that the number of women on boards of Standard & Poor’s 1500
companies barely increased, from 12.1% in 2009 to 12.6% in 2012 (Gladman & Lamb,
2012).
The executive search firm Heidrich and Struggles reported on what female
directors believe is the primary reason that the percentage of women on boards is not
increasing. The top four reasons mentioned were traditional networks are male-oriented
(35%), lack of access to decision makers on boards (19%), diversity not a board
recruiting priority (18%), and lack of women in the executive ranks (18%) (Heidrick &
Struggles, 2012).
In “No Seat at the Table,” Branson argued that as bleak as the numbers appear,
the actual number of female directors may actually be overstated and constitute only
about 10% of directors, or a third less than commonly reported, because many women
serve on multiple boards (Branson, 2006).
Women’s underrepresentation in the executive suite, and at the highest governing
levels of publicly traded companies, has predictable and unfortunate financial
consequences; it not only keeps women out of the highest paying executive-level jobs,
but it also prevents them from earning the additional compensation for that board service.
For instance, in a 2005 survey, the median annual compensation for directors was
$109,000 in the manufacturing sector, $106,250 in the service sector, and $83,000 in the
financial services sector (Peck, Silver, & Torok, 2006). Additionally, because many
directors are asked to serve on more than one board, women could be losing out on
multiple sources of ancillary compensation.
6

However, there are also other insidious costs that are borne by the U. S. economy.
According to a 2004 study which looked at 353 of the Fortune 500 companies, companies
with the highest percentage of women in senior management positions on average
outperformed those companies with the lowest percentage; return on equity was 35.1%
higher, and total return to shareholders 34% higher (Catalyst, 2004).

Figure 4. Corporate performance and women’s representation on boards.
Note. Retrieved from
http://catalystwomen.org/knowledge/files/Bottom%20Line%202.pdf.

A follow-up study conducted in 2007 found that companies with the highest
percentages of female board members outperformed those with the lowest by 66% on
return on invested capital, 53% on return on equity, and 42% on return on sales (Catalyst,
2007b).
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A 2012 study Credit Suisse reported similar results. For instance, shares of
companies with a market capitalization of more than $10 billion with women board
members outperformed comparable businesses with all-male boards by 26% worldwide
over six years, and net income growth for companies with women board members
averaged 14% over that same six year period, contrasted to only 10% of those with no
female board members (Perlberg, 2012).
The Gender Wage Gap
While the glass ceiling remains an important public policy concern, perhaps of
even more significance is the gender wage gap if only because it affects women at all
levels of employment, in almost every profession, at every stage of their career, and in
even greater absolute numbers, as the following figures show:

Figure 5. Women's earnings in relation to similarly educated men.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.womensmedia.com/new/Lips-Hilary-gender-wagegap.shtml.
8

Figure 6. U. S. gender wage gaps within ethnicity.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.womensmedia.com/new/Lips-Hilary-gender-wagegap.shtml.

One particularly troubling feature is how early the gender wage gap manifests
itself. The most definitive study, which involved an analysis of the average earnings of
3,101 suburban tenth and eleventh graders, suggested that wage differentials became
evident beginning with an individual’s very first entry into the labor market (Greenberger
& Steinberg, 1983). A more recent study reveals a gender wage gap begins to emerge
around age fourteen, with 14-year-old-boys reporting annual earnings of $400 and girls
$266. In addition, that earnings gaps only widens over time so that between the ages of
16 to 19, boys were earning on average $950 but girls only $750 (Besen-Cassino, 2008).
Uncovering these differentials is important because studies show that in the United States
most teenagers work (Entwistle, Alexander, & Olson, 2000; Manning, 1990).
9

A 2009 study discusses how the pay gap between educated men and women
begins as soon as they begin their professional careers, with women who graduated from
college one year earlier earning on average only 82% as much as their male classmates
(Huffington Post, 2012).
The wage gap is not only limited to women employed in the lowest levels of the
workplace, but is extant even at the very highest levels of management. One study,
looking at the average compensation of the top five highest paid executives of U. S.
companies, concluded that between 1992 and 1997, women executives earned, on
average, 45% less than their male counterparts (although about 75% of the differential
was explained by the fact that women worked in smaller companies and were less likely
to be CEO, board chair, or company president) (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001).
The gender wage gap in the legal profession.
As the following figure illustrates, the gender wage gap certainly appears alive
and well in the legal profession:

10

Figure 7. Percentage of positions at law firms by gender in the U.S.
Note: National Association of Women Lawyers and The NAWL Foundation, Report of
the Sixth Annual National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms
(October 2011).

A recent study by the Allegheny County Pennsylvania Bar Association of
attorneys working in southwestern Pennsylvania showed that female attorneys who work
virtually the same number of hours as men earn significantly less than male attorneys.
Further, while 20% of the men earn more than $250,000 per year, only 5% of the female
attorneys did. Also, while no female law school graduates from the 1990s were earning
over $250,000, 10% of the male graduates were, and male attorneys were twice as likely
to have achieved higher paying equity partner status in their firms (Kitzerow &
Tomlinson, 2006).
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The gender wage gap in Pennsylvania.
A 2004 University of Pittsburgh study showed that while the percentage of
women with a high school or college degree in the Pittsburgh region was among the
highest in the nation, the gender wage gap was among the largest; full-time women
workers in this region earned less than 70% of the annual earnings of full-time male
workers, an earnings differential that is the seventh largest among the fifty biggest U.S.
metropolitan areas. In a comparison of women in the seventy largest American cities,
women in working in the Pittsburgh area had the 24th highest rate for bachelor’s degrees
and the 10th highest rate for graduate degrees; however, it had the 11th lowest female
median earnings, the lowest median earnings among part-time/part-year women workers,
the 15th lowest median earnings among full-time/full-year women workers, and the 10th
lowest percentage of full-time/full-year women workers who earn $30,000 or more a year
(Bangs, Lichtenwalter, Hughes, Alex, & Shorter, 2004).
A 2007 Pittsburgh regional survey reported that women in commercial
management in this region earned just 58.3% of men in similar jobs, and only 89.5% of
national median earnings for women in management generally. The study also confirmed
that a college degree does not narrow the gender wage gap: while women in the
Pittsburgh region with a high school degree earned on average 75% of their male
counterparts’s compensation, women with a college degree earned just 71% of the pay of
men with equivalent education (Deitrick, Hansom, & Bream, 2007).
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Figure 8. Median annual earnings by gender and highest level of educational attainment.
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.ucsur.pitt.edu/documents/DeitrickGenderWageDisparity12-07.pdf.
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The same study also calculated the gender wage gap by profession in this region:

Figure 9. Relative difference in gender wage disparity.
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.ucsur.pitt.edu/documents/DeitrickGenderWageDisparity12-07.pdf.

Updated results from a 2011 survey using the latest Census Bureau data only
served to confirm the gender wage gap:
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Figure 10. Average wages for full-time, year-round workers.
Note: Retrieved from http://triblive.com/news/allegheny/2949076-74/women-analysispaid-cents-gap-working-male-female-industries-pennsylvania#axzz2LTmr3EKd.

A 2006 study of the earnings of alumni of Pennsylvania’s independent colleges
and universities showed that the wage disparity is not confined to the southwestern part
of the state. Five years after graduation, male graduates of state schools in the class of
1999 had higher average salaries than did female graduates, and while 56% of the male
graduates earned more than $60,000, just 37% of the female graduates did (Association
of Independent Colleges and Universities of Pennsylvania [AICU], 2006).
In the non-profit arena, a 2006 study (Fitzpatrick, 2007) showed that female nonprofit executives in the Pittsburgh region not only earned less than their male
counterparts, but the gender divide is increasing, i.e., it was 51% wider in 2006 than it
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was in 2004. By 2006, male directors in the region made on average $42,000 a year more
than their female counterparts (male executive directors averaged $116,868 a year, and
females $74,770).
An analysis of the latest census bureau data reveal that the 30% male-female pay
gap in Western Pennsylvania remains unchanged, with women having higher average
wages in only 20% of industries and 30% of occupations (Bowling & Weaver, 2012).
The gender wage gap in higher education.
A 2006 study by the American Association of University Professors revealed a
gender wage gap in higher education as well (West & Curtis, 2006). It reported that the
average female faculty member earned only about 81% of that earned by her male
counterparts, a ratio that has remained relatively unchanged for the past thirty years. Even
when the data is adjusted to compare only men and women of the same faculty rank, not
only do female faculty still earn on average only 88% of what male faculty earn, but they
had failed to reach salary parity in any institutional category (see Figure 11).
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.
Figure 11. Equity indicator.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/63396944-44BE-4ABA-98155792D93856F1/0/AAUPGenderEquity Indicators2006.pdf, p. 11.

At Duquesne University, the school where the researcher is earning his doctorate,
similar gender disparities in faculty salaries are evident. For the 2008-2009 academic
year, male professors earned an average of $107,900 but female professors only $90,400;
male associate professors averaged $81,900 but females only $74,100; and male assistant
professors $63,400 and females $60,400. It is only at the instructor level that females
reversed the gap – male instructors on average earned $42,800 during that school year
and females $51,900 (American Association of University Professors, 2010).
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The Economic Policy Institute calculated the hypothetical cumulative losses
suffered by the average college-educated women over a 20-year period as a consequence
of the wage gap (see Figure 12).

Figure 12. Cumulative losses from gender wage gap, 1984.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.epi.org/content.cfm?id=2111.

An article in The New York Times pointed out that traditional ways of reporting
the wage gap substantially overstated what women actually earn over time relative to
men. For instance, while the ratio of women’s to men’s salaries during the period of
1983-1998 was reported to be 77%, if one were to focus on men and women in the prime
working years of 26-59 over that same 15-year period, women actually earned on average
only about 38% of what the men did. It’s important to note that, but for federal (and state)
legislation such as the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and union contracts that standardize rates
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of pay between both men and women doing the same jobs based on seniority, the wage
gap would have undoubtedly been even larger (Madrick, 2004).
Trends in the gender wage gap.
As Figure 13 illustrates, while the gender wage gap is narrowing, progress has
stalled in recent years:

Figure 13. Median usual weekly earnings by gender.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.aauw.org/research/upload/behindPayGap.pdf.

The Institute for Women’s Policy Research showed that over the past decade the
gender-wage gap narrowed by less than half of a percentage point, from 77% to 77.4%,
after declining by almost four percent between 1991 and 2000, and more than ten percent
in the decade prior (Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2011).
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The U. S. government points out that after 25 years of progress, the average
woman’s median earnings still average 20% less than a man’s (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics [USBoLS], 2005), all the more reason that some research projects the gap will
persist for decades to come (see also Rathje, 2002, for the proposition that while the
gender wage gap can be expected to narrow over time, it is not expected to disappear).

Figure 14. The continuing gap in U.S. earnings trends.
Note. Retrieved from http://www.womensmedia.com/new/Lips-Hilary-gender-wagegap.shtml.

Another study examined trends in the wage gap:
The data indicate that the gender ratio was roughly constant at about 60 percent
from the late 1950s to about 1980…The gender earnings ratio began to increase in
the late 1970s or early 1980s. Convergence has been substantial: between 1978
and 1999 the weekly earnings of women full-time workers increased from 61
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percent to 76.5 percent of men’s earnings. However, the ratio appears to have
plateaued in the mid-1990s (Blau & Kahn, 2000, p. 1-2). It concluded that “…the
narrowing of the gender gap has primarily been associated with the entry of new
cohorts, each faring better than their predecessors…” (Blau & Kahn, 2000, p. 3).

Similarly, in 2003, the General Accounting Office found that while female
managers are paid an average of only eighty cents for every dollar that a male manager
earns, this differential has remained relatively constant over the past two decades. While
about half of the decline in the gender wage gap over the past forty years occurred in the
1980s, the 1990s brought slower progress, with much of the narrowing of the gap not
because female earnings increased, but because male earnings stagnated (U.S. General
Accounting Office [GAO], 2003).
Other research supports the notion that the glass ceiling is not expected to
disappear any time soon. Data from one study revealed that in the period from 2002 to
2005, women’s share of corporate officer’s positions at Fortune 500 companies had only
incrementally increased from 15.7% to 16.4%, an advance of just 0.7%. To put this rate
of advance in perspective, the study predicted that should the pace of recent gains remain
constant, it will be at least another 40 years before women hold even half of director
positions, and teenage girls, not yet in the labor market, would be near retirement age
before full equality would be reached (Catalyst, 2007a).
Attempts to understand contributing factors to the gender wage gap.
Many researchers are tempted to explain much of the disparity between men’s and
women’s average wages by focusing on such factors as differentials in work skills, length
of time in the labor market, number of children, child rearing, choice of occupations, and
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discrimination. While research suggests that these appear to be contributors, the literature
suggests that the reasons behind the gender wage gap are more robust and complex.
Olson, Frieze, and Good observed from a convenience sample of 2,000 MBA
graduates that females had average starting salaries of $3,000 a year less than their male
classmates, and the differential remained relatively constant ten years after graduation.
The authors concluded that starting salaries appeared to be a major contributor to the
gender wage gap, with every $1,000 increase in starting salary translating into an $800$900 increase in annual salary later in graduates’ careers. (Olson, Frieze, & Good, 1987).
On the other hand Waldfogel (1998) attributes some of the gender wage
differential to what she terms the “family gap.” That is, while the U. S. does well in the
areas of equal pay and equal opportunity legislation relative to other industrial countries,
it lags behind in the area of family policies such as child care, maternity leave, and flex
time. So, while the U. S. has focused on equalizing opportunities for women and men, it
has not adequately addressed those issues unique to having children, a burden which falls
disproportionately on women who bear much of the responsibility of childrearing. As a
result, in the U.S. there is a “family penalty” in wages of 10-15% for women who elect to
have children: women with no children earned 81.3% of what a man did, in contrast to
women with children who earned only 73.4%.
In fairness, it should be recognized that there are some who question whether the
gender wage gap even exists, or if it does, its magnitude. Hecker (1998) points out that
among 1993 college graduates, women earned only about 73% as much as men did.
However, once the data was controlled for fields of study, level of education, and
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equivalent age and experience, almost 50% of the women had median earnings of at least
87% as much as the men, and, in some cases, earned as much or more than the men.
A report by the National Center for Policy Analysis (Venable, 2002) cited
research that for people between the ages of 27-33 who have never had children, the
female-male ratio of average earnings approaches full equality (98%) although the study
admittedly analyzed data from a narrow age band.
Some researchers have suggested that we don’t have a gender “wage gap,” rather
we have a gender “hours” gap. One researcher takes issue with the definition of “fulltime” as defined by U.S. policy makers as those who work 35 hours a week or more.
Specifically, she points out that in 2007, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that
27% of male full-time workers worked more than 41 hours per week, contrasted to only
15% of full-time female workers. She concluded that because men, on average, tend to
work more hours than women, it shouldn’t be surprising that they would earn more.
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Figure 15. Men work more hours.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.city-journal.org/2011/21_3_gender-gap.html.

She also takes issue with wage disparity studies that assume that all “occupations” are
equal. Rather, because many male-dominated occupations pay more than many femaledominated occupations, this alone explains much of the gap. Even when controlling for
hours worked, occupation, marital and parental status, experience, college major, and
industry, the disparities remain, although she concedes that some of this differential is
perhaps due to discrimination and/or women’s reluctance to negotiate salaries
(Hymowitz, 2011).
Research by Livingston and Judge would seem to suggest that when thinking of
the gender wage gap, we may be misguided focusing on the woman’s side, rather than the
man’s side, of things. Rather, the gap may really be an income gap between women, and
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those men who hold different views on women’s place in work and society. In their
analysis of twenty five years of data from the United States Department of Labor’s
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, the researchers discovered that when averaged
over the past quarter-century, the average salaries of the participants broke down as
follows (Livingston & Judge, 2008, p. 1007):


Men holding traditional attitudes of women’s roles: $34,725



Men holding egalitarian attitudes of women’s roles: $22,795



Women holding egalitarian attitudes of women’s roles: $21,373



Women holding traditional attitudes of women’s roles: $20,321

Figure 16. Gender as a predictor of the effect of gender role orientation on earnings.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.apa.org/journals/releases/apl935994.pdf.
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They concluded, after controlling for education levels, types of jobs, and a similar
number of work hours per week, that men holding traditional views of the role of women
in the workplace earned $11,930 more a year than men with more egalitarian views, and
$14,404 more than women with traditional attitudes. In short, perhaps the gender wage
gap is really a gap between men holding traditional views on women’s role in work and
home, and everyone else. The authors explained the findings by positing that men who
hold traditional attitudes might negotiate harder for a higher salary and/or that employers
view egalitarian men as effete. Or perhaps women sharing traditional attitudes build their
own personal glass ceiling that becomes a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy (Livingston &
Judge, 2008, p. 1007).
Undiscovered factors contributing to the gender wage gap.
In spite of controlling for a wide variety of variables, researchers have been
unable to identify all of the factors that lead to the wage gap. One government report
admitted as much when it concluded, “While we could account for much of the earnings
difference between men and women we cannot explain all of the difference…” (GAO,
2003, p. 16).
In a survey of the average salaries of MBA graduates from the same program,
Olson, Frieze, and Good (1987) found that after controlling for work experience, job
area, industry, and starting salaries, they were only able to explain only about half of the
variance in income. Another study which controlled for occupation, rank, and employer
concluded that about 3% of the differential in male and female engineers’ salary could
not be explained by controlling for any known factors (Morgan, 1998).
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The Council of Economic Advisors (Council of Economic Advisors, 1998)
reported that 33% of the gender pay gap could be explained by differences in skills and
experience, and another 28% by differences in industry, occupation and union status, but
the reasons behind 12% of the pay gap could not be explained.
Blau and Kahn (1997) suggested yet another contributor: the overall wage
structure, or how prices are set for certain constellations of labor market skills. While
asserting that the decline in the gender wage gap from 1979-1988 could be explained by
“gender-specific” factors, particularly improvements in women’s experience and choice
of occupations, they, too, admitted that the reasons for a portion of the gap could not be
accounted for.
Citing data from the National Study of Postsecondary Faculty referenced in the
U.S. Department of Education’s Condition of Education report (National Center for
Education Statistics [NCES], 2002), West and Curtis (2006) pointed out that even after
controlling for thirteen variables such as tenure, rank, degree, age, etc., a multiple
regression analysis of the results found that there were no identifiable explanation for at
least 9% of the gap between male and female faculty salaries.
A 2007 study by the American Association of University Women, “Behind the
Pay Gap” (Dey & Hill, 2007) shows that just one year out of college, full-time working
women already earn less than their male counterparts (about 80%), but the pay gap
widens so that by 10 years post-graduation, working women are earning only 69% of
what men earn. The report goes on to point out that after controlling for those factors
known to affect earnings (industry, hours worked, level of education, and experience),
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five percent of the gap defied explanation, and after ten years, the proportion of the
differential that could not be explained more than doubled.
Another study controlling for education, labor market experience, race,
occupation, industry, and unionism, conceded that about eleven percent of the gap could
not be explained (Blau & Kahn, 2000).
A similar conclusion was reached by Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993).
Looking at the starting salaries of graduates of the University of Michigan Law School,
they discovered that what was once a small gender pay gap at graduation had grown to
60% fifteen years post-graduation. Even after controlling for hours worked,
qualifications, family status, race, location, law school grades, work history, years of
practice, months of part-time work, and type and size of employer, they were only able to
narrow the wage gap to 87%.
Similarly, in other studies examining reasons for differentials in the salaries of
college graduates, at least 10 to 15% of the wage gap had to be attributable to unknown
factors (Weinberger, 1998). A summary of these findings is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Proportion of the Gender Wage Gap That’s Not Explainable
Morgan
(1998)

Council of
Economic
Advisors
(1998)

Blau &
Kahn
(1997)

AUW
(2007)

AUP
(1997)

Blau &
Kahn
(2000)

Wood,
Corcoran, &
Courant
(1993)

Weinberger
(1985)

97%

88%

Unclear

88-95%

91%

88.2%

87%

85-90%

(3%)

(12%)

--------

(5-12%)

(9%)

(11.8%)

(13%)

(10-15%)

Note. The top number represents the percentage of the gender wage gap that was
accounted for by the factors identified in each study; the bottom number (in parentheses)
represents the percentage that remained unexplained due to unknown factors the
researchers were unable to identify.
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Others have concurred that individual behavior traits that lead to lower starting
salaries may be one of the hidden contributors, specifically women’s unwillingness to
negotiate.
At every stage of their career, women appear less effective in gaining access to
positions of power and status than men. Even though they compose nearly one half of the
work force, it is not the top half (Fireman, 1990). As in the case of wage and salary
negotiation, if women were less effective than men in negotiating opportunities and
positions of status, these inequities would then be perpetrated through subsequent formal
and informal negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999, p. 670).
In one man-in-the-street survey (Hill & Silva, 2005) people were asked what they
believed the reasons behind the gender wage gap were. As can be seen in Figure 14, more
than one in four (28%) believed that women’s negotiation skills was a contributing factor.

Figure 17. The most important explanation for the pay gap.
Note. Retrieved from http://www.aauw.org/research/upload/ perceptionsPayGap.pdf.
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Other researchers concurred with this conventional wisdom: “Research on gender
in job negotiations speaks directly to the unexplained gender gap in earnings by
illuminating psychological effects of gender on compensation negotiations” (Bowles &
McGinn, 2008b, p. 100).
Could a Gender Negotiation Skills Gap Offer a Partial Plausible Explanation for the
Gender Wage Gap?
Other researchers have concurred with Bowles and McGinn’s suggestion that
women’s lack of negotiating ability contributes to the gender wage gap (Babcock &
Laschever, 2003; Tsui, 1998). This assumption finds further support in the research of
Rosenbaum (1984), who discovered that initial earnings (starting salaries) had a
significant effect on subsequent career advancement, and Nadler and Nadler (1987) who
opined the following:
Reported inequities in gender-related success patterns in American corporations
highlight the need to explore women’s ability to negotiate successfully within
their work organizations…We contend that obtaining raises, promotions, and
other forms of organizational support are at least partially related to the
individual’s negotiation ability and that women are at a negotiation disadvantage
relative to men (p. 189).

A 2002 survey (Kolb, 2002) revealed that women appear largely ambivalent about
their negotiating ability. For instance, only about one in six reported that they regularly
negotiated their salaries. See Figure 18.

30

Figure 18. Percentage of women who say they always negotiate.
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.negotiatingwomen.com/Download/QuantativeSurvey_13.pdf.
Figure 19 shows that about sixty percent (categories 3 and 4) of women don’t take
it personally if their starting salary or raise was less than they had expected:
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Figure 19. Percentage of women who say they take it personally if starting salary or raise
is less than they expected.
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.negotiatingwomen.com/Download/QuantativeSurvey_13.pdf.

Similarly, Figure 20 confirms that a significant percentage of women won’t
counter an initial salary offer:

Figure 20. Percentage of women who counter the first offer.
Note. Retrieved from
http://www.negotiatingwomen.com/Download/QuantativeSurvey_13.pdf.

And, less than eighteen percent of women said that they were completely
confident in their ability to adjust their negotiations mid-course:
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Figure 21. Percentage of women who feel confident during salary negotiations.
Note. Retrieved from http://negotiatingwomen.com/Download/QuantativeSurvey_13.pdf.

Only fifteen percent strongly agreed that they were good advocates for
themselves:

Figure 22. Percentage of women who consider themselves proficient at negotiating.
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Note. Retrieved from
http://www.negotiatingwomen.com/Download/QuantativeSurvey_13.pdf.

Less than twelve percent were satisfied with the outcomes of their negotiations:

Figure 23. Percentage of women who are satisfied with their salary negotiations.
Note. Retrieved from
http://www.negotiatingwomen.com/Download/QuantativeSurvey_13.pdf.

Support for the notion that women lack confidence in their negotiating ability can
also be found in the research of Nadler and Nadler (1987). In their study, a convenience
sample of one hundred and seventy four students were asked to role-play salary
negotiations – eighty seven pairs of one male and one female role players. Female
“employees” ended up with lower raises than male “employees;” female “supervisors”
gave out larger raises than male “supervisors” (suggesting that women were more
influenced by “employees” who negotiated); male “supervisors” gave out larger raises to
their male “employees;” the lowest raises were negotiated by female “employees”
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negotiating with male “supervisors;” and the lowest initial offers were made by female
“supervisors” negotiating with female “employees.”
A lack of negotiating prowess, and its effect on salaries, is all the more important
because, contrary to conventional wisdom, most job offers are negotiable. For example,
in a survey of more than 500 hiring managers and 500 workers, Robert Half International
and CareerBuilder reported that 61% of hiring managers admitted that their companies
were willing to negotiate higher compensation for qualified candidates (Edge Report,
2009).
Similarly, in another survey of hiring professionals (Society of Human Resource
Management, 2004), over 80% confided that starting salaries were negotiable. In
addition, recruiters reported that women were much less likely than men to identify
themselves as very comfortable with the hiring process (10% vs. 17%), less likely to
identify themselves as somewhat comfortable with the process (32% vs. 38%), and less
likely to be neutral about negotiating (16% vs. 21%). Viewed another way, over threequarters of men were neutral to very comfortable with negotiating, while only about half
of the women were, and while there was no significant difference in the percentage of
men and women who attempted to negotiate, almost 60 % of the men negotiated over
items of monetary value, contrasted to only about a third of the women.
A study by Accenture (2012), which surveyed 3,900 business executives from
medium to large organizations from thirty-one countries, revealed that while only about
half reported having asked for a pay raise, three-quarters of those who did so received a
higher offer:
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Figure 24. Percentage of respondents who asked for a raise.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.accenture.com/usen/company/people/women/Pages/insight-womens-research-2012-path-forward.aspx.

And, of those, three-fourths were offered more money:
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Figure 25. Percentage of those who asked for a raise who received a raise.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.accenture.com/usen/company/people/women/Pages/insight-womens-research-2012-path-forward.aspx.

A study of Carnegie Mellon MBA students found a similar reluctance among
women to negotiate (Babcock et al., 2006). The researchers reported that eight times as
many male graduates (57%) as female graduates (7%) negotiated their starting salaries.
As a result of these differences in the propensity to negotiate (or “ask” in the study’s
parlance) for more money, the researchers concluded that the average starting salaries of
male graduates was 7.6% higher (about $4,000) on average than their female classmates,
or the equivalent of a couple of years of on-the-job pay increases. It should be noted that
this differential is within that proportion of the gender wage gap that earlier referenced
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studies found “unexplainable.” Students who did elect to negotiate (mostly males) were
able to increase their starting offers by 7.4% ($4,053), or about the same as the
differential between male and female’s starting salaries.
Behind the Pay Gap (AAUW, 2007) seems to support a connection between
women’s reluctance to negotiate, and at least some portion of the gender wage gap:
Individual differences in negotiating skills may lead to pay variation among
workers with similar skill sets. Employers have a fair amount of discretion in
setting wages as long as they pay at least the minimum wage and do not
discriminate based on gender, race, ethnicity, age, or other protected group (Dey
& Hill, 2007, p. 30).
What are the ramifications of an inability to negotiate effectively on one’s own
behalf? “Negotiation is a process that creates, reinforces, and reduces gender inequality in
organizations…” (Bowles & McGinn, 2008b, p. 99).
Pruitt et al. (1980) define negotiation as “symbolic communication between two
or more parties aimed at reaching agreement on an issue where there are initial
differences in preference” (p. 9). As some researchers have pointed out, recent changes in
the world of work, including a decline in the percentage of workers represented by
unions, increased job mobility, and a greater number of layoffs, have created an
environment where the ability of an individual to negotiate terms and conditions of
employment are increasingly important (Rousseau, 2001). In “Negotiation through a
Gender Lens,” researcher Deborah M. Kolb concurs with the suggestion that knowing
how to negotiate effectively is an important skill:
Negotiation is a critical skill for managers today. In the not too distant past, those
who negotiated did so because their jobs required them to bargain over contracts
with suppliers, customers, and/or unions. In other words, negotiation was a skill
used primarily by people who did it for a living. Now, changes in the economy
and shifts in organizational structures, mean that a major part of a manager’s job
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is likely to be spent negotiating. The shifting boundaries between a firm, its
suppliers, its customers, and even its competition, require that more people than
ever are likely to be both negotiating complex deals and then bargaining over
their implementation. Further, more often than not, managers are in roles where
their responsibility exceeds authority. This means that significant time is spent
negotiating with a range of internal and external stakeholders in order to get a job
done, a budget approved, and staffing for projects, among others. In network and
team structures, bargaining is the common strategy used to secure commitments
and buy-in. And as people change jobs over the course of their careers, there are
many opportunities to negotiate conditions and compensation, and/or secure funds
to support new ventures (Kolb, 2002, p. 2).
As important as it is for managers to be effective negotiators, changes in the
practice of law emphasize the need for women attorneys to have sound negotiation skills
as well. For example, as a result of court reforms and the adoption of various alternative
mechanisms that allow for the resolution of disputes outside of court, there has been a
sustained decline in the number of trials at all levels (Rottman, 2005). In recognition of
the increasing importance that settlement negotiation plays, Professor Charles Craver of
the George Washington University Law School posits that “We should not permit such
concerns to discourage a student from taking a critical lawyering skills course, and
certainly no lawyering skill is more critical than negotiating” [emphasis added] (Craver,
1998, p. 185).
Evidence for this increased emphasis on negotiating settlement of lawsuits can be
found in the American Bar Association-sponsored “Vanishing Trial Project” (2004). In
1962 there were 5,802 civil trials and 5,097 criminal trials, for a total of 10,899 trials, in
the federal courts. By 1985, the total number of trials in federal court had risen to 12,529,
but by 2002 the numbers had dropped to 4,569 civil trials and 3,574 criminal trials, or
8,143 total trials. Figure 26 and Figure 27 illustrate this decline.
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Figure 26. Civil dispositions and trial rates.
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.ncsconline.org/Projects_Initiatives/Images/CivilActionSpr05.pdf.

Figure 27. Tort and contract trials.
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Note: Retrieved from
http://www.ncsconline.org/Projects_Initiatives/Images/CivilActionSpr05.pdf.

In other words, in spite of a dramatic increase in the U.S. population in the
intervening three decades, there were more trials held in 1962 than in 2002. Parsing the
data another way, in 1962, 11.5% of federal civil cases filed went to trial contrasted with
a meager 1.8% by 2002. Between 1985 and 2003, the number of federal tort trials
declined by 79% (Stuckey, 2007), with the state court trials experiencing a similar
decline. Some judges have even gone so far as to proclaim that trials are “failures” that
result when lawyers have not done their jobs by negotiating settlements (Refo, 2004).
Since settlements are negotiated resolution of lawsuits, it’s self-evident that as
fewer cases proceed to trial, a premium is placed on attorney’s negotiation skills. To the
extent that female attorneys are deficient in these skills or reluctant to exercise them, this
may hold them back from advancement in the profession (the glass ceiling), or, at the
very least, compromise their perceived relative value to their firm (the gender wage gap),
which would then be reflected in lower compensation.
Recognizing that Negotiation Skills are Important, Can They be Taught?
Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007, p. 85) asserted that, “Maybe women need more
training and practice in negotiation to help them get over their nervous feelings and to
learn how to act more like men when opportunities to negotiate arise.”
But, even if one were to assume that women generally don’t negotiate as
effectively as men, and that negotiation is an important skill, particularly as it relates to
both starting salaries and the gender wage gap, is it realistic to assume that women could
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be taught to improve these skills? Even if the answer is “yes,” does a skills training
course focusing on improving individual negotiation competencies have a place in a
graduate school curriculum? One academician certainly believes that higher education
should be more receptive to the idea:
Over the past decade, there has been growing interest in the workplace as a
learning environment with particular focus on lifelong, self-directed and
negotiated learning programs…they challenge our fundamental conceptions and
assumptions about knowledge, how and where it arises and what we mean by
university education. Work-based learning can be especially challenging for
learners if we ask them to be co-designers of learning programs and directly
influence both the learning activities and the learning outcomes that will be
assessed. This represents a different level of participation and responsibility
compared with traditional (sic) encounters in formal education (Radcliffe, 2002,
p. 54).
Another researcher pointed out how a shift from “teaching about negotiation” to
“learning how to negotiate” could be accomplished:
Simply put, it is a shift in the focus of the classroom activities from teaching to
learning. Its implications are not, however, simple. In classrooms, they include the
following:
- Refocusing classroom practice upon gains in student understanding,
reasoning, application, and learning retention
- Clarification of student learning goals and their alignment with course
assessments
- Redesigning assessments to engage students in their own learning and to
give feedback to teachers on the efficacy of their work
(Seymour, 2001, p. 85).

We can also count Stevens et al. (1993) in the camp of those who concur that
negotiation skills can be taught. In one experiment, male and female MBA students were
placed in a simulated job interview and trained in the use of ten specific negotiation
techniques. At first, women negotiated significantly lower starting salaries than men. But
the authors observed that with additional coaching, women were able to improve their
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negotiating skills to the point where they then were able to achieve higher salaries than
the men.
In another study that focused on propensity to initiate negotiations when there is
no overt prescription to do so, while females initiated compensation negotiations at a
much lower rate than males, the gender gap could be eliminated simply by then
encouraging them to ask for more money (Small et al., 2004).
These experiments seem to lend support for the notion that if the appropriate
negotiation-related coursework were offered and taught properly, and female graduate
students enrolled in those classes, they could improve their negotiating skills. If so, it
seems plausible that they could in turn improve their ability to effectively assert their
economic self-interests, negotiate higher starting salaries, and potentially narrow or even
eliminate the gender wage gap.
But is remedying the gender wage gap that simple? If women lack the confidence
and/or skills that allow them to negotiate salaries commensurate with similarly qualified
men, would it be enough to simply offer additional coursework to help them acquire
those skills, or would this approach still be insufficient because women would be
reluctant to enroll in these classes? In short, presuming that women “don’t ask,” is it
possible to identify the reasons behind the equally important question of why they might
be reluctant to avail themselves of opportunities to learn how by enrolling in available
coursework?
Problem Statement
One of the most troubling labor market inequities is the recognition that women
working fulltime earn on average about twenty five percent less than men. Recent
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research seems to support the notion that women’s inability or unwillingness to negotiate
salaries contributes to this gap. That leads us to an important question: “If we know that
women are more reluctant to negotiate than men, can we identify those reasons why they
might be more reluctant to learn how?”
The answer has substantive public policy implications, and may provide a more
in-depth understanding of what causes the gender wage gap, whether skill building in
negotiation could help women narrow that gap, and whether or not women would take
advantage of opportunities to improve their negotiating skills if these were made
available.
Traditionally, our attempts to eliminate the gender wage gap have focused
primarily on removing structural impediments in the workplace such as enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws, rather than on individual factors such as negotiating efficacy.
The work of Babcock and others suggests that individual factors such as women’s
reluctance or inability to negotiate for higher starting salaries may be a significant but
overlooked part of the problem that is unaddressed by current policy initiatives.
Because a review of the literature shows that these important questions have never
before been asked and answered, this research proposes to open a previously unexplored
line of inquiry. More specifically, this study proposes and tests a hypothesized model that
attempts to explore in greater detail similarities and differences in how men and women
feel about negotiation, the impact that certain of these feelings may have on willingness
to study negotiation, and how these attitudes and beliefs interact to influence behavior.
It is hoped that by identifying those factors that hold men and women back from
taking advantage of opportunities to improve their negotiation skills can help inform
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interventions that encourage women in particular to become more comfortable with
negotiating, and point out some of the negative consequences that an inability or
unwillingness to ask can have, both on their earnings potential, as well as their personal
and professional growth.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
Gender Differences in Negotiated Salary Outcomes
Studies on gender differences in starting salaries are mixed, but suggest that men
are able to negotiate higher starting pay than do female candidates. In one study
illustrating the longitudinal effects of lower starting salaries, Gerhart (1990) reported that
as much as one-third of the differences in the average wages of working men and women
can be explained by differences in their starting salary.
A second study looked at the negotiating behaviors and starting salaries of two
hundred and five MBA graduates from Ivy League business schools during the 1987-88
and 1988-89 school years. They found that while twenty-one percent of both male and
female graduates negotiated their offers, and fifty-six percent received higher salaries as a
result (between $1,000 and $7,000, or 4.1% average higher starting salaries), female
graduates obtained lower monetary returns for their efforts (2.7% increase ($1,231) for
women versus a 4.3% salary increment ($1,973) for men (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991). So,
even when females negotiate their salaries at the same rates as their male classmates, they
are less effective when they do so, a finding that suggests that women’s negotiation skills,
relative to men’s, may be lacking.
King and Hisnon (1994) also supported the notion that gender could be predictive
of negotiating outcomes. In an exercise based on a hypothetical purchase of one company
by another, when paired with female opponents, males acting as either buyers or sellers
achieved a more favorable settlement amount. Neu et al. (1998) found similar results. In
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running males and females through a mock buy-sell negotiation, men routinely achieved
higher individual profits.
In a study referenced earlier (Babock et al., 2006), one hundred and seventeen
graduating seniors at Carnegie Mellon University were surveyed. Female graduates
negotiated starting salaries that averaged about 7% less than those negotiated by their
male classmates. A second part of the study produced similar results in a laboratory
setting. Male and female subjects were told they would be compensated between $3 and
$10 for playing a word game and after each had completed the assigned task, the
researchers approached them and said, “Here’s $3. Is $3 o.k.?” As compared to the
women, men were nine times more likely to reject this initial offer and ask (negotiate) for
more money. In another part of the study, several hundred people were surveyed over the
Internet. People were asked when was the most recent negotiations they had initiated or
attempted, and when they expected to negotiate next. Again, clear gender differences
unfavorable to women emerged. Men responded that their most recent negotiation
occurred two weeks ago, contrasted to the women’s four weeks; stated that their second
most recent negotiation occurred seven weeks ago, while the women responded twentyfour weeks; and said that they expected to next negotiate within the week, while the
women said within a month. The study concluded that men place themselves in
negotiation situations more often than do women, and were able to identify more of their
social interactions as potential negotiations.
In another study, Barron (2003) asked men and women what kind of salaries they
felt they were entitled to relative to other applicants for the same job opening.
Surprisingly, 70% of the men said they were entitled to a higher salary, while an equal
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percentage of the female candidates believed they were only entitled to an equal salary.
Revealing an attitude that suggests the role that willingness to negotiate may play in the
gender wage gap, only about one out of six of the women (17%), contrasted to more than
eight out of ten of the men (85%), believed that it was their responsibility to ensure that
they received the salary they thought they were worth.
Gerhart (1990) also supported this notion that negotiator effectiveness is an
additional supply side contribution to wage disparities between men and women. His
study concluded that when there are differences between male and female employees’
starting salaries, female salaries continue to lag behind men for years to come, even if the
women enjoy larger on-the-job salary increases later.
A meta-analysis of twenty-one studies supported the proposition that gender
differences favoring men in negotiated outcomes were stronger when the negotiation
aligned with masculine stereotypes, i.e., self-interested and competitive, and where
stereotypical differences between men and women were emphasized, e.g., a male
interviewer and a female candidate. The researchers agreed with the notion that men
obtained better negotiated outcomes than women, and concluded that gender accounted
for approximately 2% of the variance. Were that 2% to be carried over to salary
negotiations, the authors point out that even a difference of that relatively small
magnitude would compound over time:
Similarly, we argue that in salary and wage negotiations, even a small gender
difference in outcomes would be perpetuated through increases based on
percentage of pay. This effect could be magnified as women, in future
negotiations for pay and benefits, are less effective than men. Thus, a small effect
size in negotiation outcome could have a substantial impact on promoting genderbased wage differential in organizations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999, p. 670).
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However, the results of another study implied that pay expectations may also play
a part in how men and women negotiate their starting salaries. One researcher used a
variation of the ultimatum game to explore gender differences in pay expectations. In this
study, Player 1 received $10 and was asked to decide how much to share with Player 2.
Without being permitted direct communication, Player 2 got to decide whether or not to
accept the offer. If the offer was accepted, the money was divided as proposed. On the
other hand, if the offer was not accepted, neither player received any of the money. When
the player knew the gender of the player, both men and women (and especially women)
made lower offers to female players, and, on the receiving end, both men and women
insisted on a higher offer when the offer came from a woman. As a result, male players
ended up earning more than the women. In what appears to be a form of self-fulfilling
prophecy, the researcher concluded that “players seem to expect that women would be
satisfied with a smaller share” (emphasis in the original) (Solnick, 2001, p. 199).
These results seem to infer that both genders accept the notion that women will
accept lower pay than men, with this assumption playing out in lower salary offers along
the lines of what one researcher suggested as a mindset of, “She’s a woman so let’s offer
her less because she’ll take it” (Koretz, 2001).
In another study testing for differences in men and women’s negotiating behavior,
Eckel and Grossman (2001) found that males made slightly less generous proposals than
women, women were less generous to members of their own sex, and women were more
likely to accept an offer than a man. The authors cited similarities between the results of
their study, and Solnick’s work, supra. Specifically, just as that research found that offers
to women in the ultimatum game are less than those made to men regardless of the sex of
49

the proposer (only 43.7% of the “pie” offered to women, contrasted with 48.9% to the
men), Eckel and Grossman found smaller but analogous results, i.e., 37.2% and 38.2%
offered, respectively.
Bowles (2005) studied the starting salaries negotiated by five hundred and
twenty-five graduating MBA students. After controlling for previous work experience,
job preferences, geographic location of the job, job function, and the number of
applications submitted and offers received, in low ambiguity situations, i.e., where
candidates had relatively good information on what salaries were being paid in the
market, there was no significant differences in the salaries negotiated by the men and
women. However, in high ambiguity situations, i.e., where such knowledge of the market
was lacking, female graduates asked for or accepted salaries that were on average 10%
less than those of their male counterparts.
Factors Which May Contribute to Women’s Reluctance to Negotiate
One study of college graduates (O’Shea & Bush, 2002) found that the gender
difference in propensity to initiate negotiations may be due to differences in how people
identify the opportunity to negotiate. In this experiment, when applicants were reminded
that they could discuss the salary offer, forty-five percent negotiated. However, when that
reminder was not provided, only eight percent of the applicants tried to negotiate their
salary. Individuals in the two groups who declined to negotiate either perceived the salary
offer as non-negotiable (39%) or thought the salary offer fair (30%). It’s interesting to
note that in spite of the fact that more women than men negotiated their salary offers and
appeared to be more effective when doing so (men who negotiated raised their offers by
an average of $975, while women raised their offers by more than $1700), the average
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salary offer to men ended up over 8% higher than those offered to the women. Similar
results were found by Gerhart and Rynes (1991), i.e., while male and female MBA
students appeared to have the same propensity to negotiate, men who negotiated had
better outcomes.
On the question of why women are more reluctant to negotiate, some researchers
have proposed that the reasons can be lumped into two broad categories: factors unique to
the individual (personality traits, confidence, skill, education level, achievement
motivation, and personal values and interests), and factors outside of the individual’s
control, a.k.a. environmental factors (career choice, family roles, and gender
discrimination) (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Using Rubin and Brown’s two-part schema of
individual and environmental factors as a template to review the literature, they found
that the following factors appeared to emerge.
Category 1 - Individual factors.
From a review of the literature, it appeared that the following thirteen
characteristics, more common of women than men, served to inhibit women from
negotiating:
1. Women are less competitive
2 Women are more risk-averse
3. Women lack confidence
4. Women have less assertive verbal and nonverbal communication styles
5. Women exhibit depressed entitlement
6. Women exhibit the paradox of the contented female worker
7. Women exhibit modesty in achievement settings
8. Women see themselves as less powerful
9. Women have a different concept of what’s fair
10. Women exhibit inherent differences in how they approach conflict
11. Women have a heightened concern for relationships
12. Women’s lower expectations in turn lead to lower aspirations
13. Women have an external locus of control
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1. Women are less competitive.
Some studies have found that women don’t negotiate because it’s viewed as a
competitive endeavor, and men and women differ in their preference for competition
(Pruitt et al., 1980). Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) suggested that one of the reasons that
women remain underrepresented in executive and professional positions is their relative
disinterest in engaging in the competitive behavior that is often necessary to get ahead in
those jobs.
To contrast the competitive proclivities of men and women, they found that twice
as many men (73%) as women (35%) chose a competitive payment scheme, with women
much more likely to choose a guaranteed piece rate (non-competitive) payment scheme.
These results are consistent with those set out in the work of Babcock and Laschever
(2003) that women avoid negotiation if they can, perhaps due to traditional sex-role
stereotypes, and that men are expected to be competitive negotiators, and women
cooperative. Because cooperation creates an opportunity to be exploited by a competitive
opponent, a finding that women are less competitive may also support the notion that
women will in turn be less effective negotiators, at least when negotiating with a
competitive counterpart.
As regards the notion that women who act cooperatively may be more prone to
being taken advantage of, Rose (1995) points out that it’s actually more important that
people assume that women are more cooperative than it is whether or not they actually
are. If a woman feels it more important to be cooperative, she will accept a lesser
payback than a man in order to protect the relationship. But, if others assume that the
woman will be more cooperative, they will be less willing to invest in her. As a
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consequence, not only will cooperative female job candidates be more willing to accept
lower salary offers to make a relationship “happen,” but recruiters will offer them less
than they would to male candidates who are assumed to be less cooperative and more
expectant of a higher salary.
In one meta-analysis exploring the relationship between gender and negotiating
behavior, Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer (1998) found that women behaved less
competitively than men in “explicit bargaining” situations. The researchers point out that
conflict handling behavior (and it’s important to note that negotiation is but one conflict
resolution technique) is best understood by an individual’s orientation on two
dimensions: assertiveness and cooperativeness (Ruble & Thomas, 1976). This “dual
concerns model” (Pruitt, 1983) is illustrated in Figure 28:

Figure 28. Dual concerns model.
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As the model shows, when an individual is highly assertive but uncooperative,
they are said to be a competitive negotiator, a style which exaggerates power and
emphasizes a motivation to win at the other party’s expense. This may help us understand
whether cooperation (a characteristically female orientation), or competition (a
characteristically male orientation), is the more effective negotiating technique. The
model would seem to imply that while cooperation may ensure that the needs of the other
party are met, acting unassertive may leave a party vulnerable to exploitation by a
competitive negotiator whose objective is to maximize his/her own advantage.
In fact, a study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) considers relative gender
differences in competitiveness as one plausible explanation for why the gender wage gap
exits. They suggest that men act more competitive in the short term, so when the
competitiveness of the environment increases, the performance of men improves relative
to that of women. Studying boys and girls ages nine and ten in a physical education class,
they had the children compete against each other in a race. They discovered that boys
improved their times both in mixed and homogenous groups, but improved more when
running against girls. However, the incentive to run faster was particularly weak when
girls raced other girls, resulting in even slower times than when the girls ran alone.
Because the children did not know they were being observed, nor was there any reward
for their performance beyond the competition itself, it appears that males are more
competitive than females even when intrinsic motivation is the only reward. The study
also supported the assumption that gender differences in competitiveness due to
socialization begins to emerge at a very young age (at least by second or third grade). So,
perhaps it should not be a surprise that Watson and Kasten’s (1989) research found that
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women were less effective negotiators than men in situations where negotiation is viewed
as a competitive, win-lose game, as opposed to being framed as an exercise in joint
problem-solving.
Further, when men negotiate, they try to maximize their gain over their
negotiating counterpart, while women are more likely to try and preserve the relationship
(Berryman-Fink & Brunner, 1987). This difference also plays out in men searching for
“equitable” negotiated outcomes (which, from a man’s perspective, is his gain at the
other party’s expense), as compared to women who search for “equal” (in their view,
“fair” to both parties) exchanges (Eagly, 1987).
Another attribute of a competitive approach to negotiating is the use of deceptive
tactics to maximize advantage. In that regard, empirical evidence suggests that women
are more trusting than men (Rubin, 1975), less comfortable engaging in underhanded
tactics (Tedeschi et al., 1969), and less effective if they do try to be deceptive them
(Benton, 1969). So, to the extent that these tactics maximize the outcome to a competitive
negotiator’s advantage (such as a job offer, perhaps), women would be at a disadvantage.
In another meta-analysis, researchers provided three rationales for why women
can be expected to be more cooperative than men in conflictual situations. First, women
avoid conflict because it is seen as potentially threatening to relationships, and they tend
to accommodate others in order to prevent harm to that relationship. Men, on the other
hand, view relationships as hierarchies and dominance, and so don’t shy away from
conflict because it helps then determine their status in the social hierarchy.
Second is the impact of gender-role socialization and stereotypes. Some studies
suggest that women learn to become affiliative, and men competitive, because these
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behaviors are considered normative for each sex (Walters et al., 1998); and, citing Snyder
and Tanke (1977), simply being aware of these gender stereotypes creates expectations
that lead to behavior consistent with those expectations, a.k.a. the “Pygmalion effect.”
Third, power, and not gender, is most predictive of cooperativeness in a
negotiation. As a result, behaviors that are most characteristic of women, e.g.,
agreeableness, submissiveness, and subordination, are behaviors consistent with their
perceived low status while, conversely, the competitive behaviors associated with males
are a function of their perceived higher power/status. This approach finds support in the
research of Watson (1994b) who concluded that power, rather than gender, is a better
predictor of negotiation behaviors and outcomes. In another study, she found that women
were more nervous and uncomfortable before negotiating, were less satisfied with their
negotiating behavior and outcomes, and perceived themselves as less powerful than the
party with whom they were negotiating (Watson, 1994a).
In a similar vein, Van Kleef et al. (2004) found that when confronted with an
“angry” negotiating opponent, people made lower demands and larger concessions.
However, “angry” opponents are viewed less favorably, which suggests that anger can, in
turn, harm interpersonal relationships. These implications suggest a dilemma for women:
while a woman who gets “angry” may induce a recruiter to offer a higher starting salary,
to do so could threaten the relationship, which would be counter to most women’s
instincts to preserve that relationship.
Renard (1992) found that when paired with a competitive salary negotiator, rather
than reacting in kind, women tended to ask more questions. So, instead of making the
positional and persuasive statements that would allow them to make the case for a higher
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salary, they engage in behavior that placed them at a relative disadvantage. This finding
is consistent with the dual-concerns model that suggests that when faced with a
competitive negotiator, one needs to either attempt to make the negotiation more
collaborative, or else become more competitive in order to not be taken advantage of. As
the author concluded, “Thus, to the extent that job offer situations are, in fact,
distributive, women would be placed as a disadvantage in negotiating and might be
expected to receive a lower salary than males” (Renard, 1992, p. 98).
2. Women are more risk-averse.
Researchers have proposed that differences in propensity for risk-taking is another
factor that may help explain the gender wage gap (Levin, Snyder, & Chapman, 1988).
While they differ on what is meant by “risk-taking,” they generally focus on goals,
values, and outcomes, and potentially negative consequences (MacCrimon & Wehrung,
1986). Craver and Barnes (1999) analyzed data from eleven years of enrollment statistics
on students who took a negotiation elective in law school. The researchers found that
while female students performed just as well as male students in a highly competitive
classroom environment, female students in eight out of eleven classes avoided the
potential risk of a bad grade by electing to take the class for no credit. They concluded
that female law students had a lower tolerance for risk than their male classmates, and in
the context of negotiating a starting salary, it would seem that the concept of risk-taking
takes on added significance, particularly if the job candidate is unemployed and/or
carrying school loan obligations.
Arch (1993) postulates that men and women differ in their responses to the social
risks inherent in certain situations that arise at work. Men perceive conflict situations as
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challenging, while women view them as threatening. Thus, a woman’s tendency to avoid
risk may limit her opportunity for achievement. Arch attributes women’s aversion to
achievement situations (salary negotiations?), where there is a risk of negative social
consequences, to a variety of factors, including a disinterest in mastery or achievement
(higher salary?). In addition, she found that women’s lack of confidence, lack of
motivation to participate, and compromised performance in perceived risk situations, was
independent of what they thought of themselves in general, or their prior experiences and
successes. In other words, her research suggested that without explicit positive feedback,
women are particularly vulnerable to loss of confidence and self-esteem in public
achievement situations because of the perceived potential social risks.
We could assume, then, that to the extent that women view salary negotiations as
presenting risk, they will perform poorly relative to men, and will avoid the opportunity
to negotiate altogether even if they feel good about themselves, are confident in their
abilities, and have had prior successful salary negotiations.
Vesterlund (1997) also believes that gender differences in risk-aversion can help
explain the wage gap. She proposes a model that more risk-averse job candidates receive
lower wages than equally productive but less risk-averse candidates, are unemployed
shorter lengths of time (because they’re willing to accept lower paying jobs), and are less
likely to participate in the labor market (stop searching for work sooner). She surmises
that this occurs for two reasons: the more risk-averse have both lesser bargaining power
and a lower reservation (walk-away) wage.
In a review of the literature on gender differences in preferences, Croson and
Gneezy (2005) found that in most tasks and most populations men are more likely to take
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risks than women (Hudgens & Fatkin, 2001; Levin et al., 1988). (See also the finding that
women are considered more conservative (less risky) investors (Wang, 1994), and Eckel
and Grossman (2002a) suggesting that women are expected to be more risk-averse by
both men and other women. Similarly, Powell and Ansic (1997) confirmed that females
are less risk tolerant than men regardless of familiarity, framing, costs or ambiguity.
Analyzing one hundred and fifty studies over a thirty-year period involving more
than one hundred thousand subjects, Byrnes et al. (1999) found that in fourteen out of
sixteen tasks females were more risk-averse than men; Arch (1993), who analyzed fifty
studies on risk-aversion, reached the similar conclusion that men are more risk tolerant.
Gysler et al. (2002) discovered that gender plays a significant role in predicting
choices when individuals are confronted with uncertainty. In situations where people are
unsure of themselves or how to act (perhaps where an individual is negotiating salary for
the first time?), men are more risk-prone and women more risk-averse. Other research not
only supports the notion that women are more risk-averse, but in ways that have
implications for salary negotiations (see also Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2002).
Others have found that women are more risk-averse towards gambles (Levin et
al., 1988), and have a lower willingness to accept financial risk (Barksy et al., 1997).
Eckel and Grossman (2002) concluded that women were more than four times as likely as
men to choose a risk-free gamble, and only a third as likely to choose the highest-risk
gamble. The researchers pointed out some of the implications of their findings:
Finally, in employment negotiations, the sex of the two parties may influence both
the offers made and the aggressiveness with which each party bargains. If women
are perceived as more risk averse or less willing to risk the breakdown of
negotiation, then women may receive less generous initial offers and face more
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aggressive bargaining, leading to lower negotiated wages (Eckel & Grossman,
2002, p. 292).

In support of the notion that risk-aversion may play a role in the glass ceiling,
Johnson and Powell (1994) contend that women’s ability to be promoted is compromised
because they are perceived as less likely to make risky decisions, a conclusion consistent
with Chauvin and Ash’s (1994) finding that the female CEO’s preference for fixed
salaries over performance-based compensation led to lower earnings.
3. Women lack confidence.
Another concept closely associated with risk-aversion is lack of confidence. In
social cognitive theory, it’s generally accepted that people choose to engage in those
tasks for which they feel efficacious, but avoid tasks for which they do not (Bandura,
1997). So, to the degree that female graduate students feel less confident in their
negotiating abilities in particular, and more uncomfortable with negotiating in general,
we would expect them to be less willing than their male classmates to enroll in
negotiation coursework where any deficiencies in their skills would be subject to being
exposed in front of classmates.
In a 2010 study by Prudential (Prudential Research Study, 2010), women’s
attitudes, behaviors, financial knowledge, goals, and confidence surrounding financial
matters were explored. In general, women reported not only being significantly
concerned about their financial well-being, but felt such a general lack of confidence
about money matters that eighty-two percent admitted that they needed assistance in
making financial decisions.
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Figure 29. Percent of women who feel they are prepared to make financial decisions.
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/Womens_Study_Final.pdf.

Of those admitting the need for outside assistance, seventy-five percent identified
their spouse/partner as the resource they would most likely turn to:
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Figure 30. Who would women turn to for financial advice?
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/Womens_Study_Final.pdf.

Prudential re-ran the study for 2012-2013, and concluded that not only did women
continue to express a lack of confidence, but:
Women’s confidence gap has deepened. Women are far less confident that they
will meet their financial goals and feel less prepared to make wise financial
decisions. They are twice as likely as men to describe themselves as financial
‘beginners’ (15% of women vs. 7% of men) (Financial Experience & Behaviors
among Women, 2012).

Overall, in that same study, women expressed much less confidence in their
knowledge of money matters than did men:
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Figure 31. Females less confident than males regarding financial matters.
Note: Retrieved from http://news.prudential.com/images/20026/PruWomenStudy.pdf.

Providing insight into the reasons for their lack of confidence, only about twothirds of the women believed that they were well prepared to handle their finances:

Figure 32. Reasons for women’s lack of confidence.
Note: Retrieved from http://news.prudential.com/images/20026/PruWomenStudy.pdf.

Rather, they were willing to let their spouse perform the role of managing the
finances:
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Figure 33. Men take control.
Note: From http://news.prudential.com/images/20026/PruWomenStudy.pdf.

Other studies show that women lack confidence in other areas as well. Accenture
surveyed 3,600 professionals working in medium to large organizations in eighteen
countries (Accenture, 2009). Eighty-six percent of the men reported confidence in their
negotiation skills, contrasted to only sixty-five percent of the women. In another study of
students completing their first year of law school, forty-one percent of female students
expressed agreement with the statement that they had lower self-esteem than when they
started school, compared to only sixteen and a half percent of male students, and this was
so even though both sexes entered law school with similar credentials (Torrey &
Spiliopoulos, 1998).
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In a survey of 911 U.S. households with annual incomes over $75,000, responses
indicated that fewer women than men even participated in the survey (perhaps, the study
said, evidencing a lack of confidence), women prefer less risk than men when it comes to
money matters, women are less confident than men about their financial futures and
about their present financial situations, and women are more dependent on their spouses
for financial security (FINRA Foundation, 2006).
Reported gender differences in confidence appear fairly consistent. Not only do
women report less confidence in math and sciences (Hornig, 1987; Hyde et al., 1990), but
this uncertainty has been observed as early as the sixth grade (Fennema & Sherman,
1978), and seems to increase with age (Hyde et al., 1990).
Even successful, but under-confident, professional women may feel the need to
underestimate their own abilities relative to others, something that Clance and O’Toole
have termed the “imposter phenomenon” (1988), wherein women sometimes feel as if
they really don’t deserve their success (luck), or their lack of ability has not yet been
discovered.
Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar (1994) propose that men are overconfident even
when they are incorrect, a tendency that’s been termed the “male answer syndrome”
(Campbell, 1992). If we assume that this type of male behavior is considered normative,
it’s possible that our assumption that women are under confident is as much a function of
comparing them to overconfident, but wrong, males, as it is anything else. See also
Instone and Bunker (1983) and their conclusion that women’s lack of self-confidence
affects how they attempt to influence subordinates. O’Connor and Arnold (2006) identify
yet another factor that might impact a women’s confidence: previous negotiation
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experience. That is, to the extent that women have a history of prior suboptimal
negotiations, it may be that they will not only suffer diminished confidence in a
subsequent salary negotiation, but in a sort of unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecy, expect
to achieve suboptimal outcomes as well.
4. Women have less assertive verbal and nonverbal communication styles.
Negotiation is a social process where a powerful communication style may be
most effective. Some studies have concluded that during interpersonal interactions (such
as a negotiation), men are not only more likely to use language to persuade others, but be
more effective than women in doing so (Burgoon et al., 1983).
A study by Holzinger (1995) confirmed certain differences in communication
styles when men and women negotiate. Women took more time, used more words, made
fewer definite references, and had a lower proportion of definite references to total words
than men. Since a job candidate’s communication style can signal a lack of confidence,
credibility, and competence, the research suggests that it would not be a stretch to see
how the average women’s less assertive communication style could translate into lower
salary offers than similarly qualified, but more confident and assertive, male candidates.
Other researchers (Carli, 1990) have found that while female speakers were
perceived to be more likeable when appearing tentative while speaking to a male
audience, they were simultaneously viewed to be less competent and knowledgeable. A
later study (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995) concluded that although likeableness and
competence were both predictive of influence for men and women, when women
presented to a male audience, likeableness was a more important determinant of their
influence than competence, while women exhibiting a task style were less influential and
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likeable than men exhibiting the same style. The potential impact on salary negotiations
would then appear to be this: competent female candidates who communicate in ways
that make a male interviewer like them less will also be perceived as less competent (so,
less worthy of a higher salary) than women who may actually be less competent but more
likeable. Therefore, while women may be in a better position to be extended a salary
offer in the first place, the offer will be lower.
In a related vein, upward influence, or those tactics people use to obtain a
personal benefit from someone of higher authority in an organization, have been shown
to be central to a person’s effectiveness in a variety of organizational contexts, including
salary attainment. While most studies focus on the intra-organizational use of influence
tactics by subordinates, in the context of the gender wage gap, perhaps a case could be
made that this finding may be analogous to a job candidate (subordinate) trying to
influence a recruiter (superior).
So, if women present themselves in ways that are viewed as less competent and
confident, their upward influence may be compromised and create an additional
impediment to promotion into executive positions and elevation to service on boards of
directors.
Another study found that the upward influence strategies of men and women are
perceived and evaluated differently by decision-makers in the organization (Dreher et al.,
1989). Appealing to rationality (e.g., a tactic using logic in support of a request) was
associated with higher salaries among women but not men, while the use of an exchange
tactic (e.g., reminding a superior of past favors, or offer to make personal sacrifices to
achieve an objective) led to higher salaries for men but not women. In other words, since
67

by definition negotiation involves the mutual exchange of something perceived to be of
value, unfortunately women who attempt to use an exchange tactic to receive a higher
salary may end up engendering resistance (unlike men using the same tactic).
Studies have also shown that men have access to and make use of a wider variety
of negotiation strategies, including both those viewed as both male-oriented (arguing,
yelling, convincing, being direct), and female-oriented (pleading, avoiding, suggesting,
hinting), while women are more likely to use female-oriented strategies exclusively
(Gruber & White, 1986). To the extent that the use of a wider array of negotiating
strategies conveys an advantage, women who employ a single strategy would find
themselves at a disadvantage when attempting to convince that they are worthy of a
higher salary.
It appears that language can influence in other ways as well. Small et al. (2004)
explain that for a negotiation to transpire, the individual has to recognize that the
situation is amenable to change. In summarizing past research, they point out that males
appear more likely than women to recognize that situations are negotiable. However,
while men were more likely to initiate negotiations, women had to be prompted to “ask,”
rather “negotiate,” for more money in order to increase their willingness to initiate
negotiations. While it was unclear why using different terminology would make such a
difference, they posited that perhaps it was due to the negative connotation that the word
“negotiation” has for many women.
5. Women exhibit “depressed entitlement.”
Others suggest that women “don’t ask” because they have a sense of “depressed
entitlement.” That is, in the absence of clear-cut standards of comparison, women more
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so than men tend to devalue the value of their contributions (Berkowitz et al., 1987, p.
106). This line of thought posits that women, as members of an oppressed group,
internalize aspects of their oppression and come to believe in the legitimacy of their
inferiority. See also Beyer (1990), who found that women hold low expectations on
masculine tasks, and assume overly critical self-evaluations as a result, and Mura (1987),
who suggested that women have lower expectations of success in many areas of
achievement, including negotiation.
Other research appears to support this notion. For instance, even when current
career information was made available, female college students expected lower salaries
than male students (Martin, 1989), a difference that one researcher found was evident in
students as early as the first grade (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979).
Desmarais and Curtis (1997) found that even when previous earnings were
controlled, men were inclined to pay themselves more for an assigned task, and Kaman
and Hartel (1994) found that men held not only a higher comfort level with negotiation,
but a higher level of expected pay.
Other studies (Major & Konar, 1984) suggest that in the absence of external
standards of comparison, individuals make pay judgments based on internal standards of
what they believe to be “fair.” Because men pay themselves more than women when
external standards are lacking, they suggested that men’s internal standards of fairness
must therefore be higher than that of women. In support of this conclusion, one study of
female elementary, middle school, and high school students found that female students
paid themselves less than male students at all four grade levels studied (first, fourth,
seventh, and tenth grade) (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979).
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Barron (2003) explored how a negotiator’s beliefs affected negotiating behavior.
She found not only that the men’s initial salary requests were much higher than the
women’s, but that initial demands were significantly correlated with final outcomes. In
addition, eighty-five percent of the men said that they knew their worth, while an almost
mirror opposite eighty-three percent of the women admitted they were unsure. Similarly,
seventy percent of the men believed that they were entitled to more than other candidates
while the same percent of women believed that they were entitled to the same. Finally,
two-thirds of the men were confident of proving their worth before being hired,
contrasted with four-fifths of the women who were convinced that they could prove their
worth after they were hired.
6. Women exhibit the “paradox of the contented female worker.”
Other research seems to imply that women’s sense of depressed entitlement may
be closely related to the “paradox of the contented female worker” (Crosby, 1982). This
theory suggests that in spite of lower earnings women tend to be more satisfied (i.e., more
contented) with their salaries than men (Jost, 1997), and to the extent that they’re more
satisfied, they will perceive less need to ask (negotiate) for more. See also Major and
Konar’s (1984) five-part model to help explain the “paradox.”
A study of workers in the U.S. and Great Britain found that even though women
knew they were being paid less than men, they still expressed more satisfaction with their
jobs (Clark & Oswald, 1996). Buchanan (2002) also found that own-gender referents
appeared to play an important role in the gender paradox, i.e., women who used other
women (rather than men) as referents (as approximately 70% did in his study) reported
being more satisfied with their salaries.
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Other research has found that, while men’s job satisfaction increases with
additional earnings, the same does not hold true for women (Bender et al., 2005),
consistent with other research showing that not only are women more satisfied with their
salaries than men, but they hold lower expectations of salary increases going forward
(Keaveny & Inderrieden, 2000). See also Bylsma and Major (1994) for the finding that
higher contentment in women is more a function of same-sex rather than cross-sex
comparisons, and so women are more prone to disregard information about men’s higher
earnings, even when if this information is readily available. Similarly, other research
revealed that even when current salary data is provided (both average salary and range of
salary), in a self-fulfilling prophecy female students expected to earn less money than
their male counterparts (Martin, 1989).
Major and Konar (1984) identified that among recent college graduates, males
expected career entry salaries that were more than sixteen percent higher than females,
and during projected peak earning years this differential rose to forty-six percent. (See
similar differences in expectations in SEER, 2009). Also, women in the study held
incorrect assumptions about what others were earning, i.e., they thought others in their
field earned less than the men assumed others earned, and these differences in
assumptions not only accounted for about half of the gender differences in expected entry
level pay, but constituted the largest single factor in the gender differences in projected
peak earnings.
7. Women exhibit modesty in achievement settings.
In what has been termed “female modesty,” in achievement settings women tend
to present themselves more modestly than do men, underestimate their abilities and
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accomplishments to a greater degree, and have more negative expectations regarding
their performance (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). Deaux and Farris (1977) found that
females are more prone to use luck rather than ability to explain their performance, and
this tendency occurs most frequently in response to failure, and on tasks that are
perceived as “masculine.”
In the context of salary negotiations, at a time when a job applicant is competing
with other candidates and trying to sell his/her services to a prospective employer,
underselling one’s achievements or salary expectations can have predictably negative
consequences, both for securing the offer as well as for receiving a maximum salary. See
Heatherington et al. (1993) for the finding that this behavior tended to be expressed in
public situations, suggesting that women’s relational concerns, i.e., what others thought
of them, and the fear of the social consequences, were the primary drivers of their
behavior.
8. Women see themselves as less powerful.
It seems that the concept of power, or an individual’s capacity to influence
another, may also inhibit women from negotiating. Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson
(2003) found that power has a strong influence on behavior, and individuals who believe
that they hold less power, as the research implies that women tend to do, interact with
people of greater power (recruiters?) in predictable ways. Specifically, those lacking
power tend to interpret ambiguous events (salary negotiations?) as threatening which, in
turn, leads to compromised cognitive performance, a tendency to view oneself through
the lens of the person with whom they’re negotiating (recruiter?), and an increase in
nonverbal behavior that signals increased passivity and withdrawal. To the extent that
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these feelings lead women to undersell their achievements and potential, and downplay
their expectations and contributions going forward, this constellation of behaviors could
arguably lend themselves to sub-optimal salary offers.
9. Women have a different concept of what’s “fair.”
Another line of inquiry suggests that while men and women may expect to
negotiate a “fair” salary, they have different understandings of what constitutes “fair.”
So, while a salary offer of $50,000 may be insulting to a man, it may appear perfectly
acceptable (fair) to a woman. Thus, the man may feel the need to counter the offer, while
the woman would not.
Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) discovered that women are less selfish than
men, and are therefore significantly more inclined to want to equalize payoffs, as
opposed to men who are more inclined to maximize payoffs. Also, men tend to expect to
be rewarded for merit, as opposed to women who are inclined to search out a fair
outcome. Perhaps, then, these results imply that women don’t ask because they simply do
not identify the need to do so.
Burton et al. (1991) looked at whether gender differences in what is believed to be
ethical leads to differences in the negotiating behavior of male and female attorneys.
They found that men and women have distinctly different moral orientations, with
women exhibiting an ethic of “care,” and men an ethic of “justice.” As a consequence,
men are comfortable resolving ethical conflicts using legal abstractions, while women
rely on empathy with the needs of the other party, along with a heightened awareness of
the relationship. Women’s ethic of care is evidenced by self-sacrifice, a wish not to harm
others, self-doubt, difficulty with competition and achievement, and discomfort with
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success. Conversely, a man’s ethic of justice subordinates relationships to rules,
emphasizes logic and linear thinking, and holds to a narrow view of success. To the
extent that this justice-care ethical dichotomy accurately captures gender-based
differences, one can foresee practical implications for salary negotiations. Predictably,
women would be less comfortable than men engaging in the sorts of morally ambiguous
behavior often employed to maximize negotiated outcomes, such as puffery
(exaggeration of accomplishments or experience), bluffing (alleging the existence of
other, phantom offers), and self-rationalization (for the use of questionable tactics).
Consistent with these findings, in a study of motivation and gender, Calhoun and
Smith (1999) concluded that women negotiators concede quickly and obtain poorer
outcomes unless they can see a reason to resist concession, a pattern that appeared to
support their hypothesis that women enter negotiations with a heightened concern for
meeting the other party’s needs.
10. Women exhibit inherent differences in how they approach conflict.
Since negotiation is simply one technique used to resolve conflict, it has been
proposed that gender differences in how conflict is viewed can help explain women’s
reluctance to negotiate. That is, because negotiation is a process whereby individuals
attempt to resolve differences, and differences are by definition a form of conflict, how a
woman views conflict predictably influences how she views negotiation.
One study of preschool students found gender differences in how conflict is
resolved emerging in children as early as four and five years of age. Specifically, boys
used more interpersonal negotiation strategies, were four times more likely than girls to
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express raw will without consideration of the other’s feelings, and spent more time in
situations of disequilibrium and tension (Thomason, 1993).
A second study focusing on children between the ages of five and nine found that
girls focused on interpersonal dynamics and relationships, while boys on the contrary
tended to focus on rules and fairness (Carlsson-Paige, 1992). Similarly, other researchers
have found that school-age boys had twice as many conflicts as girls, and were more
likely to be involved in object-oriented conflict, and to argue in overt, self-serving ways.
Girls, on the other hand, were found more likely to be people oriented, covert, and
mutually serving and mitigating (Lu, 1997).
In an attempt to discern gender differences in a low-conflict situation using a
hypothetical negotiation for the purchase of playground equipment, Halpern and Parks
(1996) identified a number of discernible gender differences, all of which could arguably
be extended to salary negotiations. During the mock negotiation they found that males
mentioned monetary concerns earlier (only 4.5 minutes into the conversation vs. 11
minutes for females), and discussed these concerns longer (25.1 minutes) than females
(12.5 minutes). Further, none of the men expressed concern for how the negotiation
would affect their negotiating counterpart, in contrast to half of the women. It should be
noted that the presumption that women are more conciliatory and less comfortable with
conflict in negotiations is not universally shared, however (see Duane, 1989).
11. Women have a heightened concern for relationships.
Another study attempted to answer the question of what people value when they
negotiate (Curhan et al., 2006). The researchers found that subjective factors were just as
important to negotiators as objective metrics (in fact, half of all participants did not even
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identify tangible outcomes as important), but subjective values were better predictors of a
negotiator’s future behavior than was objective performance. These subjective values
included feelings about outcomes (satisfaction and distributional fairness), self (saving
face and living up to one’s standards), the negotiation process itself (fairness and voice),
and the relationship (trust and a good foundation for going forward).
Speaking to studies which support the notion that people tend to be more reluctant
to negotiate with their friends, Kurtzberg and Medvec (1999) point out that negotiating
with people that we know takes on emotional undertones that hold the potential to
damage the relationship. While we all have “scripts” that inform us which behaviors are
acceptable and unacceptable in social situations, when negotiating with someone with
whom we have a relationship, scripts of fairness and concern with the other’s needs
conflict with scripts to claim as much as we can. In support of the importance of personal
relationships on dyadic negotiations, they assert that relationships, rather than the
standard utility or preference to achieve more rather than less, is actually descriptive of
most people’s actual preferences (Valley et al., 1994). So, if women hold greater concern
for relationships, during salary negotiations female job candidates could be assumed to be
more reluctant to counter an offer from a recruiter they have just gotten to know for fear
that person will be offended that her behavior is violating the “friendship script.”
12. Women’s lower expectations in turn lead to lower aspirations.
In one study of 5,450 MBA students from forty-three universities (Universum,
n.d.), female graduates expected to receive a lower starting salary than the male students.
While female students expected to earn $89,599 upon graduation, male students
expected to earn $97,519, a difference of $7,900, or almost 9% (a differential that is more
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or less consistent with the 7.6% in Babcock and Laschever’s study referenced earlier
(2003)). A study involving college students may suggest why: thirty-one percent of the
men but only twenty-two percent of the women said salary was the most important factor
in choosing a job offer; sixty-four percent of the men reported having a reservation
(walk-away) salary standard, compared to only fifty-six percent of the women; and
eighty-one percent of the men felt they had an accurate idea of job salaries for similar
positions, contrasted with just seventy-six percent of the women (Tromski & Subich,
1990).
Another study concluded that lower pay expectations affect women on a variety
of levels (Major et al., 1984). First, a woman who expects and/or asks for less pay may
appear to be less capable or qualified than a male who asks for more. Secondly, an
assumption that a woman possesses lesser qualifications may translate into lower initial
salary offers, and then on to poorer evaluations leading to lower pay raises down the
road. Lastly, prospective employers may offer female candidates a lower salary believing
that they will be more satisfied with less money than similarly qualified male candidates.
But perhaps these findings on lower expectations are important for another
reason, given that other research indicates a link between pre-negotiation aspirations and
final outcomes (Pruitt, 1981), with higher expectations generally leading to more
favorable outcomes (Wanous, 1980). Similarly, White and Neale (1994) also found that
reservation and asking prices strongly influence outcomes. As a consequence, it can be
expected that women who have lower aspirations will tend to receive lower offers.
A study by Major et al. (1984) also confirms that pay expectations have a
significant impact on salary outcomes. As a general rule, candidates who ask for more
77

receive more; however, the magnitude of this expectancy effect differed depending on the
applicant’s gender. Female candidates whose pay expectations were mid-range for the job
received higher offers than did men with similar expectations, while women with extreme
expectations relative to the rate range (either high or low) fared worse than did men with
similar expectations. On the other hand, men and women’s initial salary demands had
minimal effect on their chances of being offered the position.
In exploring why men receive higher starting salaries than women of comparable
credentials, Kaman and Hartel (1994) focused on two factors: negotiation strategies and
pay expectations. They found that not only were men more likely to use “active
negotiation strategies” (i.e., asking for the highest salary possible, asking for more than
expected, and rejecting the first offer) and less likely to use “self-promotion and
preparation strategies” (i.e., emphasizing education and the willingness to work hard, and
emphasizing a willingness to do different things), but men also had higher expectations
evidenced by higher target and walk-away points.
Various explanations for the higher pay expectations of men have been suggested
including differences in pay history (Greenberger & Steinberg, 1983), women’s tendency
to undervalue their worth, and the inclination of women to use same-sex comparisons
(McFarlin et al., 1989). Riley (2001) identified an additional factor that may affect
women during salary negotiations: because the degree of uncertainty regarding the
appropriate bargaining range disproportionately concerns women, in highly ambiguous
negotiating situations like salary negotiations females’ less optimistic target prices and
initial offers result in lower payoffs.
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Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn (2004) found that a shift in the representation role
of the female negotiators (i.e., representing themselves [self-promotion] as opposed to
representing others [advocacy]), also had a significant effect on outcomes, particularly
where women lacked clear guidelines for evaluating what constituted a good offer.
Specifically, women serving as advocates for others reported significantly more
optimistic target prices (fourteen percent higher) and intended initial offers (twenty-two
percent higher) than did females representing themselves. Their findings were consistent
with other research that gender differences in salary tend to be lower in more regulated
industries and where information about appropriate salary levels is more readily
available, and consistent with studies that report that while self-representing males
reported higher target wages and initial offers than women, the gender differential
disappeared when men and women were acting in an agency capacity (Riley, 2001).
A study of six hundred and seventy-six accounting majors (Lathan et al., 1987)
not only identified significant gender differences in expected future salaries, but found
that those differences increased the longer men and women progressed in their careers.
However, Claussen-Shulz (2003) suggested that strategy, as well as expectations, may
factor in as well. Not only were negotiated outcomes significantly correlated to the
magnitude of the first offer, but individuals who expressed a high rate of success to a
superior or client (high expressed commitment) before entering into negotiations were
more likely to make a higher opening offer. Also, a high expressed commitment seemed
to provide some protection against the anchoring effects of an opponent’s extreme
opening offer. See also Blau and Ferber (1991).
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A more recent study revealed that not much has changed given that women
continue to have lower salary expectations. A 2008 survey of seven hundred and fiftytwo graduating undergraduate business majors found that fifty-one percent of the female
graduates expect to earn $30,000 or less in the upcoming year, contrasted with only
thirty-five percent of male graduates. Further, twice as many male graduates expected to
earn more than $50,000 in their first job (twenty-four percent of the male graduates vs.
twelve percent of the female graduates). Salary expectations going forward showed an
even greater gender divide. Only thirty-eight percent of the females compared to fiftynine percent of the males expected to be earning over $50,000 three years postgraduation. And, gender differences in expected salaries persisted in the most recent
survey. While income expectations for college graduates were lower in 2011 than 2010,
no doubt due to the lingering effects of the great recession, both for immediate earnings
as well as three years post-graduation men continued to anticipate higher earnings both
now and in the future than women. For example, thirty percent of males but only eleven
percent of females anticipated earning more than $50,000 in their first year of
employment. Three years out differences in earnings expectations only increased with
sixty-three percent of males and thirty-five percent of females expecting to be earning
more than $50,000 (Wilf, 2011).
One explanation for the lower earnings aspirations of women, i.e., lack of
confidence, is suggested by Farber and Rickenberg (1999). In their study, even when
women performed as well as men in a mock negotiation, they expressed less confidence
in their performance. Other studies have shed additional light on the reasons behind
women’s lower aspirations. Building on the earlier research of Bandura and his
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colleagues recognizing the importance of goal setting to subsequent performance,
(Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Bandura & Simon, 1977), Locke et al. (1984) suggested the
following sequence of events. Self-efficacy (defined as how well one believes he/she can
deal with a prospective situation, and largely predicated on past performance) has a direct
effect on goal setting, and goal setting is an important predictor of future performance.
Ipso facto, if a woman hasn’t negotiated well in the past, this may cause her to question
her negotiating competency in later salary negotiations, leading her to lower her
expectations and set more modest goals. As a consequence, this may encourage her to
moderate her salary expectations, and discourage her from countering a low salary offer.
Others have proposed that women’s lower salary aspirations are attributable to the
fact that they are less greedy or selfish than men (Eckel & Grossman, 1998). Oliver,
Balakrishnan, and Barry (1994) found that when one has high expectations in a
negotiation, it decreases feelings of satisfaction with the outcome, and it should be noted
that their desire to negotiate with that same person again is a function of satisfaction.
Perhaps, then, women lower their pre-negotiation expectations in order to minimize the
risk of being disappointed, and to serve as a kind of defense mechanism to steel
themselves for negotiations with that person later, particularly if they expect to be hired
and have to work with them on a regular basis.
13. Women have an external locus of control.
Another explanation for why women are reluctant to negotiate for more money
may be attributable to differences in how much control they believe they exert over the
outside world. The concept of “locus of control” (Rotter, 1966) refers to the degree to
which individuals attribute what happens to them as a function of their behavior and
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personal characteristics (an internal locus of control), or as a function of some external
factors such as fate, chance, luck, or powerful others (an external locus of control). Other
researchers have found an association between an external locus of control and
diminished achievement. Lefcourt (1983) for instance suggested that,
…(P)rolonged achievement effort will occur only among individuals who believe
they can, through their own efforts, accomplish desired goals. Individuals must
entertain the hope that their efforts can be effective before they can make the
sacrifices that are prerequisites for achievement (p. 81).
Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars (1997) confirmed that women score higher on
external locus of control than men (see also Kunhikrishnan & Manikandan, 1995). The
significance of this finding cannot be underestimated. If women feel that their
accomplishments are more a function of fate, luck, or someone else exerting power over
them, it’s logical to assume that they would be less inclined to forcefully self-advocate in
a salary negotiation. It may also imply an explanation for the self-doubts some women
seem to have about their accomplishments, and their potential reluctance to play up their
accomplishments when discussing salary with a potential employer.
Category 2 - Environmental factors.
It appeared that the following environmental factors also have a role to play in
inhibiting women from “asking:”
1. Prescriptive gender stereotypes
2 Prescriptive gender-linked norms: modest, selfless, likeable
3. Self-promotion as a risk factor
1. Prescriptive gender stereotypes.
In addition to individual factors that lead women to be reluctant to ask for more
money, there are also a number of environmental factors that seem to also play a part.
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One researcher proposed that “sex categorization is deeply rooted in the cultural rules
that organize interaction” (Ridgeway, 1997, p. 219). This continual reinforcement of
presumed gender differences results in, among other things, the cueing of certain gender
stereotypes such as the devaluation of women’s jobs, and differences in men and
women’s reward expectations that are sufficient to create and maintain gender inequality
in wages. And women, as much as men, appear to buy into these assumptions. (See also
Prentice and Carranza (2002) for a discussion of prescriptive gender stereotypes).
Various explanations have been proposed for the role of stereotypes, including
that they simplify the demands of the perceiver (Macrae et al., 1994); make information
processing easier; emerge in response to environmental factors such as different social
roles (Eagly, 1995), group conflicts (Robinson et al., 1995), or differences in power
(Fiske, 1993); justify the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994); or emerge in response to a
need for social identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).
Because sex is a strong social cue that prescribes different behaviors for males
and females, strong expectations for appropriate gender-based behavior form the basis of
gender stereotypes. Because these stereotypes can influence expectations of what men
and women can and should do, they greatly influence both individual and group behavior
(Eagly, 1987).
Wade (2002) argues that society’s expectations that men will act agentically
(advocate for their own interests), and women communally (on behalf of other’s
interests), may help explain why so many women find it so difficult to engage in selfadvocacy. An illustration of the impact that stereotyping can have, in this case the
assumption that women aren’t as competent as men, may be evidenced in the work of
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Lyness and Thompson (1999) who showed that women are more likely to be promoted
into management as opposed to being hired into management, suggesting that rather than
assuming that women are deserving, management expects them to have to prove
themselves first.
Another study found that women were significantly more likely than men to say
that their job requires that they work very hard (Gorman & Kmec, 2007) even when
variables such as job and family responsibilities and individual qualifications (education
and skills) were accounted for. The researchers concluded that while neither actual
differences in job characteristics, nor family responsibilities, accounted for this perceived
gap in effort, it did help to explain women’s perception that they were being held to
stereotypically higher performance standards than men.
Gender stereotypes can be evidenced in other ways as well. Two studies (Ayers,
1995; Ayres & Seigelman, 1995) found that new car dealers offered female shoppers
higher prices than males, and as much as forty percent higher in the case of white females
versus white males. Ayres terms this process the “search for suckers.” He posits that
revenue-based discrimination turns solely on the seller’s assumption about the maximum
amount a given group member would be willing to pay. It’s not difficult to see parallels
in salary negotiations, i.e., the seller’s (recruiter) offer (starting salary) is influenced by
the seller’s belief about the minimum amount a group member (female job candidate)
would accept. So, if the seller believes that a woman would accept a lower salary than a
similarly qualified male, the recruiter may feel comfortable offering the female candidate
less. See also his earlier research (Ayers, 1991).
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Steele (1997) showed that perceived gender-based stereotype threats dramatically
depress the standardized test performance of women. Might not this same inability to
perform under pressure, then, diminish women’s performance in another pressure-packed
situation like negotiation? See also Kray and Thompson’s review of the literature on
gender stereotypes and negotiation performance (Kray & Thompson, 2006).
Matheson (1991) studied the impact that gender has on interpersonal expectations.
She found that females who were to negotiate with another female expected her to be
fairer, more cooperative, and less exploitative (but not as competent or strong). If,
however, the female was unaware of the gender of her counterpart, she expected the other
woman to be uncooperative. In other words, it appears that because uncooperativeness
and competitive behavior is seen as masculine, women seem to adopt the stereotype that
negotiation is a “masculine” and “competitive” process.
2. Prescriptive gender-linked norms: modest, selfless, likeable.
There is no form of human excellence before which we bow with profounder
deference than that which appears in a delicate woman…and there is no deformity
in human character from which we turn with deeper loathing than from a woman
forgetful of her nature, and clamorous for the vocation and rights of men
(Bledsoe, 1856, p. 224).

Individuals are criticized when they act either in violation of what others expect
of them, or in ways that disconfirm stereotypes. These individuals can pay a high social
price for such non-conforming behavior, and the costs are even higher when it’s genderbased expectations that are violated. So, when a woman asserts her own self-interests
(i.e., in a manner more consistent with expected male behavior), she is perceived to be
behaving inappropriately (Rasmussen & Moely, 1986).
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Unlike gender stereotypes which are expectations of behaviors, gender norms
play out when there is an audience. Because in most business contexts male behavior has
come to be considered the norm (“normative”), when a woman acts masculine, she is
seen to be more competent, but less likeable. Apparently, one of the strongest genderbased norms is that women should be modest and selfless, i.e., downplay their own
needs. Therefore, while we may find it acceptable for women to ask on behalf of others,
it is not acceptable when they try to do the same for themselves. As a result, women who
highlight their accomplishments in job interviews run the risk of having the interviewer
see her as competent, but not particularly likeable (Wiley & Crittenden, 1992).
A study examining the reasons behind the dearth of women in STEM professions
pointed out that being seen as both competent and well-liked was particularly difficult for
women to achieve in science and engineering fields (AAUW, 2010). Undergraduates
were asked to rate the competence and likeability of a male and a female candidate in a
stereotypically male job (such as STEM). While the male and female employee were
rated equally competent when their prior success was known, when that information was
not known the female candidate was rated significantly less competent than the male
candidate.
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Figure 34. Competence and likeability of men and women in “male” professions.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.aauw.org/learn/research/upload/whysofew.pdf.

Raiffa (1982) identified the following traits of an effective negotiator: assertive,
rational, decisive, constructive, and intelligent. On the flip side, Lax and Sebenius (1986)
identified the traits of an ineffective negotiator: weak, emotional, irrational, and overly
conciliatory. Studies have confirmed that traits associated with effective negotiators are
more often perceived to be “masculine,” while traits associated with ineffective
negotiators are seen to be characteristically “feminine” (Williams & Best, 1982).
Unfortunately, this presents female job candidates with a dilemma; when they resist
“acting like a man” and behave in conformity with societal expectations of what it means
to be “feminine,” they run the risk of being perceived as ‘ineffective” negotiators and
receive lower salary offers. But if they exhibit traits associated with effective negotiators
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(by acting “more like a man”), they run the risk of facing opprobrium for appearing
“unfeminine.”
3. Self-promotion as a risk factor.
As one researcher put it,
Salary negotiations are one of the most common reoccurring negotiations
individuals face and serve as a nexus for a variety of issues. Inherent in these
negotiations is a tension between promoting and acquiring resources for oneself
and joining and being accepted by organizational members. This tension is
particularly manifested in request for higher salary (Barron, 2003, p. 636).
One feminine trait discussed in the literature is the concept of “fear of success”
(Horner, 1968). This perhaps helps explain some of the reasons for women’s inhibition to
achieve in competitive situations like negotiations, including fear of loss of femininity
(i.e., acting more like a man), rejection, and social isolation. In support of the notion that
a fear of success reflects cultural norms of what’s appropriate feminine behavior, Cherry
concluded that both men and women show an avoidance of non-traditional activities, and
anticipate negative consequences when they violate expected sex-role norms (Cherry &
Deaux, 1978).
Some suggest that women face an unenviable choice of either being liked or being
influential (Janoff-Bulman & Wade, 1996), i.e., between being seen either as a strong
negotiator or a good woman. In what has been termed the “backlash effect” (Rudman,
1998), women are viewed negatively for acting in ways that “violate” the female gender
stereotype that women should be “nice,” and face social and economic sanctions. While
self-promotion may allow women to make a favorable first impression and maximize
their negotiating effectiveness, those who do so run the risk of suffering reprisals for
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violating the social expectation that women should be modest. See Eagly and Karau
(2002) where female leaders are perceived less favorably than male leaders because of
conflict between the female gender role and positions of leadership. And, see Fiske et al.
(1991) for the role that sex stereotyping plays in denying a woman partnership in an
accounting firm because she was too “masculine.”
Again, women negotiators appear caught in a catch-22: if women act like more
like men (“agentically,” that is, self-promoting, competitive, ambitious, and assertive),
they are more likely to be perceived as suitable for leadership roles but may face
repercussions (backlash) in their personal relationships (Rudman, 1998). On the other
hand, if they act in ways that people assume women should (i.e., “communal,” or modest,
kind, thoughtful, and sensitive to other’s feelings), they will be more liked, but less likely
to be hired or promoted. See also a discussion of the “black sheep effect” whereby
individuals high in group identification (e.g., women) derogate unfavorable in-group
members (i.e., other women) who act in ways that violate group expectations (e.g, selfpromote). See also Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1988) for further detail regarding the
proverbial “mean girls” response.
Rudman discovered that women who were assertive and boastful are less liked
than modest women (Rudman, 1998), and Levine and Feldman (1997) point out that
women view likeability as an important objective in any social interaction. Therefore, we
can assume that in “masculine” contexts (e.g., salary negotiations), a woman’s attempts
to emphasize her accomplishments would run the very real risk of generating pushback
from a prospective employer.
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Bowles et al. (2007) ran a series of experiments to help answer the question of
whether gender differences in propensity to negotiate could perhaps be explained by
different treatment of men and women during negotiations. They found that when a
woman attempts to negotiate a higher salary with a man, she faces a greater social cost
(men say they are significantly less inclined to work with a woman who negotiates than
one who does not), even if the woman is viewed as equally competent as a man who also
negotiates. They conclude that women who negotiate violate the status-based
prescriptions of appropriate female behavior, i.e., women should act pleasant and nondemanding, and went on to suggest that women have reason to be concerned about
emphasizing their accomplishments with a prospective employer, particularly if they are
competing with a male candidate and negotiating with a male recruiter. For this reason,
they did not find it surprising that women were not only significantly less inclined to
negotiate if they knew the evaluator was a male, but were also more nervous about
countering an initial offer.
Members of social groups (including women) who are stigmatized (Heilbrun,
1976), attempt to maintain their self-esteem via one of three mechanisms: by attributing
negative feedback of their poor performance to prejudice, by limiting comparisons of
their performance to in-group members, e.g., women-to-women, and by selectively
devaluing those performance dimensions in which their group is seen to do poorly. In this
context, it’s not difficult to see how women may do poorly negotiating their salaries, but
in the process rationalize that factors other than their individual performance are to
blame.
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Does a Review of the Literature Suggest Why Women Might Be Unwilling to
Improve their Negotiating Skills?
As we have seen, for a variety of reasons women appear unwilling or unable to
ask for more money. A review of the literature suggests that the following attitudes and
beliefs inhibit women from negotiating:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Women shy away from “masculine” activities
Women are averse to studying certain subjects
Stereotype threats
Kanter’s theory of tokenism
Women’s attitudes about money

Demotivating factor 1 - Women shy away from “masculine” activities.
As discussed, negotiation is often perceived by women to be something that males
do (“masculine”). One researcher characterized this perception of negotiation as follows:
“Not so long ago, negotiation was viewed as a rather sordid affair, associated with
haggling, dickering, bartering, niggling, swapping, and backroom dealmaking” (Kolb &
Putnam, 1997, p. 231); in short, not a process that would seem to be congruous with the
values or sensitivities of most women.
Others point out that we should not be surprised that negotiation is considered a
masculine activity because, after all, we tend to view the subject through a male-gendered
lens:
We argue that negotiation analysis is “gendered,” i.e., it is characterized by
attributes and behaviors that are more commonly associated with masculine
worldviews, such as self-interest, competitiveness, and rationality, are more
prominent that those associated with feminine perspectives, such as connection,
collaboration, and emotionality. Second, the framework fails to take account of
how a negotiator’s position in a social hierarchy, a hierarchy that tends to be
gendered and characterized by power differentials, might influence expectations
about what possibilities exist for her to negotiate successfully. Finally, this
framework, with its focus on inputs and outcomes, ignores or hides features of the
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negotiation process, where issues of gender typically get played out (Kolb &
Putnam, 1997, p. 232).
In an earlier study, Kolb also contended that because negotiation tends to be
studied from a male-centric perspective, it leads to certain predictable results:
The research and the pragmatic advice that derives from them, reinforce
masculine attributes – enlightened individual self-interest, analytic rationality,
objectivity, and instrumentality. Those attributes typically labeled as feminine are
less valued – qualities such as empathy, concern for relationships, subjectivity,
and emotional expressiveness. While feminine attributes can be appreciated, they
pale beside the traits associated with masculinity which are seen as intimately tied
to success (Kolb, 2002, p. 4).

A study by another author concurs with this opinion:
Using feminist critique, I show the pervasiveness of the male-gendered bias that
undergirds negotiation theory. First, negotiations research is primarily
transactional, an archetypically male perspective…Second, negotiation research
stresses rational versus emotional human behavior…Third…I argue that the
dominance of a masculine orientation toward separateness leads to competitive
dynamics. Fourth, negotiations are inherently competitive, a point that is
supported by international negotiations research. Fifth, research on organizational
justice highlights the systematic devoicing of traditionally feminine voices in
organizations. Finally, the scientific study of negotiation is itself male-gendered.
The current methods of conducting research on negotiations, themselves,
contribute to the privileging of masculine versus feminine-gender-based concepts.
Gendered assumptions refer to the explicit or implicit adoption of masculine
characteristics (i.e., traits that have historically been viewed as masculine) as
central to the theory. These traits include autonomy, rationality, objectivity,
competitiveness, and efficiency. By implication, then, a gendered science also
actively depreciates (or at a minimum is silent about) the value of characteristics
socially constructed as feminine – for example, subjectivity, dependence,
emotionality, and connectedness…the critical point here is that this privileging
this the masculine over the feminine does not necessarily occur at a conscious,
intentional level, but is so embedded in everyday practices of social culture and in
the canons of scientific inquiry that both men and women have been socialized to
accept it as truth (Gray, 1994, p. 4-5).
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Consistent with this male-centric worldview of negotiation, others point out that
competitive metaphors, such as games, sports, and war pervade the field. Talking about a
hypothetical student of negotiation, Cohen writes:
If she is like most students, she will soon arrive at the competitive metaphors that
dominate the field of negotiation, if not our culture…Negotiation is a game of
poker in which players must hold the cards close to the chest…Negotiation is a
sport like football, where a “level playing field” is required…or like basketball,
where “timeouts” are sometimes taken, or like baseball where parties sometimes
play “hardball”…Sometimes negotiation is a military war fought with weapons by
Ramboesque soldiers and gladiators who shoot proposals out of the air and follow
marching orders from their superiors…(Cohen, 2003, p. 434).
This male-paradigm view of negotiation is especially evident in the legal
profession. In a study titled “Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex
Shape the Adversary System,” the author illustrates how we have come to associate a
competitive (i.e., male) paradigm with the practice of law:
Even its name begins to tell the story: the adversary system. American court
procedure is labeled in a way that implies a fight or a contest, highlighting the
conflict rather than the resolution…A complex web of metaphor pervades the idea
of the adversary system…In case law, academic literature, professional literature,
and in popular culture, a trial is a battle and the lawyer the client’s champion; a
trial is a sports contest and the lawyer the client-team’s winning coach or star
player. Metaphors transform the trial lawyer from a mere person who presents
information favorable to his client to a triumphant hero and change the other party
to the dispute into the enemy. This metaphorical fixation on the combative, noncooperative aspect of dispute resolution and the suppression of any duty to other
litigant, the court system, or the community, contributes to a professional role that
is severely out of balance…The lawyer role is supported and enhanced by the
war, sports, and sex metaphors (Thornburg, 1995, p. 225-226).
The author went on to point out why these metaphors should matter:
Anything that we rely on constantly, unconsciously, and automatically is so much
a part of us that it cannot be easily resisted, in large measure because it is barely
even noticed. To the extent that we use a…conceptual metaphor, we accept its
validity. Consequently, when someone else uses it, we are predisposed to accept
its validity. For this reason…conventionalized…metaphors have persuasive
power over us (Thornburg, 1995, p. 231).
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Acknowledging this male-centric paradigm of negotiation matters because we
know that women tend to avoid engaging in activities that are seen to be “masculine.” On
this basis alone we could expect to find then that women, if given the choice, would
demure from studying the subject.
Research suggests yet another reason to assume that women would be expected to
shy away from studying negotiation; they expect to be treated less favorably than a man.
Two studies illustrate that this expectation is not irrational. Ayres and Siegelman (1995)
found that when negotiating the purchase of a new car, female buyers are forced to pay
more for the car than male buyers. In other words, salespeople offer to close the deal for
less money with men than with women. Why? Rather than discrimination, they
concluded that salespeople operate under the assumption that women will simply agree to
pay more. Similarly, Gerhart and Rynes (1991) found that recruiters offer male MBA
graduates higher starting salaries than similarly qualified female graduates less, again
based on the assumption that they will be willing to accept less.
Demotivating factor 2 - Women are averse to studying certain subjects.
Well-documented research on women’s aversion to studying STEM subjects may
also provide clues into whether or not women would similarly be averse to studying a
topic like negotiation. Much work has been done on girls’ interest, confidence,
achievement, aspiration, and retention in math and science-related coursework. Author
and educator Sheila Tobias, who has researched math anxiety particularly, provided the
following answers in an interview with Education World (EW):
EW: What is at the heart of math phobia?
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Tobias: The heart of math phobia as I researched it is lack of confidence. In the
case of women and girls, this has to do with feeling that "math is for boys" or in
the case of minority members, for "people unlike me." Lack of confidence
contributes to lack of experience and practice, and this in turn erodes confidence
still more.When girls succeed at a math lesson or on a math quiz, they attribute
their success to luck; boys attribute it to their own inner ability. When girls fail,
they attribute their failure to a lack of ability; boys attribute theirs to a lack of
effort. That's why even girls who do well in mathematics in school don't develop
the kind of confidence males do. Teen-age boys along with girls' parents send out
many signals to girls that math is a male domain… (Delisio, 2006).
Others agree with Tobias’ observations, and see a gender effect associated with
the expectations of teachers towards girls and boys studying science, the nature of the
interactions between instructional staff and students, and among students in the
classroom. These serve to negatively influence girls’ attitudes toward math and science,
their self-confidence in performing well in these subjects, their levels of achievement,
and their incentive to continue studying these subjects. Others have concluded that
teachers assume that high achievement in science studies is not consistent with the
feminine role and assume that the study of science is a “masculine” pursuit. It should be
noted that teacher expectancy is particularly important to girls who lack prior experience
with the subject, or lack of self-confidence regarding how they would do (Butler et al.,
1993). One might ask, to the extent that female teachers and other role models similarly
view negotiation to be a “male subject,” do they send out these same sorts of
demotivating signals to their female students who are contemplating studying this subject
as well?
While researchers, educators, and practitioners have long attempted to decipher
the mystery of the relative abilities of males versus females in math-related domains, we
know that even as girls move from elementary school through high school, and then on to
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college, they progressively lose interest in studying STEM subjects. This waning
enthusiasm, documented in such studies as the Program for International Student
Assessment (Goldiner, 2008), and Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Study (Kepcher, 2008), becomes particularly evident beginning in middle school.
Perhaps it’s plausible, then, that women’s generally negative feelings about negotiation
begin to form around this same time as well.
So, how prevalent is women’s aversion to majoring in STEM subjects?
According to one researcher:
By the time they enter college, many young women have less appetite for the
more technically oriented areas of science, data suggest. Forty-four percent of
incoming male freshmen who intended to major in science chose engineering as
their initial focus, compared with only 12 percent of females…Fifteen percent of
the men chose computer science, compared with 3 percent of the women
(Cavanagh, 2005).
Women earn just nine percent of engineering-related bachelor’s degrees, represent
just twenty percent of IT professionals and less than seventeen percent of the computer
science AP test takers, are less than ten percent of the higher level computer science AB
test takers, and earn less than twenty-eight percent of the computer science bachelor’s
degrees (AAUW Educational Foundation, 2000). Also, while it is projected that nearly
seventy-five percent of tomorrow’s jobs will require use of computers, yet less than onethird of the participants in computer courses and related activities are women (AAUW
Educational Foundation, 2000).
A more recent study (2010), supported by the National Science Foundation,
recognized that while women have made gains in the STEM fields, stereotypes and biases
continue to impede their progress:
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The number of women in science and engineering is growing, yet men continue to
outnumber women, especially at the upper levels of these professions. In
elementary, middle, and high school, girls and boys take math and science courses
in roughly equal numbers, and about as many girls as boys leave high school
prepared to pursue science and engineering majors in college. Yet fewer women
than men pursue these majors. Among first-year college students, women are
much less likely than men to say that they intend to major in science, technology,
engineering, or math (STEM). By graduation, men outnumber women in nearly
every science and engineering field, and in some, such as physics, engineering,
and computer science, the difference is dramatic, with women earning only 20
percent of bachelor’s degrees. Women’s representation in science and engineering
declines further at the graduate level and yet again in the transition to the
workplace (AAUW, 2010).
Some speculate that girls’ lack of interest in STEM subjects is in part due to
culture and stereotypes that steer women away from these fields (Bloom, 1999; Hartigan,
1999), while others contend that girls shy away from these topics because they regard
these disciplines as providing fewer opportunities for social interaction than other
professions.
In the AAUW study (AAUW, 2010), both bias and gender stereotypes were
identified as demotivators:
Women in STEM fields can experience bias that negatively influences their
progress and participation. Although instances of explicit bias may be decreasing,
implicit bias continues to have an adverse effect. Implicit biases may reflect, be
stronger than, or in some cases contradict explicitly held beliefs or values.
Therefore, even individuals who espouse a belief of gender equity and equality
may harbor implicit biases about gender and, hence, negative gender stereotypes
about women and girls in science and math (Valian, 1998). Nosek et al. (2002a)
found that majorities of both women and men of all racial-ethnic groups hold a
strong implicit association of male with science and female with liberal arts
(AAUW, 2010, at pg. 24).

In fact, it appears that strong gender bias against women working in STEM exists
even among the highly educated who are already working in a STEM field. To illustrate,
in a randomized double-blind study, science faculty from research universities were
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assigned identical applications with either male or female names on them, and were asked
to rate each for a hypothetical laboratory manager position. Faculty rated the applications
with male names as significantly more qualified and hireable, assigned them a higher
starting salary, and offered them more career mentoring even though the only differences
between the applications was the assumed gender of the job candidates. Surprisingly, this
bias against female applicants extended to both male and female faculty equally. A table
from page 3 of the study summarizes the results and shows how bias appeared to
influence the judgment of the faculty reviewers:

Figure 35. STEM faculty assumptions about male and female candidates.
Note: Retrieved from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/unofficialprognosis/2012/09/23/study-shows-gender-bias-in-science-is-real-heres-why-it-matters/.
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Figure 36. STEM faculty ratings of hypothetical male and female job candidates.
Note: Retrieved from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/unofficialprognosis/2012/09/23/study-shows-gender-bias-in-science-is-real-heres-why-it-matters/.
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Figure 37. STEM faculty salaries to be offered to male and female candidates.
Note: Retrieved from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/unofficialprognosis/2012/09/23/study-shows-gender-bias-in-science-is-real-heres-why-it-matters/.

Quoting from a discussion of the study:
If faculty express gender biases, we are not suggesting that these biases are
intentional or stem from a conscious desire to impede the progress of women in
science. Past studies indicate that people’s behavior is shaped by implicit or
unintended biases, stemming from repeated exposure to pervasive cultural
stereotypes that portray women as less competent but simultaneously emphasize
their warmth and likeability compared with men. Despite significant decreases in
overt sexism over the last few decades (particularly among highly educated
people) these subtle gender biases are often still held by even the most egalitarian
individuals, and are exhibited by both men and women (Moss-Racusin et al.,
2012).

Other research has also pointed out the impact of stereotypes on women who
choose to study a STEM subject:
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Negative stereotypes about girls’ and women’s abilities in mathematics and
science persist despite girls’ and women’s considerable gains in participation and
performance in these areas during the last few decades. Two stereotypes are
prevalent: girls are not as good as boys in math, and scientific work is better
suited to boys and men. As early as elementary school, children are aware of these
stereotypes and can express stereotypical beliefs about which science courses are
suitable for females and males (Farenga & Joyce, 1999; Ambady et al., 2001).
Research profiled in chapter 8 verifies the prevalence of these stereotypes among
adults as well (Nosek et al., 2002b). Furthermore, girls and young women have
been found to be aware of, and negatively affected by, the stereotypical image of
a scientist as a man (Buck et al., 2008). Although largely unspoken, negative
stereotypes about women and girls in STEM are very much alive. A large body of
experimental research has found that negative stereotypes affect women’s and
girls’ performance and aspirations in math and science through a phenomenon
called “stereotype threat.” Even female students who strongly identify with
math—who think that they are good at math and being good in math is important
to them—are susceptible to its effects (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008) (AAUW, 2010, at
p. 38).
However, investigators have consistently concluded that an early loss of
confidence in their ability to “do math” may also be a factor for diminishing girl’s
interest in studying that subject. This shouldn’t be surprising given that in one study
almost two-thirds of teachers surveyed believed that boys were naturally more gifted at
math than were girls (Brown & Josephs, 1999).
In much the same way we have seen that women doubt their negotiating ability
even when they achieve equivalent outcomes as men do, studies show that even when
achieving higher math and science grades than boys, girls express lower confidence in
their abilities, and report enjoying these subjects less. This is consistent with research that
reports that managerial women express less confidence and less satisfaction with their
negotiating performance than male colleagues, even though they did not differ in the
results they achieved (Watson & Hoffman, 1992).
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Demotivating factor 3 - Stereotype threats.
Other studies have explored a different dimension of the diminished performance
problem: when females are placed in an environment in which they have to compete with
males, it compromises their ability to solve math problems. And, when men and women
compete in mixed gender situations, it’s only the women and not the men who experience
a performance deficit, and these deficits are directly proportional to the number of males
in their group. Even when one male is paired with two females in a mixed-sex dyad, it’s
the females who experience problem-solving deficits (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000). The
study concluded that even without the need to explicitly activate stereotype threats,
simply placing women in what they perceived to be a threatening intellectual
environment is enough to compromise their performance which is predicated on their
internalized assumption that they lack the ability to perform. These results seem to
confirm the theory that women placed in an environment where they are the minority
serves to disrupt their cognitive functioning on stereotyped tasks (negotiating?).
In another study, Brown and Josephs (1999) concluded that if women believed
that they were being evaluated in a way that might confirm that they had a deficiency in
math, they performed poorly. Men, on the other hand, performed poorly if they thought
they were taking a test designed to indicate whether they were exceptionally strong in
math. In other words, each gender tends to focus on a different end of the performance
spectrum. It, therefore, raises this question: might the same gender dichotomy hold true
for negotiation?
In addition to these performance deficits, others suggest that girls are subtly, and
often unintentionally, discouraged from studying certain subjects by classmates and
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parents (National Science Foundation [NSF], 1994). In one study of community college
students, even after accounting for SAT math scores, high school GPAs, and previously
successful completion of high school coursework in math and science, women still
retained a lower level of interest in these subjects. Citing other studies, the author
surmises that such coursework may be at odds with the perceived heightened level of
competition and lack of role models of other women in those fields, paired with
perceptions of low self-ratings of ability in areas that are seen as male-dominated
(Change, 2003).
There may even be another dimension to the problem. One study concluded that
women’s performance on math tests correlated most closely with the degree to which
they assumed that studying math was “useful” (Armstrong & Price, 1982, p. 101),
suggesting that the primary reason that women don’t study these sorts of topics is because
they’re not convinced they will use it (negotiation as well?)(Table 2).
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Table 2. Relative Importance of Factors Affecting Women’s Decision to Study Math
Rank ordered results on the relative importance of certain
factors affecting students’ decisions to take more math classes
Grade 12 females
Grade 12 males
Factors
Mean
Rank order
Mean
Rank order
How useful mathematics will be
80.91
1
79.27
1
How good or bad in mathematics
74.55
2
68.81
3
How much math is liked or disliked
72.43
3
69.20
2
What math teachers think
66.40
4
64.63
4
What mother thinks
65.73
5
63.03
6
What father thinks
62.51
6
64.19
5
What school counselor thinks
56.27
7
55.69
7
Whether friends take mathematics
25.12
8
31.83
8
Whether classmates approve
16.48
9
24.89
9

It appears, then, that women view both STEM subjects as well as negotiation as
something that men do (“masculine”). And, as we have seen in STEM subjects, where
women lack the confidence to do well and assume a lack of usefulness, they avoid
enrolling in this coursework. Given that women tend to view STEM subjects and
negotiation similarly, might this suggest that women’s willingness to study negotiation
would likewise be compromised?
Demotivating factor 4 - Kanter’s theory of tokenism.
Another line of thought suggests yet another reason why women might not be
expected to relish the thought of learning how to improve their negotiating skills.
Kanter’s theory of tokenism, which focuses on proportionate representation in groups,
posits that an individual will exhibit token behavior if they are in the numerical minority
in a group, and dominant behavior if they are in the numerical majority. This theory helps
explain how underrepresentation of females in math and science coursework can become
a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. More particularly, this theory suggests that individuals
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who anticipate being “tokens” in a group (e.g., women in a predominantly male group,
and females asked to participate in an activity assumed to be in a “male” domain) will
engage in token behavior, e.g., trying not to show up the dominants, avoiding risks and
conflict, and going along to get along (Kanter, 1977). Tokenism can also manifest itself
by decreased participation in group activities and exertion of less influence in the group
(Kelsey, 2000).
Other research has uncovered the impact that tokenism plays in female’s lack of
interest in studying STEM subjects. One study found that not only were females who
anticipated being tokens in a group setting more likely than non-token women to prefer
another group and to request a change in the gender mix of the group, but these observed
effects were stronger for those women who were less confident about an upcoming task
to begin with (Cohen, 1995).
To extrapolate, tokenism predicts that women who consider studying “male”
subjects (Kelley, 1982; McEwen et al., 1986; Pedersen et al., 1986) will not only be
hesitant to take the coursework, but if they do, will find themselves in a predominantly
male environment where they will ostracized by the dominant group members (men). It
would not seem too difficult, then, to imagine that to the degree to which women view
negotiation as masculine, they would be equally uncomfortable with the thought of
enrolling in negotiation classes where they would similarly expect men to dominate.
Demotivating factor 5 - Women’s attitudes about money.
Perhaps another reason to assume that women would be less willing than men to
avail themselves of the opportunity to improve their negotiation skills can be found in
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women’s attitudes about money and finance (since, after all, negotiation often involves
the process of allocating resources, one component of which is salary).
A study of Australian men’s and women’s attitudes and behaviors on the subject
of money (Aus. Government, 2008) revealed significant difference between men and
women on seven attitudes about finances. Women were more likely than men to believe
that:








Dealing with money is stressful and overwhelming (52% vs. 43%)
Thinking about their long-term financial future makes them uncomfortable
(42% vs. 37%)
Dealing with money is boring (34% vs. 29%)
Nothing they do will make a big difference to their financial situation (23%
vs. 19%)
They live for today (29% vs. 34%)
Money is simply a means to buy things (52% vs. 59%)
Money is not important to be happy in life (38% vs. 35%)

It seems that our attitudes about money affect our behavior in varying degrees.
Specifically, attitudes reflective of “Nothing I do will make a big difference in my
financial situation,” “Dealing with money is boring,” and “Thinking too much about my
long-term financial future makes me feel uncomfortable,” appeared likely to have a
moderate impact on women’s behavior, while “Dealing with money is stressful and
overwhelming,” “I do not spend a lot of time thinking about financial information before
I make a financial decision,” “Financially, I like to live for today,” and “I do not try to
stay informed about money matters and finance,” evidenced a relatively large impact on
their behavior.
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Figure 38. Attitudes towards money.
Note. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingmoney.gov.au/documents/women/womenunderstandingmoney.
pdf, p. 34.
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Figure 39. Women’s attitudes, beliefs and barriers towards money.
Note: Retrieved from
http://www.understandingmoney.gov.au/documents/women/womenunderstandingmoney.
pdf, p. 61.

Consistent with these results, another study also confirmed women’s apparently
uneasy relationship with money. Of the 1,925 U.S. women surveyed, one in four (25%)
said that they lacked sufficient knowledge to make smart financial decisions or chose to

108

avoid financial responsibility entirely. And, only about one in six (18%) felt confident,
empowered, and extremely knowledgeable about money (Allianz, 2006).
Other research reveals similar gender differences. Men scored higher on measures
of obsession, power, budget, and achievement while women reported feeling more
anxious about money (Oleson, 2004). See also Furnham (1984).
In a study of employee attitudes at one southeastern public university, Tang and
Talpade (1999) suggested that males value money more highly than females, and see
money as satisfying esteem needs that are more important to them than to females. See
also Mitchell and Mickel (1999).
Conclusion
While there are many environmental and individual influences that can be said to
contribute to the wage gap and other workplace gender inequities, it appears that
women’s unwillingness or inability to negotiate plays a part. While the weight of the
evidence seems to point to the conclusion that “women don’t ask,” to date there has been
no research on the related question of what factors might demotivate them from being
willing to learn how.
To address this gap in the research, this study proposes to isolate those attitudes
and beliefs that keep women (and also men) from taking advantage of opportunities to
improve their negotiation skills by declining to enroll in negotiation electives, organize
those attitudes and beliefs into a model of inhibiting factors, including how they interact
and influence each other, and then use factor analysis to test if the proffered model
offering a plausible explanation.
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Chapter Three
Method
Introduction

This chapter covers material related to the sampling process, design of the study,
the research questions, and the analysis associated with them.
Method
Sample and participant selection.
Working with the Director of the Career Services Office at Carnegie Mellon
University’s Graduate School of Public Policy (Heinz College), eighty-two domestic and
twenty-seven graduate programs in public policy/public administration/international
affairs were invited to participate in this study (Appendices A & B). Schools were
selected based on a combination of factors including the size of the student body, the
program’s national ranking, its membership in either the National Association of Schools
of Public Administration and Affairs (NASPAA), the Association of Professional
Schools of International Affairs (APSIA), or the Association for Public Policy Analysis
and Management (APPAM), and geographic dispersion. Schools that agreed to
participate were promised a copy of the book “Women Don’t Ask” authored by a
member of the Heinz College faculty.
Twenty-two of the invited domestic graduate schools agreed to participate (22/82,
or 27%) but none of the international programs. Of the completed surveys received, thirty
percent (338/1116) were received from students and alumni of the Heinz College
(Appendix C).
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Of the 1,116 participants there were some who elected not to complete the survey,
others who completed the survey but didn’t answer the control question as instructed, and
yet others who failed to identify their gender (Appendix D). Because this study focused
on men and women’s perceptions about negotiation in general, and willingness to take
advantage of opportunities to improve their negotiation skills in particular (by enrolling
in negotiation electives), it was believed that the most accurate research data would come
from participants who were willing to both identify their gender and pay close enough
attention to what was being asked to answer the control question as instructed.
Therefore, unless indicated otherwise, only responses that met these two criteria (N =
1,016) were included in the statistical analysis.
Demographics.
A summary of participant demographics can be found in Appendices E, F, G, and
H. In short, the research sample consisted of 1,016 students and alumni of twenty-two
domestic graduate programs of public policy/public administration/international affairs
(hereinafter generically referred to as “public policy”). Participants were sixty percent
female and forty percent male. About a third were twenty-five years of age or younger,
with forty percent between the ages of twenty-six and thirty. On average, female
participants were slightly younger (seventy percent aged thirty or <) than male
participants (about 2/3 aged thirty or <), and about 9 in 10 either U.S. citizens or lawful
residents of the U.S.
Only one in three participants reported married status, with females less likely to
be married than males, results that appear consistent with national statistics and a
reflection that a significant proportion of participants were under the age of thirty. Three
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out of four participants said that they were the primary wage earner, with male
participants more likely to report that status than females. Examining graduate majors by
gender, stark differences between male and female participants became evident. Men
were four times more likely than women to be technology majors, twenty-five percent
more likely to be management majors, and about forty percent more likely to be studying
international affairs.
And, three out of four participants were enrolled in master, rather than doctoral,
programs. It is noted that in the 2009-2010 academic year, there was a 44:56 male-female
ratio for students enrolled in master degree programs in public policy and 62:38 malefemale ratio in doctoral programs (Monchaya Wanna, Office Manager/Director of Web
Services, National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, personal
email, February 20, 2013).
Measure.
The survey consisted of twenty-two statements, each reflecting one of twenty-one
hypothesized attitudes, along with one control question (Appendix FFF). The statements
were numbered, and then randomized before being placed into the survey. The control
question was included to screen out participants who were not thoughtfully answering the
questions.
The survey also collected certain other demographic data as well (school,
negotiating a starting salary, the percentage of recruiters who have more money to give
than their initial offer, the probability of a job offer being retracted, gender, student
status, age, citizenship, marital status, wage earner role, undergraduate and graduate
majors and inquired participant’s willingness to enroll in negotiation electives). A six112

point Likert scale was used to query participant’s self-reported strength of agreement
with each of the twenty-one statements (attitudes) (Appendix I).
Schools were invited to participate by asking them to forward a provided email
link on to their students and alumni (Appendix CCC). This link would connect them to an
on-line survey hosted by Survey Monkey, a paid on-line subscription service that collects
and stores survey responses for later analysis.
Research questions and analyses.
Research Question 1
Will the data collected fit the hypothesized latent factor model?
To answer this question, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run. CFA is a
better test of hypothesized latent factors because exploratory factor analysis and principal
component analysis do not test a hypothesis, but rather, are descriptive techniques
(Schreiber, 2008). Survey results were based on a Likert scale/ordered categorical model
with a theoretical underlying continuum. Factor analysis is a collection of methods used
to show how underlying constructs influence responses on a number of measured
variables. It is used to uncover the latent structure of a set of variables, i.e., reduces a
larger number of variables to a smaller number of factors. It allows for identification of
the number of underlying dimensions contained in a set of observed variables and the
subset of variables corresponding to each of the underlying dimensions. These underlying
dimensions are known as continuous latent variables, or factors, and the observed
variables are known as factor indicators.
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This study is essentially a CFA across groups. The general purpose of a CFA is to
obtain evidence for a hypothesized model, i.e., testing to see if a set of data fit a theorized
model. CFA is used when the researcher already has an a priori assumption about the
structural relationship among the variables, i.e., a model that attempts to explain the
observed behavior. In that case, CFA is the accepted statistical technique used to test and
verify the factor structure of a set of observed variables and in this particular case, to test
the researcher’s theory against the data that was collected via the on-line survey.
CFA tests whether an unobserved set of constructs are influencing responses in a
predicted manner, i.e., it is used to determine the fit of a predetermined factor model to an
observed set of data. CFA permits the testing of the hypothesis that a relationship
between the observed variables and their underlying latent constructs exist. Generally, the
protocol is for the researcher to formulate the theory of expected behavior, write
questions based on that theory, determine the appropriate scale, design the data collection
instrument, pilot test the instrument, collect the data from the target sample, and then run
the CFA calculations.
CFA seeks to determine if the number of factors and the loadings of measured
(indicator) variables on them conform to what is expected on the basis of some
pre-with established theory. The researcher’s a priori assumption is that each
factor is associated with a specified subset of all indicator variables. A minimum
requirement of confirmatory factor analysis is that the researcher hypothesizes
beforehand the number of factors in the model, and usually the researcher will
also posit expectations about which variables will load on which factors (Antony,
2012).
And, “a prime use of factor analysis has been in the development of both the
operational constructs for an area and the operational representatives for the theoretical
constructs” (Gorsuch, 1983, p. 350). That is, “factor analysis is intimately involved with
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questions of validity. Factor analysis is at the heart of the measurement of psychological
constructs” (Nunnally, 1978, p. 112-113).
CFA is based on the common factor model that suggests that each observed
response is influenced both by underlying common factors, as well as partially by
underlying unique factors. The strength of the link between each factor and each response
varies so that it can be seen that a particular factor exerts more influence on some
responses than others. Analyses are performed by examining patterns of correlations, or
covariances, between the responses. It is assumed that responses that are either highly
correlated positively or negatively are influenced by the same factors, while those
relatively uncorrelated are influenced by different factors. The focus of interpretation in a
CFA study is the strength of the relationship between indicators and factors, as well as
the relationships between multiple factors.
Because the researcher’s prior experience teaching and training in the field of
negotiation, and basic familiarity with the literature, had suggested a model that
explained the factors inhibiting women from studying negotiation, CFA was the
statistical process used to test the a priori expectations of his model. Gorsuch posited that,
“Whereas the former [exploratory factor analysis] simply finds those factors that best
reproduce the variables under the maximum likelihood conditions, the latter
[confirmatory factor analysis] tests specific hypothesis regarding the nature of the
factors” (Gorsuch, 1983, p. 129).
Another researcher gave credence to the usefulness of CFA in testing proposed
models; “Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a statistical technique used to verify the
factor structure of a set of observed variables. CFA allows the researcher to test the
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hypothesis that a relationship between observed variables and their underlying latent
constructs exists. The researcher uses knowledge of the theory, empirical research, or
both, postulates the relationship pattern a priori and then tests the hypothesis statistically”
(Suhr, 2006, p. 1).
Observed and latent variables.
The hypothesized relationships among variables using CFA can be represented
diagrammatically. To illustrate the general concept, in the following figure the large
circles represent the latent constructs and the small circles the unique factors
(measurement errors) in the observed variables or disturbances in the equation, the
measurement, or both. Errors (e) are variances in the responses that are not explained by
the latent construct. The single and dual head arrows are called paths, with single head
paths representing directional effects from one variable (latent or observed) to another,
and dual head paths representing a correlation or relationship. The rectangles are the
observed or manifest variables. The paths from the latent constructs to the individual
manifest variables are constrained to only one (1), and there are no “cross loadings”
where a manifest variable is affected by more than one latent construct. The regression
coefficient is set at one for one path from each latent variable and for each of the error
components. Each path has its own regression coefficient. Since error is an unobserved
variable, there is no specific measurement unit and so a value must be set arbitrarily, with
a value of one (1) the most commonly used value.
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Figure 40. Generic example of a confirmatory factor analysis path diagram.

Sample size.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) requires large sample sizes which affects
sampling error; the larger the sample, the smaller the sampling error. While the general
rule of thumb is twenty cases for each free parameter, ten is a more likely target (Kline,
2005). A free parameter is a value to be estimated by the computer, that is, it is not
specified prior to analysis by the researcher. For example, if the theorized model has
fifteen free parameters to estimate, a sample size between 150 and 300 participants would
be recommended.
Power analysis is also an important consideration when selecting sample size for
SEM analyses. Power at the coefficient level (path) can be examined (Saris & Satorra,
1993). Researchers, though, tend to think about power at the model level. Estimated
power and the associated minimum sample size have been studied (MacCallum & Austin,
2000; Hancock & Freeman, 2001). In general, the smaller the degrees of freedom for the
model, the larger the sample size needed to reach an acceptable power of .80.
For this study, the CFA will have twenty-one distinct parameters. However, since
responses were received from over one thousand participants, the number of participants
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was well in excess of any of the generally accepted measures of minimum sample size
for a SEM study with this number of parameters.
Missing data.
Participants commonly fail to complete every item on a survey. Missing data is a
serious concern because research results can be biased by providing incorrect estimates
such as the calculated standard error value. There are three different types of missing data
- missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and non-ignorable
(Little & Rubin, 2002). MCAR occurs when the missing data is not related to any group
of participants or any other variable; MAR occurs when data may be missing at random;
and non-ignorable missing data is the most serious because the data are missing as a
function of another variable.
However, several approaches for dealing with the missing data, such as pairwise
deletion, listwise deletion, regression, multiple imputation, full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) and expectation maximization (EM) algorithm, are available (Little &
Rubin, 2002; Muthen & Muthen, 2004).
In general, pairwise deletion occurs when participants are deleted if they are
missing from that part of the analysis but are included in other analyses if the data is
complete. Pairwise deletion is not recommended because sample size can change
depending on which variables are being analyzed, and this approach can lead to
mathematical problems such as a zero in the denominator of an inverted matrix. Pairwise
deletion also greatly limits the ability to generalize the results of the sample to the
population. Listwise deletion is acceptable but is best used when the data are MCAR. It is
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robust with MAR if the missing values of the independent variables do not depend on the
values of the dependent or outcome variable.
If data are MAR, full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is recommended.
If the data are non-ignorable, FIML estimates will tend to be the least biased (Little &
Rubin, 2002). Because in this study there is an embedded assumption that data will be
missing, a FIML approach will be used.
Estimation methods and normality issues.
Estimation concerns the procedure to be used to derive the parameter estimates.
Though the most common is maximum likelihood (ML), and is the default on most
programs, the type of data one has (nominal, ordinal, etc.), and the distributional qualities
of those data, determines which estimation method is most suitable. For normally
distributed data, ML is a full information method where all parameters are estimated at
once (Eliason, 1993). Normally distributed data is symmetrical about the mean.
Generalized least squares (GLS) and unweighted least squares (ULS) are also full
information techniques. But, GLS is part of the weighted least squares family (WLS) and
ULS requires all observed variables to have the same scale (Kline, 2005; Muthen &
Muthen, 2004).
If the data are continuous but non-normal, there is always the option to transform
the data. A corrected normal theory method can be utilized where the parameters are
estimated with ML along with robust standard errors or corrected test statistics. When the
data is non-normal and the non-normality is not corrected, the standard errors can be too
low which results in incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis and the chi-square value can
also be inflated which will result in the rejection of true models based on exact fit tests.
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The appropriate correction is the Satorra-Bentler method which adjusts the chi-square
value lower based on the size of observed kurtosis (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). An
asymptotically distribution free (ADF) method is possible but it requires very large
sample sizes such as twenty-five hundred cases. ADF estimation does not assume normal
distribution of the variables or multivariate normality. Therefore, if the data are skewed,
ADF estimation is one technique for dealing with this problem.
Simulated data has been used to examine the effect of skewness and kurtosis, and
the results indicate that maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors can
be used with skewness below two, and kurtosis below seven (Curran et al., 1997).
Likert-type scales are quite common in survey-based research, as with the survey
used in this study. Likert scales are technically ordered categorical, that is, there is an
underlying continuum with each choice a separate category. Although there is no
consensus on how to handle Likert-type scales with three to five categories, ordered
categorical data can be estimated with the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) family of
estimators, along with the FIML approach.
Fit indices.
There are numerous fit indices. A fit index provides a global examination of how
well the collected data fit the hypothesized model. Researchers typically have
preferences, but common fit indices for a single analysis are Comparative Fit Index
(CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI or Non-normed fit index (NNFI), and Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Kline, 2005). Most statistical packages that run SEM
models produce a number of different fit indices. The model chi-square value and degrees
of freedom should be reported because certain fit indices are based on those values. The
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model chi-square is considered a badness of fit index because, in general, the higher the
chi-square value, the worse the data are presumed to fit the model.
The RMSEA is another badness of fit index. An overall RMSEA less than or
equal to .06, and a confidence interval range from zero to .08, indicates a close or good fit
(Hu & Bentler, 1999). There are mixed outcomes with RMSEA where the overall value is
below .06 and the lower value is .00 and the upper value is over .10. This happens more
often with small samples, but is a reminder that fit indices are sample statistics that are
affected by sampling error (Kline, 2005).
The CFI is based on a ratio of the chi-square of the tested model and the
independent or null model. The range of values for the CFI are zero (0) to one (1), but a
value of one does not indicate a perfect fit, just that the chi-square of the model is less
than the degrees of freedom of the model tested. Generally, a value equal to or above .95
has been considered to signify a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
One recent simulation indicates that fit values are affected by sample size,
complexity, and misspecification of the model (Sivo et al., 2006). For example, for a
simple confirmatory model, the RMSEA value for a sample size of 500 should be .03 in
order to ensure the rejection of all misspecified models. But, the standardized root mean
square residual (SRMR) value would be .15 which is considered high (Sivo et al., 2006).
The fit indices discussed above are used for continuous data but work has been
conducted with categorical data. The TLI and CFI values, for categorical data, should be
greater than or equal to .95. For the RMSEA, a value less than or equal to .06 indicates a
good fit (Yu, 2002). Yu also believes that another index, the weighted root mean square
residual (WRMR), should have a value less than .90 for both continuous and categorical
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data. It is important to judge the overall fit from multiple indices and not just a single fit
index (Hu & Bentler, 1999). This study, therefore, will utilize the TLI, CFI, and RMSEA
fit indices.
Nested models.
Nested models are modified versions of the original, theorized model. Nested
models occur when researchers add or remove relationships among observed or latent
variables after analysis. The core of this post-analytic process should be an examination
of the coefficients of hypothesized relationships. The researcher examines the
significance of individual structural paths representing the impact of one latent construct
on another, or the latent construct on the observed variable as is the case with CFA. The
statistical significance of path coefficients are established through an examination of the
t- or z-values (depending on the software) associated with structural coefficients. It is
important to note that a standardized coefficient can be greater than one and does not
indicate that there is something wrong, but that there might be a high degree of multicollinearity; two variables highly correlated for example will bias the results (Joreskog,
2006).
SEM is an a priori method; therefore, the removal or addition of a relationship
(direct/indirect or correlated), called a modification, has to make theoretical, not just
statistical, sense. Basing modifications to the hypothesized model only on statistical
results may lead to a final model that highlights quirks or unique characteristics of the
sample rather than be representative of the population. Typically, removing a path will
result in a higher or worse chi-square value, and adding a path will lower the chi-square
value. Modification values, which indicate which paths should be added or removed, are
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either the Lagrange Multiplier which examines how much the chi-square would decrease
if a specific path was added, or the Wald W statistic which examines how much the chisquare would increase if a specific path was removed.
Once a modification is made, also called model trimming or building, the original
model and the new model are compared. The comparison is a chi-square difference
analysis and tests the null hypothesis of identical fit between the two models. If multiple
systematic modifications are made, the researcher should report fit indices with the first
and final model.
It should be noted that once modifications have been completed, the analysis has
moved from confirmatory to exploratory. Researchers are often tempted to re-specify or
modify the original model when they find that parameter estimates were statistically nonsignificant. However, the abuse of fit indices occurs when the researcher attempts to keep
improving the fit by running the data over and over again (Ullman, 2001).
Alternative models.
When testing alternative models with the same data that are not nested or
hierarchically related, the chi-square test between old and new models is not appropriate.
There are two good choices for the researcher at this point for fit index comparison; the
Akake Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In general,
the model with the lowest value is the best. Researchers may consider mathematically
equivalent models, and an equivalent model should provide the same predicted
correlation or covariances but with different paths among the manifest variables (Kline,
2005; MacCallum & Austin, 2000).
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Residuals.
The residuals, that is, the difference between the observed score and the predicted
score based on the model, should be discussed in any SEM report. The general rule of
thumb is to look for correlation residuals (fitted residuals) that have an absolute value
greater than .10. There is no rule for how many of these indicate a problem, but as the
size of the number increases, the more compromised the model’s explanatory power
becomes. A discussion of the standardized form of the residuals is preferred. The
standardized residual values enable the researcher to determine the number of standard
deviations of observed residuals from zero residuals that should exist if the causal model
fits perfectly (Byrne, 2006). A Q-plot, which graphs the standardized residuals in
comparison to a 45-degree line, displays residual values that extremely depart from the
Q-plot line, that is, no longer on the line or close to the line, indicating that the model is
in some way misspecified (Byrne, 2006).
Research Question 2
Are there gender differences between the latent factor scores?
To answer this question, a between-subjects MANOVA was run with the four
latent factors as dependent variables and gender as the between-subjects independent
variables. When there are two or more dependent variables, multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) compares the population means (multivariate) of two or more
groups and tests the statistical significance of differences in the group’s means. This
analysis helps to answer whether changes in the independent variable(s) lead to
significant effects on the dependent variables and the interactions between and among
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those dependent variables and between and among the independent variables. The test
results in individual p-values for each dependent variable that allow the researcher to
conclude whether or not the differences and interactions between them are statistically
significant. MANOVA is appropriate when you have multiple-dependent variables that
are correlated (Schreiber & Asner-Self, 2010).
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Chapter Four
Results

This chapter presents the results of the study based on the data collected from
1,016 completed surveys. The results are presented by research questions.
Research Question 1
Will the data collected fit the hypothesized latent factor model? To answer this
question, a confirmatory factor analysis using EQS 6.1 build XV (Bentler, 2005) was
completed. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors was chosen
(Bentler, 2005) along with RMSEA, TLI, CFI , and SRMR as the fit indices of choice
(Schreiber, 2008; Sivo et al., 2006).
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Table 3. Conceptual Model of this Study
The twenty-one attitudes hypothesized to underlay the four latent factors
Factor 1
Importance/Usefulness

Factor 2
Threats to relationships

Underlying attitudes

Underlying attitudes

Don’t see myself using

Other classes are more
important/ useful
Not sure studying
negotiation would be
useful
Don’t need since I’m
already an effective
negotiator
Negotiation can’t be
taught
Don’t really know
what negotiation is

Factor 3
Concerns with class
methodology
Underlying attitudes

Factor 4
External locus of
control
Underlying attitudes

Concerned with taking
advantage of other
party (fairness)
I lack confidence in my
negotiating skills

I’m not interested in
studying

It’s not polite to brag
when discussing salary

I can learn to
negotiate on my own

I’m concerned about
pushback

Unsure about how
class would be taught
(methodology)
Don’t know enough
about negotiation to
take a class
My friends don’t take
the class

Employer should
determine starting
salaries
Negotiation is as much
about luck as skill

I’m risk-averse and
negotiation is risky
I’m not competitive but
negotiation is

I’m intimidated by
those with more power

I lack negotiation role
models

These attitudes and beliefs about negotiation inhibit men and women
from taking advantage of opportunities to improve their negotiation skills.

Testing the Model
The CFA analysis allows us to conclude that the hypothesized model results
indicate a moderate fit to the data given that the RMSEA is somewhat elevated and the
CFI and TLI are at the lower end of the acceptable range (Table 5). While the residuals
are normally distributed, a few are high (>.20). The internal consistencies (alpha of the
original four factors) are as follows:
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Table 4. Internal Consistency
Factor
Factor 1 - Importance/usefulness

Internal
consistency
.68

Factor 2 – Threats to relationships

.72

Factor 3 - Concerns with class methodology

.68

Factor 4 - External locus of control

.58

Table 5. Fit Results across Models
S-B Chi Square/df
TLI
CFI
RMSEA

Hypothesized
919.92/160

Correlated errors
1074/159

Item 17 on factor 2
720.98/159
.90
.90
.058 CI [.05, .063]

At first, it appeared that correlating the errors of item 17 (I don’t know enough
about negotiation to be comfortable taking an elective class on the subject) and item 3 (I
don’t have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice negotiating in front of a
class) would clean up some of the residual issues and improve the fit. However, to the
contrary, it increased the Santorra-Bentler Adjusted Chi-Square value indicating a worse
fitting model. Item 17 appeared to remain a problem and modification index results
suggested that it should be aligned with Factors 2 (Threats to Relationships). Fortunately,
this significantly dropped the Santorra-Bentler Chi-Square value (198.94, 1, df, p<.001)
indicating a much better fitting model. Though the Chi-Square value indicates misfit in
the model, there is still disagreement whether Chi-Square should be used in large samples
such as the one forming the basis of this study (>1,000 participants) (Kline, 2005).
Two alternative models were also tested. The first alternative model was a onefactor model which did not fit the data (Satorra-Bentler Chi-Square was 3298.01, 188 df;
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RMSEA =.12). The second alternative model was a random assignment of items to
factors. Because of high factor correlations, a second-level factor model with two macro
factors of factors 1 and 3 and 2 and 4 was completed. Again, the chi-square increased to
761.18 on 158 df, with a RMSEA = .65. This is a statistically significant difference
indicating a worse fit. For these reasons the two alternative models were rejected. Figure
41 shows the CFA path diagram of the final model.
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Figure 41. Path diagram of the Negotiation Opportunity Reluctance Model (NORM). The
NORM shows the constellation of attitudes and beliefs that serve to inhibit men and
women from taking advantage of opportunities to improve their negotiation skills.

Some suggest that arbitrary cutoff levels should not be used in interpreting factor
loadings. Others contend that a .7 standard is too rigorous and propose a more modest .4
standard while yet others recommend that loadings above .6 should be considered “high,”
and those below .4, “low.”
By one rule of thumb in confirmatory factor analysis, loadings should be 0.7 or
higher to confirm that independent variables identified a priori are represented by
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a particular PC, on the rationale that the 0.7 level corresponds to about half of the
variance in the indicator being explained by the factor. However, the 0.7 standard
is a high one and real-life data may well not meet this criterion, which is why
some researchers, particularly for exploratory purposes, will use a lower level
such as 0.4 for the central factor and 0.25 for other factors and call loadings above
0.6 "high," and those below 0.4 "low." In any event, factor loadings must be
interpreted in the light of theory, not by arbitrary cutoff levels (NIRACLE, n.d.).

In CFA, goodness of fit, or the discrepancy between observed values and the
values that can be expected under the model, are used to confirm whether or not a
hypothesized model offers a plausible explanation of behavior. An acceptable goodness
of fit leads to acceptance of the model, and conversely, a poor goodness of fit requires
rejection of the model.
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Table 6. Overall Goodness of Fit Values

Chi Squared

Bentler-Bonnet
Normed Fit Index
(NFI)

Bentler-Bonnet NonNormed Fit Index
(NNFI)
Bentler’s
Comparative Fit
Index (CFI)

Bollen’s Incremental
Fit Index (IFI)

Root Mean Square
Error of
Approximation
(RMSEA)

What’s measured

Generally acceptable
goodness-of-fit values

Tests a null hypothesis that the
frequency distribution of certain
events observed in a population
sample is consistent with a
particular theoretical distribution
and assesses the magnitude of the
discrepancy between the fitted
covariance matrices and a sample
Analyzes the discrepancy
between the chi-squared value of
the hypothesized model and the
chi-squared value of the null
model
Analyzes the discrepancy
between the chi-squared value of
the hypothesized model and the
chi-squared value of the null
model
Examines the discrepancy
between the data and the
hypothesized model, while
adjusting for the sample size
issues inherent in the chi-squared
and NFI fit index
Compares a chi-square for the
model tested to a null model that
specifies that all measured
variables are uncorrelated (there
are no latent variables)
Analyzes the discrepancy
between the hypothesized model,
with optimally chosen parameter
estimates, and the population
covariance matrix

If probability of
observing the difference
is higher than
conventional criteria for
statistical significance
(.001-.05), we would not
reject the null, but is
affected by sample size
.90 – .95 or higher

Actual
goodness-offit values for
the NORM
919.2/160

.0924

0.90 – 0.95 or higher

.0923

.90 – .95 or higher

.0935

.90 or higher

.0935

<.03 = excellent fit
<.05 = close fit
<.08 = reasonable fit
>.10 = poor fit

.073
(90%
confidence
interval of
RMSEA)
(.069, .077)

Research Question 2
To answer research question 2, a MANOVA was completed because the factors
were found to be highly correlated (Table 6). Descriptive and inferential statistics are
provided below in Table 7.
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Table 7. Means and Standard Deviation across Factors by Gender
Mean

sd

n

-.03

.99

406

.02

1.01

610

-.19

.96

406

Factor score 1 –
Importance/Usefulness

Male

Factor score 2 –
Threats to Relationships

Male
Female

.14

1.00

610

Factor score 3 –
Concerns with Class
Methodology
Factor Score 4 –
External Locus of Control

Male

.02

.98

406

Female

.00

1.02

610

-.08

.99

406

.06

1.00

610

Female

Male
Female

Assumptions Tested
In MANOVA, as with other linear techniques, there is the assumption of
normality, multivariate normality, independence, random sampling and homogeneity of
covariance matrices.
In this study, normality was examined based on the skew and kurtosis of each
factor scored. All are normally distributed in the univariate sense. Outliers were
examined with box blots and no serious outliers were observed. Next, outliers were
checked with the Mahalanobis test with Chi-Square using the regression option in SPSS.
The Box-Test, used to test the covariance matrices, was statistically significant (p =
.001). An examination of the covariance matrix did not show any major issue, nor did the
residual plots (see example in Figure 42) show anything odd. It is possible that the test is
overly conservative to the sample size as has been discussed by Tabachnik and Fidell
(2007). Given these two issues, we can conclude that the other results can probably be
trusted (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Below, Pillai’s Trace was chosen because of the
failed Box Test. The assumptions of random selection from the population cannot be
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tested, and is generally assumed because most social science studies do not randomly
select from the population and then randomly assign. Given that the two groups are males
and females, it was not necessary to randomly assign participants to either group. The key
to a MANOVA is having a representative sample, and in this case even that cannot be
fully determined. Rather, that assumption is most likely untenable because participants
who completed the survey may have been more willing to express their views about
negotiation than those who chose not to participate.

Figure 42. Residual plot of the factor score Importance/Usefulness from the MANOVA.

The following table shows the multivariate results. For gender differences, Pillai’s
trace (as with the others) indicates a statistically significant difference between males and
females on two factor scores, Threats to Relationships and External Locus of Control, but
not on two others - Importance/Usefulness, and Concerns with Class Methodology.
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Table 8. Multivariate Tests of Statistical Significance
Effect

Intercept

Gender

Value

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

Pillai's
Trace

.97

7962.56a

4.00

1011.00

.00

Partial
eta
squared
.97

Noncent.
parameter

Observed
powerb

31850.23

1.00

Wilks'
Lambda

.03

7962.56a

4.00

1011.00

.00

.97

31850.23

1.00

Hotelling's
Trace

1.50

7962.56a

4.00

1011.00

.00

.97

31850.23

1.00

Roy's
Largest
Root

1.50

7962.56a

4.00

1011.00

.00

.97

31850.23

1.00

Pillai's
Trace

.03

7.69a

4.00

1011.00

0.00

.03

30.76

1.00

Wilks'
Lambda

.97

7.69a

4.00

1011.00

0.00

.03

30.76

1.00

Hotelling's
Trace

.03

7.69a

4.00

1011.00

0.00

.03

30.76

1.00

Roy's
Largest
Root

.03

7.69a

4.00

1011.00

0.00

.03

30.76

1.00

a. Exact statistic
b. Computed using alpha = .05

Table 9 displays the between-subject results for the MANOVA. As indicated, the
independent variables (gender) had a statistically significant effect on two of the
dependent variables (beliefs). The effect sizes (partial eta squared) are low, but do show
that there are some important gender differences here. With females indicating much
stronger agreement than males with two of the beliefs, we can conclude that when
women negotiate, not only are they more concerned about the impact that negotiating
might have on their relationships, but also more strongly assume that they lack the power
or influence to affect the outcomes of those negotiations.
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Table 9. Between-Subjects MANOVA Results
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source

Corrected
Model

Intercept

Gender

Error

Total

Corrected
Total

Importance/
usefulness
Threats to
Relationships
Concerns with
Class Method.
External Locus
of Control
Importance/
Usefulness
Threats to
Relationships
Concerns with
Class Method.
External Locus
of Control
Importance/
Usefulness
Threats to
Relationships
Concerns with
Class Method.
External Locus
of Control
Importance/
Usefulness
Threats to
Relationships
Concerns with
Class Method.
External Locus
of Control
Importance/
Usefulness
Threats to
Relationships
Concerns with
Class Method.
External Locus
of Control
Importance/
Usefulness
Threats to
Relationships
Concerns with
Class Method.
External Locus
of Control

Type III
sum of
squares
.28a

Sig.
0.42

Partial
eta
squared
0.00

Noncent.
parameter
0.66

Observed
powere
0.13

26.37

0.00

0.03

26.37

1.00

0.04

0.07

0.79

0.00

0.07

0.06

1

2.91

5.14

0.02

0.01

5.14

0.62

5541.54

1

5541.54

12955.74

0.00

0.93

12955.74

1.00

9686.96

1

9686.96

26065.52

0.00

0.96

26065.52

1.00

9005.25

1

9005.25

15448.96

0.00

0.94

15448.96

1.00

12664.14

1

12664.14

22319.08

0.00

0.96

22319.08

1.00

0.28

1

0.28

0.66

0.42

0.00

0.66

0.13

9.80

1

9.80

26.37

0.00

0.03

26.37

1.00

0.04

1

0.04

0.07

0.79

0.00

0.07

0.06

2.91

1

2.91

5.14

0.02

0.01

5.14

0.62

433.72

1,014

0.43

376.84

1,014

0.37

591.06

1,014

0.58

575.36

1,014

0.57

6224.88

1,016

10609.88

1,016

9982.76

1,016

13854.94

1,016

434.00

1,015

386.64

1,015

591.11

1,015

578.27

1,015

Df
1

Mean
square
0.28

F
0.66

9.80b

1

9.80

.04c

1

2.91d

NOTE:
a. R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = .000) b. R Squared = .025 (Adjusted R Squared = .024)
c. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001) d. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = .004)
e. Computed using alpha = .05
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Chapter Five
Discussion
The Female’s Paradox: “Dissed if you negotiate, but disadvantaged if you don’t.”
Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.
George E. P. Box (1987, p. 424)
Whether measured by underrepresentation in the executive suite or on boards of
directors, higher unemployment rates, or lower average annual earnings, women face
many inequities in the workplace. These disparities are troubling not only from a fairness
perspective given our country’s longstanding public policy of equal distribution of social
and economic opportunities, but because of the potential impact on our nation’s
economic competitiveness.
One inequity that has far-reaching implications is the gender wage gap. Whether
and to what extent women’s reluctance to negotiate salary is a contributing factor remains
unclear although one study seems to indicate so – it found that individuals who chose to
negotiate could increase their salary offers by as much as $5,000 (Marks & Harold,
2011). We have seen that women are not only less likely than men to engage in salary
negotiations, but in some cases, eight or nine times less likely (Babcock & Laschever,
2003).
To illustrate women’s feelings about negotiation, one study surveyed 2,500
professionals in eight countries regarding their feelings about having to negotiate for a
higher salary. Not only were Americans, in general, most likely to feel anxious (39%),
but the group that reported the greatest degree of discomfort was American women
(73%) (LinkedIn, 2012).
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When presented with opportunities to negotiate salary, a reluctance to ask for
more money can have a significant impact on earnings. One study found that employees
who engaged in suboptimal conflict resolution behaviors (e.g., avoiding) received lower
ratings of leadership effectiveness which, in turn, led to a diminished likelihood of being
promoted and denying them the opportunity to receive a pay increase. As negotiation is a
conflict resolution technique, this study would seem to suggest that avoiding
opportunities to negotiate can jeopardize promotional opportunities, and the higher
salaries that accompany advancement into progressively more responsible levels of
management (Eckerd College, 2004).
Another study showed the impact that an avoiding style of negotiating can have
on salaries. As shown in Figure 43, it is the only style that doesn’t offer the potential to
increase one’s salary (Marks & Harold, 2011).

Figure 43. Model of salary negotiations.
Note: Marks & Harold. 2011, at p. 3.
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A second potential implication of a reluctance to negotiate is that it can lead to a
diminution of promotional opportunities which can inhibit a woman’s ascension into the
executive ranks, and subsequent appointment to boards of directors. This not only can
deprive women of the opportunity to earn significant additional outside income, but
organizations that lack female board representation tend to underperform those that don’t.
According to one study which examined the financial performance of 2,360 companies
over a six year period, companies with no female board members underperformed those
who did by twenty-six percent, and averaged net income growth of only ten percent, as
compared to fourteen percent for companies with female directors (Credit Suisse
Research Institute, 2012).
A third major impact of an unwillingness to negotiate salary is that it can result in
lower average starting salaries in the very beginning of a woman’s career. The NACE
2010 Student Survey detailing starting salaries for graduating college seniors revealed
that, on average, the median starting salary for female graduates was almost $8,000 less
than their male classmates (and, it should be noted that this 17% difference in men’s and
women’s salaries approximates the wage gap generally (NACE, 2011).
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Figure 44. 2012 NACE report of job and salary offers, by major and gender.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.naceweb.org/gender/?print=yes.
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Figure 45. 2012 NACE report of median salary offers, by major and gender.
Note: Retrieved from http://www.naceweb.org/gender/?print=yes, at p. 5-6.

It’s also worth noting that a lower starting salary can have a tremendous
compounding effect on total earnings over the course of a woman’s career. One study
calculated the potential loss of earnings as follows. During their lifetime female high
school graduates will earn $700,000 less than male high school graduates, female college
graduates will earn $1.2 million less than male graduates, and a female professional
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school graduate will earn about $2 million less than their male classmates (The Wage
Project, [n.d.]).
Another often overlooked impact of women’s lower starting salaries can be found
in the research on fairness. This line of inquiry advances the notion that how a woman
perceives the outcome of her salary negotiations with her employer affects whether or not
she thinks that she’s being treated fairly (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Porter et al., 2004). And,
this is not unimportant in that other studies have linked pay dissatisfaction with higher
levels of absenteeism, increased tardiness and turnover, and compromised organizational
performance (Williams et al., 2006).
In light of the significant negative residual effects that reluctance to negotiate has
on individuals, organizations, and society in general, women should be encouraged to
take advantage of every opportunity to improve their ability to ask for more money.
Towards that end, this study identified those attitudes and beliefs that appear to inhibit
women from taking advantage of opportunities to improve their skills, and proposed and
tested an hypothesized model attempting to explain the same.
In short, as discussed in Chapter 4, the model tested was not only shown to be
plausible, but some significant differences between men and women’s attitudes and
beliefs about studying negotiation emerged. The public policy implications of these
results, and suggestions for future avenues of inquiry, will now be explored.
Research Questions
As we have seen, the model posits that four core beliefs that inhibit women from
taking advantage of opportunities to improve their negotiation skills; i.e., negotiation is
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not important/useful, threats to relationships, concerns about class methodology, and an
external locus of control (perceived lack of power to affect outcomes).
The assumption about negotiation’s utility ( that is, that it isn’t important/useful),
is consistent with research which suggests that women are much less likely than men to
recognize opportunities to negotiate (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). In one study men
reported that they had most recently negotiated within just the past two weeks, while
women reported that for them it had been over twice as long. And, men said that their
second-most-recent negotiation had occurred about seven weeks prior, in contrast to
women who said a full six months earlier (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2004).
To suggest that lack of importance/usefulness can inhibit women from taking negotiation
coursework is also consistent with studies that have shown that women’s willingness to
invest in studying a topic is largely a function of its perceived utility.
For instance, in one study that looked at the reasons behind women’s
underrepresentation in STEM coursework, the primary reason was an assumption that
studying math would not be useful (Armstrong & Price, 1982). Other studies have
reached the same conclusion (Armstrong, 1985; Hilton & Berglund, 1974; Pedro,
Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981, Berryman, 1983). Lantz and Smith (1981) also
concluded that enrollment in math and science electives is related to student’s interest in
the topic, their perceived prospects for doing well in those classes, and their prior
achievement.
That women might question the utility of certain subjects also finds support in the
research of Reyes (1984) who concluded that women don’t study math because they
don’t perceive it to be relevant to their future career goals.
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The second core belief centers around women’s concerns about how negotiating
might impact their relationships. More so than men, women feel the need to act in ways
that are seen as socially acceptable (Walters et al., 1998, Kolb, 2002) and expect
pushback when they don’t (Snyder & Tanke, 1977, Rasmussen & Moely, 1986). And,
because the terms used to describe negotiation tend to be “male-centric,” this may explain
why women assume that negotiation is something that “males” do, and should they
choose to engage in it, they run the risk of pushback for acting non-stereotypically (i.e.,
“masculine”).
Findings that women choose to avoid topics they view to be “male” is consistent
with studies that find that similar concerns discourage women from studying STEM
subjects (Kolb, 2002). And, so, to the same degree that women view studying math and
negotiation as “male,” they will feel it a topic more suitable for men who also have an
inherent aptitude to understand it better (Zimmer & Bennett, 1987). And, in a related
vein, others have suggested that girls who see certain subjects as masculine and therefore
not necessarily relevant to their own lives, may also feel less motivated to do well in
those subjects (Stage et al., 1985).
Perhaps women’s sensitivity to how others see them, including the need to
maintain positive relationships and fear of pushback, are manifestations of an overall
aversion to risk. Since women tend to be more risk-averse than men (Eckel & Grossman,
2002, p. 292) it seems consistent that they would be reluctant to take a negotiation class
because while it might allow them to become more effective negotiators, it would
concomitantly increase the risk that they could damage their relationships in the process.
In apparent support of this notion, one study concluded that the more risk-averse an
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individual, the less likely they are to negotiate: “We expect that individuals who are more
risk averse will frame a salary negotiation as more of a risk and thus be less willing to
enter into negotiation” (Marks & Harold, 2011, p. 375). These authors went on to
conclude: “Individual differences played a significant role in predicting whether or not
individuals negotiated, and if so, what strategies they used. Risk-averse individuals
tended to shy away from negotiating at all” (Marks & Harold, 2011, p. 386).
And women, despite strides in education and rising labor market participation
rates, report feeling less confident and knowledgeable about financial matters than men
(Prudential Research Study, 2010). Thus, because annual earnings often lie at the heart of
our perceived financial wellbeing, it’s plausible that women might come to view salary
negotiations as simply another kind of financial decision.
The third core belief, centering on concerns about how the class might be taught
(class methodology), appears to reflect a generalized fear of the unknown, perhaps
apprehension that a woman would find herself isolated in a predominantly male class
where they would be in the minority. Insecurities can also arise from the expectation that
not only would their performance be judged, but they would have to compete with male
classmates for grades as well.
And, perhaps women’s apparent assumption that they can learn to negotiate on
their own is really a defense mechanism that allows them to give themselves permission
to avoid studying the subject. This conclusion appears to find support in the concept of
self-efficacy, that is, the notion that people are willing to engage in self-deception to
avoid a task they perceive to be unpleasant (Bandura & Simon, 1977; Locke & Bobko,
1984).
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Extrapolating from previous studies that conclude that women tend to make more
modest attributions for their performance when they believe their accomplishments will
be made public (Berg et al., 1981), perhaps they would be concerned that the class would
require role playing, particularly where they have pre-existing doubts about how they
would perform (Thornburg, 1995). It’s not surprising that research has found that
individuals pursue studies in areas that they value and expect success in (Chipman &
Thomas, 1984), and students who like certain subjects are more successful in those
studies (Schofield, 1982). And because girls do less well when they like the subject less
(Armstrong, 1980), their feelings about negotiation may affect their willingness to
participate in those kinds of courses.
The fourth core belief appears to be consistent with women’s generally higher
external locus of control. Individuals with an external locus are more likely to believe
their fate is determined by chance, or outside forces over which they have limited or no
control. That women tend to have a higher external locus finds support in the research of
Smith et al. (1997), Kunhikrishnan and Manikandan (1995), and De Brabander and
Boone (1990). Yet others attribute women’s higher external locus scores to their greater
awareness of external constraints on their ability to achieve their goals (Doherty &
Baldwin, 1985), which in this context might reflect women’s assumption that in a
negotiation, the other party (particularly a male) has more power than they do.
The four attitudes the current study hypothesized were associated with an external
locus of control (i.e., women are more willing to defer to others in setting their salary,
believe that negotiation is as much about luck as it is skill, perceive that they lack the
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power to influence the outcomes of their negotiations, and need to act modestly), are all
consistent with this notion of an external locus of control.
That an external locus should assume a perceived lack of power (Keltner et al.,
2003) should perhaps not be surprising given that women live in a male-dominated
society where many privileges and opportunities tend to favor men. And, women’s
reluctance to call attention to their accomplishments (brag), is consistent with their
acculturation to behave modestly, or a self-defense mechanism to minimize calling
attention to themselves. Other studies conclude that in competitive situations, women are
prone to undervalue their accomplishments, behavior that also comports with a reluctance
to self-promote (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004).
One study that showed a strong implicit bias against female job applicants appears
to confirm women’s assumption that others exert undue influence over them. A random
sample of one hundred and twenty-seven faculty members from different universities in
biology, chemistry and physics (STEM subjects) were asked to evaluate hypothetical
applicants for a lab manager position, with application materials and resumes identical in
every respect except that half had a male name at the top and the other half a female
name. Faculty were then asked to rate the applicants on a number of different dimensions.
Even though only the names differed, reviewers, both male and female, rated the
applicants they assumed to be male more competent, more likely to be hired, deserving of
a higher salary and more worthy of mentoring (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012). Similarly,
McIntyre, Moberg, and Posner (1980) concluded that when resumes of hypothetical job
candidates differing in the gender of the name only were mailed to four hundred and
fifty-eight potential employers, male candidates also received preferential treatment.
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The NORM also showed how and to what degree all four beliefs positively
covariated. It showed, for instance, that the more strongly women feel about any one
belief, the more strongly they also feel about the other three hypothesized beliefs. This
translates into the more a woman questions the importance/usefulness of negotiation, the
more she fears pushback, the more reluctant she will be about taking a class to study the
topic, and the more she assumes that outside factors impact the outcomes of her
negotiations.
Women’s concerns about relationships also strongly covary with external locus of
control (.95 correlation coefficient, .90 coefficient of determination). So, the more
concerned a woman is about pushback, the more likely she is to accept that others exert
influence over her (external locus of control), and vice versa. Perhaps one way to
understand this interaction is that women’s heightened sensitivity to what others think
allows a point of entry for other people to exert even more influence over them, and
conversely, the more women accede control of their life to others, the more important
those relationships are believed to be. And, as a side note, people who perceive a lack of
control over their circumstances are more likely to experience greater levels of depression
and career burnout (Glass et al., 1993).
This study also underscores a strong correlation between the assumption that
negotiation is unimportant/not useful and reluctance to take a class (.90 correlation
coefficient, .81 coefficient of determination). Not surprisingly, and consistent with the
research on the dearth of women in STEM studies, the more women feel that negotiation
is not going to be useful, the less likely they will be to invest the necessary time and
resources to master the skill.
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Doubts about importance/usefulness also appear significantly associated with a
strong external locus (.72 correlation coefficient, .52 coefficient of determination), and a
strong external locus is similarly associated with concerns about taking the class (.66
correlation coefficient, .44 coefficient of determination). One way to view this
relationship may be to say that the more women assume that control over their lives lies
outside of their control, the more they feel that a skill predicated on exerting control over
their environment is not particularly useful, and if a particular skill is not useful, there’s
little reason to study it.
Similarly, lack of perceived importance/usefulness and fear of pushback are also
strongly correlated (.61 correlation coefficient, .37 coefficient of determination), possibly
because the more pushback women expect to receive were they to negotiate, the more it
will cause them to question whether learning how to negotiate more effectively is going
to end up being all that useful to them.
It also seems intuitive that the more concerned women are about pushback, the
less interested they would be in mastering a skill they presume will engender that very
result (.51, .26 coefficient of determination). To the degree that this suggests a lack of
confidence about their expected performance in class, this would be consistent with the
research of Craver and Barnes (1999) who found that women were much more likely than
their male classmates to take law school negotiation electives for no-credit. They attribute
this to women’s lack of confidence in how they would fare in a competitive class.
Similarly, see also a study which found that women’s propensity to apply for a position
also substantially decreases if they assume the workplace is going to be “competitive”
(Flory et al., 2010).
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Finally, the model revealed a unidirectional vector running from “Threatens
Relationships” and toward “Don’t Need/Already Effective.” Because these two
assumptions are negatively correlated, it shows that the more women assume that
negotiating can harm their relationships, the less likely they are to conclude that these
skills are important or useful (and, to that degree, the less likely they will be to take the
class). On the other hand, the less they believe that negotiating harms relationships, the
more likely they will find it to be important/useful, and the more amenable they’ll be to
enroll in a class.
Attitudes that Correlate with Non-enrollment in Negotiation Electives
While the NORM suggests the attitudes and beliefs that can keep women out of
the negotiation classroom, a correlation was also run to confirm if any of these attitudes
could be shown to be actually associated with non-enrollment. Results are summarized in
Table 10.
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Table 10. Attitudes Associated with Non-enrollment in Negotiation Electives
Females

Males

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

.44

.87

Lack confidence

<.01*,**

.03*

Won’t use

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

.24

.96

.055*

.16

Can learn on my own

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

Other classes more important/useful

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

Employer should determine salary

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

Negotiation involves luck

<.01*,**

.22

Risk-averse

<.01*,**

.03*

Not sure useful

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

Class methodology

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

.06

.03*

Can’t be taught

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

Don’t know enough about negotiation

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

Already effective

<.01*,**

<.01*,**

Friends don’t take

.01*,**

.11

Not sure what it is

<.01*,**

.07

.22

.56

.02*

.06

No interest in studying
Concern with taking advantage

Lack role models
Concern with pushback

Intimidated

Modesty
Not competitive
* Significant at .05.
** Significant at .01.

Generally consistent with the model, seventeen of the twenty-one attitudes were
shown to be associated with women’s non-enrollment in negotiation electives, and
thirteen with men’s non-enrollment. Eleven attitudes were strongly associated with nonenrollment (<0.01) for both men and women (no interest in studying, won’t use, can learn
on own, other classes more important/useful, employer determines salary, negotiation
involves luck, not sure useful, concern with class methodology, can’t be taught, don’t
know enough about, and already effective), and two were associated for both men and
women but at different levels of significance (lack of confidence and risk-averse). Four
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attitudes were not significant for men, but were for women (concern with pushback,
friends don’t take, not sure what negotiation is, and not competitive). Feeling intimidated
was significant for men, but not women. And, only three attitudes were not associated
with non-enrollment for either men or women (concern with taking advantage of
negotiating counterpart, lack of role models, and modesty). Table 11 reports these same
results, but in a somewhat different way.
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Table 11. Correlation of Attitudes with Non-enrollment in Negotiation Electives

Friends don’t take
Not sure what negotiation is
Lack confidence
Risk-averse
No interest in studying
Won’t use
Can learn on my own
Other classes more important/useful
Employer should determine salary
Negotiation involves luck
Not sure useful
Class methodology
Can’t be taught
Don’t know enough about negotiation
Already effective
Not competitive
Concern with pushback

Women
Men
Significant at the 0.01 level
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Significant at the 0.05 level
X
X

Lack confidence
Risk-averse
Feeling intimidated

X
X
X
Not significant

Intimidated
Concern with taking advantage
Lack role models
Modesty
Concern with pushback
Friends don’t take
Not sure what negotiation is
Not competitive

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Although CFA and correlation look at data from two different statistical
perspectives, the results of these two analyses, and the way in which they appear
together, serve to lend added credence to the assumption that the NORM is plausible.
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A between-subjects MANOVA was also run to determine the effect of gender (the
two independent variables) on each of the dependent variables (the four core beliefs).
While it was hypothesized that gender would not affect the degree to which men and
women identified with each belief, in two instances this not shown to be the case. Rather,
statistically significant differences were found between men and women’s average scores
(degree of agreement with) on concerns about the impact that negotiating had on
relationships and locus of control, but not, however, on perceived importance or
usefulness of negotiation nor on class methodology. These results suggest that women, to
a much greater extent than men, have concerns about the negative impact negotiating will
have on how others see them, as well as the assumption that the results of their
negotiations lie more with their negotiating counterpart than with their own efforts.
Conclusions and Implications
Attempts to overcome the four demotivating beliefs may impact men and
women’s willingness to improve their negotiation skills differently.
Because the MANOVA revealed that women have significant concerns that
negotiating has the potential to harm their relationships, and see themselves to be less
powerful than their negotiating counterparts, it would seem to follow that we could
expect these feelings to more strongly demotivate them from enrolling in negotiation
electives. Perhaps, then, to the extent that universities attempt to increase female
enrollment in these electives by conveying the message that they can learn to become
more effective negotiators in ways that don’t harm relationships, and become more
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empowered in the process, this particular emphasis would have a more meaningful
impact.
This study increases our understanding of factors contributing to the
gender wage gap.
While not all the reasons for the wage gap have been identified, many researchers
have proposed that women’s reluctance to negotiate their salary may be a largely
overlooked contributor (Nadler & Nadler, 1987; Dey & Hill, 2007; Olson et al., 1987;
Blau & Kahn, 1997; Wood et al., 1993; Weinberger, 1998). This view finds support from
at least one professional recruiter who lamented in an online blog:
Today I finished interviewing my third new hire this month, two of which are
women. They both are getting paid substantially less than the man I hired earlier
this month, and to be honest I am getting tired of that. I don't set the wages, I just
handle negotiations (HR has to approve every offer I make). Our process, despite
the pay gap, is identical for men and women. We start with phone interviews, and
move into a personal and technical interview. Once a candidate passes both of
those, we start salary negotiations. This is where the women seem to come in last.
The reason they don't keep up, from where I sit, is simple. Often, a woman will
enter the salary negotiation phase and I'll tell them a number will be sent to them
in a couple days. Usually we start around $45k for an entry level position. Fifty to
sixty percent of the women I interview simply take this offer. It's insane, I already
know I can get authorization for more if you simply refuse. Inversely, almost 90%
of the men I interview immediately ask for more upon getting the offer. The next
major mistake happens with how they ask for more. In general, the women I have
negotiated with will say 45k is not enough and they need more, but not give a
number. I will then usually give a nominal bump to 48k or 50k. Company policy
won’t let me bump more than 5k over the initial offer unless they specifically
request more. On the other hand, men more frequently will come back with a
number along the lines of 65k to 75k, and I will be forced to negotiate down from
there. After this phase, almost all women will take the offer or move on to
somewhere else, not knowing they could have gotten more if they asked. At the
end, most of the women I hire make between 45k and 50k, whereas the men make
between 60k and 70k. Even more crazy, they ask for raises far less often, so the
disparity only grows.
(Retrieved from
http://www.reddit.com/r/TwoXChromosomes/comments/hvv2m/i_work_for_a_la
rge_multinational_tech_company_i/).
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The implications of this study showing how women hold generally negative
feelings about negotiating, previously referenced research which suggests that women’s
reluctance to ask can have a negative impact on their salaries, and anecdotal evidence
lamenting women’s inability to negotiate, lend further credence to the assumption that
individual behavior (i.e., women’s reluctance to ask, along with a reluctance to take
advantages to learn how) may have a largely unexplored role to play in the gender wage
gap.
Independent samples T-test.
In addition to running a MANOVA to determine the influence of gender on the
four core beliefs, an independent samples t-test was also run to compare the means of
men and women’s scores on each of the twenty-one attitude statements. At the .05
confidence interval, statistically significant gender differences were found on eighteen of
the twenty-one. The only that were not found to be statistically significant were, “Taking
advantage of the other party,” “Lack of role models,” and “Impolite to brag” (Appendix
PP).
Participant’s attitudes about negotiating salary.
Even though most participants reported being primary breadwinners (Appendix
E), nonetheless a majority reported never having negotiated a starting salary (seeing the
need to ask for more money)(Appendix J). It appears that for many, then, even potential
improvements to their standard of living, or just a larger salary in general, are not
sufficient to motivate them to ask for more money.
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On the other hand, work experience does, however, appear to influence propensity
to negotiate. Contrary to currently enrolled students, a majority of alumni had negotiated
their salary, perhaps because they had more opportunities from being in the workforce
longer, had gained greater confidence, or their work experience had taught them the
importance of earning a higher salary (Appendix J).
Both men and women hold similar beliefs regarding the percentage of employers
they believe have more money to give than their original offer (Appendix L),
assumptions that comport with previously cited studies that show that a significant
majority of job offers are in fact negotiable.
When asked to quantify the consequences of countering a prospective employer’s
initial offer, only about one in six participants believed that a majority of employers
would retract a job offer, with more than a third assuming that there was little to no risk
of retraction (Appendix M). Given that these responses suggest that both male and female
participants assume that negotiating salary offers are low risk but high reward, it might be
expected then that they would be emboldened to negotiate their salary, particularly since
most said that they were the primary bread winner, almost all believe that at least some
employers had more money to give, three in four believe that a majority of job offers are
negotiable, and one in three assume that there is less than a one in ten chance that a job
will be retracted. However, even though these results confirm that participants perceived
little downside in countering an initial offer, and assumed a high probability of success
were they to do so, most could not bring themselves to negotiate the offer.
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Participant’s willingness to enroll in negotiation electives.
Assuming skill building to be the focus of negotiation coursework, one way to
measure participant’s receptivity to improving their skills is to determine whether or not
they are willing to take advantage of opportunities to enroll in an available negotiation
elective. Survey question first #15 asked participants if negotiation electives were
available to them:
If you're currently enrolled as a student in your graduate program, was an elective
class in negotiation offered during this current school year (2008-2009)? Or, if
you're not a student but are an alumnus, was an elective negotiation class offered
in your program while you were enrolled as a student?
Question #16 then asked participants who had answered Question #15 in the
affirmative (i.e., negotiation electives were available) whether they had taken the class:
If you're a current student and an elective class in negotiation is offered in your
program did you take the class? Or, if you're an alumnus, and a negotiation
elective was offered while you were a student, did you take the class?
For participants who answered question #15 in the negative (i.e., they did not
have a negotiation elective available), they were instructed to skip Question #16 and
answer Question #17 which asked if they would have taken a class had one been offered:
If you're a current student and an elective class in negotiation was not offered in
your program during the current academic year (2008-2009) but were to be
offered while you were still in school, would you take the class? Or, if you're an
alumnus, and a negotiation elective was not offered while you were a student,
would you have taken the class had an elective in negotiation been offered?
Responses suggested that some participants were apparently confused by the
wording of these questions, given that a greater number reported that they had taken an
available negotiation elective than had reported that their program had even offered a

158

course. As a result, only the responses of participants who reported that a negotiation
elective was not available to them were used to analyze the responses to Question #17.
While almost sixty percent of participants overall said they had taken a
negotiation class (Appendix P), when responses are broken out by gender and enrollment
status (Appendix Q), significant differences between students and alumni and men and
women begin to emerge. For instance, alumni were much more likely to have taken a
negotiation elective than students (71% to 59%), and female students were least likely to
have taken the course (48%), followed by male students (59%), male alumni (70%) and
female alumni (72%). To summarize these results, female students were significantly less
likely than their male classmates to have taken a class, and about half as likely as either
male or female alumni.
While the reasons for this disparity remain unclear, it could perhaps indicate that
interest in studying negotiation is waning among the current generation of female
graduate students, or because female alumni who had taken the class while still in school
were more comfortable with negotiation than many of the current female students, and so
participated in greater numbers. Or, to be kind, maybe it’s simply a reflection that the
passage of time has dimmed the alumni’s memory and they mistakenly assumed that they
had taken the course when in fact they hadn’t.
Attitudes about studying negotiation (Appendices T-NN).
Ninety percent of participants disagreed with the statement that negotiation isn’t
useful (Appendix EE), and a similar percentage that they didn’t see themselves using
negotiation (Appendix W), accompanied by a large percentage who disagreed with the
statement that other classes covered more important/useful topics (Appendix AA). In
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perhaps a sort of cognitive dissonance, however, assumptions that negotiation is
important and useful does not comport with the low percentage of participants who said
that they had or would actually take the class.
However, at the same time participants agreed that negotiation is an important
skill, they seemed to evidence a reluctance to become too effective since about two thirds
said it would not be right for them to use these skills to take unfair advantage of their
negotiating counterpart (Appendix U).
When asked if they felt intimidated when negotiating with members of the
opposite sex or those with more power or status, many more women than men agreed,
with five times as many women as men the men reporting strong agreement (Appendix
GG). Consistent with the earlier finding that women are much more aware of power
imbalances (external locus), this perception appears to play significant role in whether,
and to what extent, they choose to negotiate.
In recognition of the central role that friends and family play in forming our
attitudes and beliefs, both men and women agreed that role models had helped them
recognize the importance of negotiation (Appendix X).
Regarding concerns that negotiating can impact relationships, as well as how
others view them (Appendix Y), females not only reported being significantly more
concerned with pushback, but were much more likely to agree or very strongly agree. It
should be noted that women’s sensitivity with what is often euphemistically referred to as
the “bitch” factor finds support not only in this study, but is a common refrain in the
literature, suggesting the significant role it appears to plays in women’s decision-making.
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Forty percent of participants overall strongly, or very strongly, disagreed that they
could teach themselves how to negotiate more effectively (Appendix Z). Nonetheless,
even though almost nine in ten women disagreed with this statement, and two-thirds were
not aware of another course that would be more important or useful (Appendix AA), their
assumptions did not translate into a willingness to take advantage of the opportunity to be
taught these skills given that over half admitted that they had not taken a negotiation
elective and one in three reported no intention of doing so. These results perhaps imply
how difficult it will be to increase female enrollment in negotiation coursework, even if
more such classes were made available.
Women, more so than men, also feel that the employer should take the lead in
determining their starting salary (Appendix BB), an attitude consistent with an external
locus of control. And, in spite of the fact that participants agreed that studying negotiation
would be useful in their careers, these skills could be taught, and they would feel
comfortable taking a class, a significant minority of both genders still harbored concerns
that negotiation was a risky endeavor (Appendix DD).
Many participants also appeared to have concerns about classroom methodology,
including perhaps how they might perform (Appendix FF). Does this imply that current
methodologies for teaching this subject do not resonate with students, they view the
quality of instruction to be lacking, or for whatever other reason the topic strikes fear in
the heart of graduate students in general.
About half of the females, and about a third of the males, felt intimidated when
negotiating with more powerful counterparts (Appendix GG). While this should not be
surprising, the determinative question is to what extent these feelings inhibit or
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compromise individual’s performance, or serve to keep them out of the negotiation
classroom.
In spite of research which shows the importance of relationships to women
(Gilligan, 1982), having a dearth of friends in the class did not appear to inhibit them
from taking a negotiation elective (Appendix KK). This perhaps suggests that the way to
increase female enrollment in these kinds of courses will not necessarily involve the need
to enroll female students en mass.
About seven in ten participants disagreed with the statement that it’s impolite to
brag when discussing salary with a prospective employer (Appendix MM), an apparent
rejection of the notion that females are, by nature, more modest. While participants did
feel it acceptable to brag about their accomplishments, at the same time these feelings do
not seem to translate into a willingness to actually negotiate the offer. Might this suggest
that men and women naively assume that emphasizing their abilities and
accomplishments will lead the prospective employer to increase their offer without the
need for them to counter?
And, consistent with negotiation as a masculine paradigm, females were more
likely to frame it as a win-lose, competitive proposition (Appendix NN).
Comparison of the degree to which men and women identify with each of
the attitudes.
Although the survey instrument is not designed to be sensitive enough to permit
any meaningful conclusions to be drawn from simple differences in men and women’s
average item level scores (indicating their strength of agreement with each of the twentyone attitude statements), descriptives were run in an effort to provide further insight into
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the model. On a scale of 1-6, with 1 being “Disagree very strongly” and 6 “Agree very
strongly,” differentials between men and women’s average degree of agreement with
each attitude statement ranged from no difference, to as high as .56 on a scale of 1-6
(Table 12). Consistent with prior research on gender differences, the two statements
evidencing the largest differential were lack of confidence and lack of power, with
women reporting feeling both much less confident and much less powerful than men
when they negotiated. Women also expressed more fear of pushback, a greater aversion
to taking risks, and less competitiveness, less sure that negotiation is useful, more
concern about taking advantage of their negotiating counterpart, and a greater willingness
to let prospective employers determine their starting salary.
In contrast, although the differentials were small, men reported a greater degree of
agreement with the inappropriateness of bragging, concerns about class methodology, a
belief that they are already effective negotiators, the importance that role models play in
teaching them about the importance of negotiation, and an assumption that they’re able to
improve their negotiation skills on their own. However, both men and women shared
similar views that other electives were more important/useful than negotiation. It should
be noted, however, that this may be more a reflection of the belief that it’s important to
take as many classes as possible in one’s major, than it is that negotiation courses, in
isolation, are unimportant.
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Table 12. Gender Differentials in Average Scores on Each Statement

Twenty-one attitude statements
I don’t have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice
negotiating in front of a class.
I’m intimidated by the thought of negotiating with a member of the
opposite sex, and/or those who have more power/status/rank than I.
I’m concerned that if I negotiate others may see me as too “pushy” or
assertive.
Negotiation is risky and I don’t like to take risks.
It’s not polite to brag about one’s accomplishments or abilities when
discussing starting salary.
Negotiation is a competitive process and I’m not really all that
competitive.
I would have questions and concerns about the methodology used to
teach an elective class in negotiation.
I just don’t see myself using negotiation in my personal or
professional life.
When I negotiate with someone, I’d be concerned if I took advantage
of that person.
I don't know enough about negotiation to be comfortable taking an
elective class on the subject.
When interviewing for a new job, I prefer to let the prospective
employer determine what’s a fair starting salary.
I would only take an elective class in negotiation if my friends did.
I’m not sure if studying negotiation would be useful in my career.
I don’t’ need to study negotiation because I'm already an effective
negotiator.
I’ve not had role models in my life who can help me understand the
importance of being a good negotiator.
Not interested in studying negotiation.
Taking an elective class in negotiation is unnecessary because one
can learn to negotiate on their own.
Negotiating a good deal is as much about luck as it is about one’s
negotiating ability.
Negotiation skills can't be taught in a classroom setting.
I’m not really sure what negotiation is.

Average
female
score

Average
male
score

Differential
between male
and female
scores

3.48

2.92

.56

3.35

2.82

.53

3.63

3.28

.35

3.07

2.80

.27

2.78

2.97

.19

2.97

2.79

.18

3.19

3.34

.15

2.01

1.87

.14

3.91

3.79

.12

2.48

2.37

.11

3.10

3.00

.10

2.12

2.04

.08

2.31

2.25

.06

2.46

2.50

.04

3.25

3.29

.04

2.21

2.19

.02

2.57

2.59

.02

2.94

2.92

.02

2.65

2.63

.02

2.20

2.18

.02
I would rather take elective classes that cover more important/useful
3.03
3.03
.00
topics than negotiation.
Note: 1 = Disagree very strongly, 2 = Disagree strongly, 3 = Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Agree strongly, 6 = Agree very
strongly.

Table 13 shows the degree to which male and female participants agreed with
each attitude statement, in descending order of strength of agreement. The greatest
agreement for both was concerns about taking advantage of their negotiating counterpart.
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For women, their next highest average scores (concerns about pushback, a lack of
confidence, and feeling relatively powerless) appear consistent with previously
referenced research on females and negotiation.
Table 13. Average Scores Indicating the Degree to which Men and Women Identified
with Each Attitude Statement
Female’s average score
Male’s average score
3.91 Concern with taking advantage of
3.79 Concern with taking advantage of
negotiating counterpart
negotiating counterpart
3.63 Concern with pushback if I negotiate
3.34 Concerns about taking a negotiation class
3.48 Lack confidence when I negotiate
3.29 Lack negotiation role models
3.35 Lack power when I negotiate
3.28 Concern with pushback if I negotiate
3.25 Lack negotiation role models
3.03 Rather take a different class
3.19 Concerns about taking a negotiation
3.00 Employer determines salary, not negotiator
class
3.10 Employer determines salary, not
2.97 Shouldn’t self-promote when you negotiate
negotiator
3.07 Negotiation involves risk and I’m not a
2.92 Lack confidence when I negotiate
risk taker
3.03 Rather take a different class
2.92 Negotiation outcomes are due to luck
2.97 I’m not competitive but negotiation is
2.82 Lack power when I negotiate
2.94 Negotiation outcomes are due to luck
2.79 I’m not competitive but negotiation is
2.78 Shouldn’t self-promote when you
2.80 Negotiation involves risk and I’m not a risk
negotiate
taker
2.65 Negotiation can’t be taught
2.63 Negotiation can’t be taught
2.57 Don’t need a class, I can learn to
2.59 Don’t need a class, I can learn to negotiate
negotiate on my own
on my own
2.48 Don’t know enough about negotiation to 2.50 Don’t need a class, I’m already an effective
take a class
negotiator
2.46 Don’t need a class, I’m already an
2.37 Don’t know enough about negotiation to take
effective negotiator
a class
2.31 Not sure if negotiation is important/
2.25 Not sure if negotiation is important/useful
useful
2.21 Not interested in studying negotiation
2.19 Not interested in studying negotiation
2.20 Not sure what negotiation is
2.18 Not sure what negotiation is
2.12 Would take a negotiation class if friends 2.04 Would take a negotiation class if friends did
did
2.01 Don’t see myself using negotiation
1.87 Don’t see myself using negotiation
Note: 1 = Disagree very strongly, 2 = Disagree strongly, 3 = Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Agree strongly, 6 =
Agree very strongly.
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Negotiation Coursework
Because the results of the goodness of fit indices run on this data indicate that the
NORM is plausible, it also suggests what would need to be done to make negotiation
coursework more attractive to them. Leibbrandt and List (2012) concluded that once
women learned that a salary was negotiable, they were able to overcome their reluctance
to ask for more money. In their study, by changing the wording of a job advertisement to
indicate that salaries were negotiable, female applicants were three times more likely to
apply for the job and three times more likely to negotiate their offer (8% to 24%) than if
that statement wasn’t included. And, this wording change also served to reduce the
gender gap in applications by almost half. If we assume that students are routinely taught
in negotiation classes that salaries are negotiable, it’s plausible that increasing female
enrollment in this coursework could educate and empower them to negotiate higher
salaries.
Because men are more comfortable with negotiation, it’s logical to assume that
they would then be more willing to register for negotiation electives, leading to their
overrepresentation in the classes. If so, schools might want to consider enacting measures
to help ensure gender balance in the classroom, such as tailoring the content and format
of the class to appeal to women’s sensitivities, or perhaps increasing the number of
female instructors who teach this coursework.
We have seen that women tend to frame negotiation as a competition. This is
important because Eccles et al. (1986) found that girls who studied math in a competitive
classroom environment ended up holding less positive attitudes towards the subject,
while Peterson and Fennema (1985) concluded that while a competitive classroom helped
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male’s performance, it had the opposite effect on females. It is not inconceivable that
early classroom experiences teach girls that negotiation is “winner take all,” and leads
them to internalize generally negative attitudes about the process which eventually get
reflected in lower rates of participation in this coursework when they reach graduate
school.
For this reason, negotiation electives might be made more attractive to women if
less emphasis was placed on competitive tactics and strategies in class, and more on
cooperation, empowerment, and problem-solving. And, to send a consistent message, this
focus should carry over to course descriptions, class methodology and grading rubrics as
well.
However, in a larger sense, it may not be enough to simply encourage women to
“ask” if they harbor lingering concerns about being relationally punished as a
consequence (pushback). We may need to come up with alternative ways of teaching
negotiation so that women come to understand that they can become more effective
negotiators without violating cultural stereotypes and norms about how they should act,
and to convince them that they do so without the need to adopt masculine traits.
Because of women’s concerns surrounding class methodology (their sixth highest
average score), course design may also have to take into consideration women’s
sensitivities about their possible performance and grade in class. So, there may need to be
less emphasis placed on classroom performance, and more on attendance, effort, journal
writing, and examinations that place more importance on content mastery.
Other studies have shown that certain differences in classroom behavior may
impact the learning environment for women. More particularly, males have a tendency to
167

dominate classroom discussions and activities, while girls tend to do better with one-onone student-teacher interactions (Younger et al., 1999). And yet others have shown that
teachers interact more frequently with males, and encourage them more (Becker, 1981;
Sadker & Sadker, 1986), initiate more interactions with them, and provide boys with
more specific feedback (Stallings, 1985). As a consequence, certain instructional
methodologies will resonate less strongly with females than males, and so negotiation
instructors may need to take a more active role in classroom management, including
being sensitive to how roles are assigned in mock negotiations, encouraging more female
participation in classroom discussions, and making time to allow opportunities for female
students to meet with them outside of class. And, because women appear to be reluctant
to ask for more money, instructors should ensure that students have opportunities to
practice salary negotiation in class.
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Towards a Deeper Understanding of the Reasons behind Women’s Reluctance to
Study Negotiation
To help understand the drivers of human behavior (in the context of this study, the
avoidance of opportunities to improve one’s negotiation skills), it’s illustrative to refer to
the belief-attitude-value (BAV) System (Rokeach, 1968). Rokeach (Figure 46) believed
that behavior could be understood as encompassing three psychological dimensions;
the cognitive, which focuses on beliefs (what we know to be true); the affective, which
focuses on attitudes (how we feel); and the behavioral (how we will act consistent with
these attitudes and beliefs).

Figure 46. Beliefs, Values, and Attitudes (BAV) System.
Note: Retrieved from http://docmo.hubpages.com/hub/Teaching-and-AssessingAttitudes.
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The BAV system posits that our behavior is a function of our attitudes and beliefs
which arise from our own, unique experiences, with each belief underlain by certain
associated attitudes. It is this constellation of beliefs and attitudes, acting in concert and
informed by our personality and awareness of subjective norms, that find manifestation in
our behavior.
Were we to refer to the BAV System to better understand what the NORM
appears to be telling us, it would seem that female participant’s prior experience with
conflict and negotiation, along with their awareness of cultural norms that signal them
that negotiation isn’t something that women “do,” cause them to adopt and internalize the
four negotiation-related core beliefs shown on the model. The interaction of these
negative beliefs, and underlying attitudes about negotiation, then serve to demotivate
women from taking negotiation coursework.
Because we know that our attitudes and beliefs are formed through observation
and experience, beginning as soon as we begin to interact with others around us, it would
seem logical that women’s feelings about negotiation begin to form early in life as well
(Broadbear & Broadbear, 2000). In support of the notion that our early experiences
influence our later beliefs and behaviors, we turn to the Order of the Jesuits who
famously opined, “Give me the child until he is seven, and I will give you the man.”
From our understanding of the BAV system, women’s views on negotiation are in
all likelihood already well on their way to being formed in childhood. However, we have
come to understand that the most formative years for the adoption of certain attitudes and
beliefs is not uniform, but rather assume more significance during different times in our
lives.
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For instance, one researcher found that pre-teen girls’ self-image is most
amenable to influence during their middle school years once they begin to realize the
importance of their social networks (Kilpatrick, 2012). Similarly, girl’s waning interest in
studying math and science subjects seems to emerge in middle school as well, perhaps
around the time that male-female competition begins to heat up and grades become more
important (Cavanagh, 2005). However, it remains to be seen what the most formative
years for the development of the various attitudes and beliefs about negotiation are for
women.
Another study, while not directly looking at negotiation, may offer some
additional insight into the reasons behind women’s reluctance to take advantage of
opportunities to improve their negotiation skills. To the extent that its findings regarding
receptivity to skill mastery is applicable to negotiation, it may be because women believe
that any attempt to improve their negotiation skills would prove futile.
More particularly, Dweck (1999) contrasted those who believe that subject
mastery is the result of effort, with those who believe that it’s more a function of innate
ability. She labels people as having either a “mastery” orientation (effort), or a
“performance” orientation (innate ability). People with a mastery orientation assume that
the key to learning any topic (negotiation?) is a function of the amount of time and effort
they are willing to invest. Those with a performance orientation, on the other hand,
believe that either you’re born with an innate ability to do well in a particular subject or
you’re not, and so effort has little or no impact on performance. So, for these students,
they assume that if one lacks an innate ability in a particular area (math in the case of her
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study), no investment of time will allow them to achieve mastery if they are not so
already predisposed.
Should this categorization hold true for mastering negotiation skills, we could
argue that women who hold a fixed mindset about negotiating ability would assume that
good negotiators are born and not made, and so would see little value in taking a class in
an attempt to improve their skills. It should be noted that this assumptions is congruous
with the NORM, and all the more so since it suggests some degree of overlap between
the beliefs that demotivate women from studying math, and beliefs that appear to
similarly hold them back from studying negotiation.
Another study (AAUW, 2010) built on this Fixed-Growth Model (Figure 47). It
reiterated that women who have a “growth mindset” are more amenable to change. If so,
we can assume that similarly inclined women would also be more likely to believe that
their negotiation skills can be improved, and so more likely to enroll in coursework. The
following quote from the AAUW study appears to fit in very well with the discussion of
how women’s attitudes and beliefs about negotiation develop.
The significance of an individual’s mindset often does not emerge until she or he
faces challenges. In a supportive environment such as elementary school, students
with a belief in fixed intelligence may do just fine; however, upon encountering
the challenges of middle school, differences are likely to emerge between students
with a fixed mindset about intelligence and those who believe that intelligence
can increase with effort (AAUW, 2010, pg. 31).
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Figure 47. Fixed versus growth mindset.
Note: Retrieved from http://educatoral.com/afl_strategies.html.

Suggests the Need for Changes in Workplace Practices
Unfortunately, the kind of firsthand experiences that could help women gain a
more favorable view of negotiation are not often modeled by their employers. To the
contrary, this study suggests that the following sorts of behaviors which are the norm in
many workplaces could unintentionally reinforce a woman’s preconceived, negative
attitudes about negotiating; assuming that negotiation is not important enough to offer
employees training or coaching opportunities to improve their competencies (e.g.,
negotiation not important/useful, negotiation can’t be taught, lack of role models);
paying new hires and promoted employees higher salaries simply because they were
willing to ask for more money (e.g., the employer tells me what I should be paid, lack of
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power, fairness, external locus of control, not polite to brag); allowing stereotypes or
unconscious biases to negatively influence female employees’ performance appraisals
(e.g., external lack of control, lack of power, modesty in achievement, negotiation is too
risky, lack of role models); characterizing certain women as “bitchy” or “bossy” (e.g.,
concerns about self-image, fear of pushback, negotiation is too risky); lack of career
development opportunities or mentoring for female employees (e.g., lack of negotiation
role models); recognizing and rewarding “macho” behavior, particularly in such
departments as sales, litigation, and finance (e.g., negotiation is too competitive, concern
with taking advantage/fairness); allowing male employees to dominate staff meetings
(e.g., I’m not competitive, negotiation if too risky, fear of pushback, lack of confidence);
and a dearth of women in senior management positions and boards of directors (e.g., lack
of role models, external locus of control), to name but a few.
Because of the apparent disconnect between the behavior that women need to see
modeled in order to be able to adopt a more positive view of negotiation, and what is
often actually observed in the workplace, practices that appear otherwise innocuous on
their face may be unintentionally, but subtly, reinforcing their preexisting negative
attitudes.
Implications for University Career Services
As previously discussed, studies have shown that women identify fewer
opportunities to negotiate than men, are less willing to negotiate when they do have the
chance, tend not to be as successful, and are more uncomfortable negotiating salary.
These findings raise important questions about the ethical obligations of the university
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career services’ profession whose mission it is to help students succeed in their chosen
careers.
For instance, do they have the obligation to search out if a gender-wage gap exists
among its graduates? If so, should they be expected to address it by, among other things,
encouraging more females to enroll in negotiation coursework? Or, should they be
expected to take the time to determine whether these classes can improve female
graduates’ negotiation skills? Should they insist that negotiation coursework even be
made available? And, should there be on-campus recruitment policies in place that forbid
or discourage recruiters from offering female candidates a lower starting salary than
similarly qualified male classmates, simply because the women may be more reluctant to
negotiate their offers?
While the results of this study raise legitimate questions regarding the ethical
obligation of the career services profession, it appears that the answers to these questions
remain a work in progress.
Implications for Professional Recruiters
We have seen that the wage gap is evident as soon as men and women graduate
from school and accept fulltime employment. While it remains to be seen what role the
recruitment process plays in perpetuating gender salary differences, the ethical standards
of the recruiting profession appear silent on their obligations related to this issue.
For instance, should college recruiters be expected to word their job postings to
minimize “male centric” language that may discourage women from even applying, or
pressure them to accept lower offers? Should they be prohibited from making lower
offers to female graduates simply because they appear reluctant to negotiate the offer, or
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appear more willing to accept less than male classmates? After all, one study concluded
that all it takes for recruiters to justify making lower offers to female candidates is for
them to come up with at least a rational reason for doing so (Belliveau, 2012).
Or, given certain preconceived notions that many women have about the
negotiation process, should we expect recruiters to be more aware of the kinds of things
that they say or do during the interview that might be construed as pushback by female
candidates, perhaps discouraging them from negotiating an offer at all?
To answer these questions, this researcher reviewed the National Association of
Colleges and Employers (NACE) Principles for Professional Practice guidelines. These
guidelines state that, “The National Association of Colleges and Employers connects
campus recruiting and career services professionals, and provides best practices, trends,
research, professional development, and conferences” (emphasis added). However, they
are silent regarding how recruiters are expected to deal with any of the aforementioned
questions (NACE, 2011). Apparently, even though it’s universally recognized as an
important national concern, the profession appears content to let it up to individual
recruiters to ensure insure that they manage the employee selection process in a way that
does not unfairly disadvantage any candidate.
Because most recruiters have more money to give than their initial offer, provided
that candidates are willing to ask for it (Society of Human Resource Management, 2004;
The Edge Report, 2009), answers to these questions are not academic because to the
degree that female candidates are discouraged from negotiating offers, they leave money
on the table and the gender-wage gap gets perpetuated. And, as the following researcher
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pointed out, there are additional risks associated with attempts to hire the best candidate
at the lowest possible “price” (salary):
Organizations should be especially cognizant that salary negotiations represent
one final opportunity to convince their top candidates to accept their job offer. To
the extent the negotiation process is perceived as unfair or the offer as
unreasonable, the organization’s chances of securing an affirmative response are
reduced; decreasing the utility of the entire recruitment process. Moreover, even
for those candidates who ultimately accepted the offer despite perceived unfair
negotiations, the relationship between the employer and employee could be
damaged (Marks & Harold, 2011).
Implications for the Human Resources Profession
Human Resources strives to improve organizational performance by ensuring the
most optimal utilization of every employee. Quoting from a model mission statement
found on the Society of Human Resources Management (SHRM) website:
The human resources department is dedicated to partnering with [Company
Name] business units to maximize the potential of our greatest asset–our
employees. We embrace change and the opportunity it brings. We are focused on
delivering quality customer service and are committed to recruit, develop, reward
and retain our global workforce (Downloaded from
http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/samples/policies/pages/missionstatementhr.a
sp).
If their charge is to find ways to maximize employee potential, and if negotiation
is recognized as an essential workplace competency (Stamato, 2004), then this study
should serve as a guide to encourage the development of assessment instruments and
training materials to assist female employees in becoming more effective negotiators.
These products could prove similarly useful to others who work in the professional
development field, including training and development, OD/OB, management
consultants, career counselors, guidance counselors, sales, employee/labor relations, as
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well as those who work in areas such as law and business where strong negotiation skills
are particularly important.
Helping to Create World-Class Negotiating Organizations
As two well-respected negotiation academics put it,
At first glance, not all organizations see negotiation as a key to their success.
They tend to think first of revenue growth, cost management, innovation,
customer engagement, and (particularly lately) leadership development. But
negotiation is central to all of these efforts. Indeed, successful negotiations can
make or break companies” (Movius & Susskind, 2009, p. 3).
In the book “Built to Win,” the authors emphasize that negotiation competency is
a critical organizational capability. They propose that in order to become the world-class
negotiating organization that all companies should aspire to, they propose the following
three-step model for transforming negotiation into a core business process; assess the
current negotiating performance of staff, adjust and align organizational incentives to
recognize and reward effective negotiating skills, and implement metrics and systems to
perpetuate a culture of continuous learning.
Since the NORM serves to raise awareness of the attitudes and beliefs that may
make female employees resistant to taking advantage of opportunities to improve their
negotiating skills, this study can help companies design and implement more effective
interventions in support of initiatives that could augment efforts to become world-class
negotiating organizations.
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Limitations
Generalizability.
This study relied on data collected from a sample consisting of a narrow, cross
section of participants representing master and doctoral students, largely under the age of
thirty, and enrolled in, or graduates from, related graduate programs. Even though the
responses of over 1,000 participants were collected, they came from a largely
homogenous population, all the more so since a third of the participants represented a
single institution. According to Thompson, homogeneity of college student samples
weakens the impact of individual differences and variability on studies of negotiation
outcomes and behavior (Thompson, 1990).
Because of homogeneity, assumptions about the generalizability of the results of
this study are difficult to project. However, to answer that question will require a
rerunning of the study with a broader, and more diverse, sample.
Confirmatory factor analysis.
While confirmatory factor analysis is an accepted methodology for testing
models, it only allows the researcher to conclude within a reasonable degree of certainty
that the model being tested is plausible. In other words, it can’t tell us that the model is
accurate, only that it does not appear to be inaccurate. While model fit was within
generally acceptable ranges in this study, until other explanations for men and women’s
reluctance to study negotiation are postulated and similarly tested, we cannot be sure that
other, more accurate and useful models than the NORM have yet to be discovered.
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Overfitting.
The aim of testing a model is not to describe a particular sample as accurately as
possible, but rather to determine if the model accurately predicts the behavior of the
underlying population. Overfitting, labeled the "curse of predictive modeling,” occurs
when a model indicates an adequate fit, but fails to provide accurate predictions for a
different dataset than the one tested. Overfitting can result when a model is unnecessarily
complex such as where there are too many parameters relative to the number of
observations. This can lead to exaggerating otherwise minor fluctuations in the data,
leading the researcher to be overly optimistic about the performance of the model. It
might be a problem in this study to the extent that the sample (male and female graduate
students and alumni of certain domestic graduate programs in public policy) is not
representative of the overall population of men and women in general.
In this case, we cannot be sure to what degree the results of this study, testing the
responses of over 1,000 participants, has been potentially compromised by overfitting in
spite of the researcher’s best efforts, including avoiding make every statistical
modification that could have been made based on the Lagrange multiplier values since
doing so tends to lead to overfit models.
Sampling and non-response bias.
When responses are drawn from a convenience sample, it’s possible that the
population being surveyed is not random. Here, because the responses of some members
of the targeted population were less likely to be included than others, if for no other
reason than that their schools declined to participate in the study, some degree of
sampling bias can be expected.
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Some measure of non-response bias is also probable given that many female
participants did not feel favorably disposed towards the topic to begin with, and so were
in all likelihood not inclined to complete the survey (Bandura, 1997). We know that the
odds of people participating in surveys are about forty percent lower if the topic doesn’t
interest them (Groves et al., 2004). So, in this data set, it’s reasonable to conclude that
women who were comfortable with negotiation were oversampled, and women who were
uncomfortable with negotiation were undersampled.
As the following figure illustrates (Figure 48), the willingness to participate in a
survey is determined by eight factors, one of which (survey-specific impressions) speaks
to the level of preexisting interest a potential participant has in the topic (Rogelberg et al.,
2000).
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Figure 48. Reasons for survey noncompliance.
Note: Retrieved from
https://orgscience.uncc.edu/sites/orgscience.uncc.edu/files/Employee%20attitude%20sur
veys%20-%20examining%20the%20attitudes%20of%20nonco.pdf.
Knowing what we know about non-response bias, we can assume that many of the
students and alumni who elected not to participate in the survey harbored a pre-existing
aversion to negotiation (i.e., a negative survey-specific impression). To see if this might
be so, this researcher re-ran the survey with students and alumni of CMU’s Heinz
College who said they would not/did not take a negotiation elective (hereinafter, Group
2)(Group 1, on the other hand, constituted those students/alumni of the twenty-two
182

participating schools who presumably represented a more random sample of views on
negotiation).
In order to obtain responses from individuals in Group 2, during the 2012 school
year, students who were enrolled in the researcher’s negotiation electives were offered
the opportunity to earn extra credit by inviting students and CMU alumni who did not
and had not taken a negotiation class to complete the survey. Three hundred and fortynine (349) responses were received. Because participants in Group 2 were either
presumed to have a dislike of, or at least lack interest in, studying negotiation, it was
expected that they would report having more negative feelings about negotiation, and so
report being less willing to negotiate a salary than participants in Group 1. If this were so,
then some degree of non-response bias in the original study results could be presumed.
Results of the second survey appeared to confirm the existence of response bias
since Group 2 participants not only evidenced stronger agreement with each of the
twenty-one attitudes than those in Group 1, but were much less likely to have ever
negotiated a salary.
More specifically, female participants in Group 2 reported stronger agreement
with eighteen of the twenty-one attitudes than did women in Group 1 (Appendix WW),
with the largest differentials on, “Don’t know enough about negotiation,” “Not sure what
negotiation is,” “Would only take a class if my friends did,” and “Don’t see myself
using.” Further, while a majority of women in Group 1 had negotiated a starting salary,
only about thirty percent of the women in Group 2 had (Appendix XX). In other words,
women in Group 2 were forty percent less likely to have countered a salary offer than
women in Group 1. As prior research suggests, their reluctance to negotiate most likely
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resulted in this group receiving lower average starting salaries then they would have had
otherwise. Ironically, then, women who stood to benefit the most from learning how to
“ask” were least likely to have been enrolled in the class that could have taught them
how.
The efficacy of negotiation coursework.
Even though this study presumed that enrolling more women in negotiation
coursework would improve their skills, and thus allow them to negotiate higher offers
that would lead to a narrowing of the gender wage gap, it has never been shown that
successfully completing negotiation coursework allows students to negotiate higher
salaries. And, even if this were shown to be so, we remain unsure which instructional
methodologies generate the most skill improvement, or whether or not these
improvements are permanent.
To prevent dispatching enthusiastic, overconfident but unprepared negotiation
students into the real world, one set of researchers tested the four most common ways of
teaching negotiation to see which were most effective at providing real-world skills;
didactic (teaching abstract principles), learning via information revelation, observational
learning, and analogical learning. They concluded that of the four methodologies,
observation and analogical reasoning consistently appeared to produce the most effective
results (Perry, 2011; Lewicki, 1997; Thompson & Leonardelli, 2004; Movius, 2008;
Gillespie et al., 1999).
Because it has never been shown that taking a negotiation class allows students to
negotiate higher salaries, it remains conjecture that expanding the availability of
negotiation coursework and increasing women’s enrollment in said coursework would
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have any impact on the wage gap. Further, an overreliance on classroom instruction to
improve graduate students’ negotiation skills would also increase the risk of overlooking
the possibility that other modalities (mentoring, coaching, training, self-study,
observation, role models, etc.) may offer even more effective ways to improve women’s
ability to ask. To answer these questions will require further study.
What if salary isn’t as important to women as it is to men?
Some have suggested that salary is not the most important part of the job offer for
many women, although this is not universally shared (Marks & Harold, 2011). They
propose that instead of focusing on raising the salary offer, they negotiate for things such
as more flexible work schedules, different job titles, increased vacation time, and
educational assistance. To the extent that this is accurate, as long as starting salaries
remain the focus in gauging the level of improvement in ability to “ask,” we may end up
erroneously concluding that taking negotiation coursework only leads to minimal
improvement in women’s ability to negotiate higher offers.
Inherent limitations in the survey design.
Contrary to what the NORM appears to suggest, it’s possible that other factors,
not captured by this study, are more important demotivators that serve to keep women
from studying negotiation. For instance, it’s plausible that scheduling conflicts, the poor
reputation of negotiation instructors, concentration in majors that permit only a limited
number of electives, a greater passion for other coursework (rather than a dislike of
negotiation), and advisor recommendations also have a significant role to play.
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Recommendations for Future Research
Re-run the survey to address concerns about generalizability.
Because the study’s relatively narrow sample raises questions about
generalizability, surveying a broader and more diverse group of participants would help
inform whether or not the model holds for women in general, or only for women enrolled
in graduate programs of public policy/public administration/international affairs.
Therefore, the field would benefit from re-surveying women enrolled in other fields of
study, and undergraduates, professional women working in the fields of law, business and
medicine, and different demographic groups, to name but a few possibilities.
The need to propose and test other explanations for women’s reluctance
to study negotiation.
One well-known limitation of CFA is that while it indicates whether the model
being tested offers a plausible explanation the factors that influence behavior, we cannot
be sure that there aren’t other, even more accurate models. Therefore, we need to propose
and test other models that attempt to explain the same behavior to determine whether the
NORM offers the most accurate explanation.
Determine whether enrollment in negotiation coursework equips women
to negotiate higher salaries.
One study reported that even after training women in negotiation techniques and
goal-setting, women set lower goals and negotiated lower salaries than men who had
completed the same training (Stevens et al., 1993, p. 182). This may call into question the
assumption that we can narrow the wage gap by encouraging more women to enroll in
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negotiation coursework. For this reason, the field could benefit from further research that
compares average starting salaries of women who have taken a class in negotiation with
the starting salaries of those who hadn’t to determine if successful completion of
negotiation electives has a measurable impact on starting salaries.
A cursory review of the starting salaries voluntarily reported by 2012 graduates of
the Heinz College (Appendix YY) perhaps portends what a larger and more rigorous
study might show. It should be noted that because the number of responses in many of
the categories is so small, it is not possible to reach any definitive conclusions. However,
preliminary analysis of the data suggests some potentially intriguing results.
For example, taking a negotiation class appears to significantly increase a
women’s willingness to negotiate her offer since sixty-two percent of women who took a
class negotiated their offer, contrasted with only forty-one percent of those who had not.
It appears that taking the class either makes women more likely to negotiate, or women
who were more comfortable with negotiation in the first place are more likely to enroll in
such coursework.
Similar results appear to hold for males. While sixty-one percent of men who took
a negotiation class negotiated their offers, only forty-nine percent of those who didn’t
take the class did. So, just as women were able to significantly increase their willingness
to “ask” by taking this kind of elective, so, too, were men.
Taking a negotiation class also seems to be associated with higher salaries, even
in those instances where these students didn’t actually counter the offer. In seven of the
nine majors, students who had taken the elective but didn’t negotiate their offers received
higher average starting salaries than students who hadn’t taken the class but did negotiate.
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Could this suggest that there are intangible benefits to taking the class (confidence
perhaps?) that leads recruiters to make higher initial offers, or could some other unknown
factors be at play such as student’s greater willingness to put the first number on the table
and so anchor the subsequent discussion? Again, only additional data collection from a
larger and more diverse sample over a longer period of time will allow us to answer that
question.
Determine if negotiation coursework is the most effective way to improve
women’s salary negotiation skills.
While the NORM suggests what attitudes and beliefs inhibit women from taking
advantage of opportunities to improve their negotiation skills, it does not necessarily hold
that these same factors inhibit women from taking advantage of other, alternative skill
improvement opportunities such as seminars, mentoring, coaching, self-study and
training programs. The field could benefit from further inquiry that answers that question
as well.
Determine when women are most susceptible to internalizing their
attitudes/beliefs about negotiation.
If we wish to increase women’s receptivity to taking advantage of opportunities to
improve their negotiation skills, it will be important to determine how, when and why
women begin to develop negative feelings about negotiation, and the most opportune
times to intervene to help them reframe the process in a more favorable light. We have
already seen that there appear to be critical junctures when women internalize attitudes
about certain topics. For example, as regards the study of math and science, Berryman
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(1983) concluded that the most critical time to intervene to encourage more students to
study these subjects is prior to high school. It is not a stretch to conclude that feelings
about negotiation begin to develop at certain periods in a woman’s life as well.
Having a good understanding of when and why certain critical junctures in
women’s attitude development about negotiating occur holds the key to timing more
efficacious interventions.
Explore similarities to women’s feelings about studying STEM subjects.
As previously discussed, there appears to be some overlap between the attitudes
and beliefs that inhibit women from studying negotiation, and those that keep them out of
STEM classrooms (Armstrong & Price, 1982). In one study of female high school
senior’s feelings about math, the following factors were shown to affect whether they
would be open to taking another math course (in that respect, it could be argued that the
situation is similar to women’s enrollment in negotiation electives since enrollment was
optional in this math coursework as well (Table 14).
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Table 14. Why Girls Don’t Study Math vs. Why Women Don’t Study Negotiation.
Relative importance of factors affecting
women’s decision to study math (rank-ordered)
Usefulness

How well they think they’ll perform

Whether they “like” the subject
What their teachers think
What their mother thinks
What their father thinks
What their school counselor thinks
Whether their friends take the class
Whether their classmates “approve”

Similar beliefs and attitudes about
studying negotiation per the NORM
Other electives more important/useful, negotiation
is not important/useful, not sure studying
negotiation would be useful, don’t see myself
using.
Lack of confidence in negotiation skills, I’m not
competitive but negotiation is, concerns with how
class would be taught, don’t know enough about
negotiation to take a class.
Not interested in studying negotiation.
Concerns about self-image, concern with
pushback, to negotiate is too risky.
Concerns about self-image, concern with
pushback, to negotiate is too risky.
Concerns about self-image, concern with
pushback, to negotiate is too risky.
Concerns about self-image, concern with
pushback, to negotiate is too risky.
Friends don’t take the class.
Concerns about self-image, concern with
pushback, to negotiate is too risky.

Underrepresentation of women in STEM subjects and the gender wage gap,
remain serious public policy concerns. It would be important, then, to know if the factors
that keep women from studying negotiation are the same or similar to these factors that
keep them from studying science, technology, engineering and math subjects. Therefore,
using the model to design initiatives to help overcome women’s reluctance to study
negotiation might prove similarly useful in helping to overcome female’s reluctance to
enroll in math and science subjects as well.
Ascertain the availability of negotiation coursework.
Presently, the general availability of negotiation coursework in graduate schools
of public policy is not tracked, nor do we know why schools decline to offer these
classes. As a result, it would be futile to propose increases in female enrollment in
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negotiation electives if this coursework is not even available. An informale study this
researcher conducted a few years ago may shed some light on the answer to this question.
During the 2010-2011 school year, websites of the same 85 graduate schools
invited to participate in the study were reviewed to determine the availability of
negotiation coursework. To be counted, a course had to meet the following five criteria; it
had to be offered during that school year, “negotiation” had to be in the title, the class had
to have as its primary focus the improvement of individual negotiation skills (that is,
learning “how to” negotiate rather than just learning “about” negotiation), it had to be
offered on an elective basis, and it had to be offered in that graduate program rather than
by another department on campus.
Course catalogs revealed that only about a third of the schools offered a
negotiation class that met all the criteria (Appendix AAA). These dismal results indicate
that ensuring that this coursework is made available to all students remains very much a
work in progress.
A need to more fully discern the nuances of the NORM.
In spite of the fact that ninety-nine percent of female participants believe that
prospective employers have more money to give than their initial offer, a majority report
being the primary breadwinner, one-third believe that there is a less than ten percent
chance that a job offer would be retracted if they countered an initial offer, and two-thirds
think that job candidates should take the lead in determining starting salary, yet a
majority reported that they had never negotiated their starting salary.
Similarly perplexing, even though eighty percent of the women admitted they
were not able to learn how to negotiate on their own, ninety percent agreed that
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negotiation would be useful in their career, eighty-six percent admitted that negotiation
skills could be taught, and two-thirds couldn’t think of another elective that was more
important, more than half said admitted that they saw no need to enroll in a negotiation
class.
It would appear incongruous that someone holding such positive assumptions
about negotiating would feel uncomfortable asking for more money, or decline to take
advantage of opportunities to improve their skills. For this reason, we need to understand
how to better reconcile these glaring incongruities.
It should be noted that an additional question was asked on the survey
administered to Group 2 that did not appear on the survey given to Group 1. In an attempt
to further understand the strength of particular demotivators, participants were provided a
list and asked to rank order the reasons why they would not/did not a negotiation elective.
Scheduling conflicts were reported to be the primary reason (30%), with the second that
other classes were more important/useful (29.2%), and the third a lack of interest (13.1%)
(Appendix ZZ).
Since this particular question was not asked on the original survey, there is no
way of knowing if the responses of the Group 1 participants would have been different
from those in Group 2. The answer is important since in order to best design interventions
to increase female participation in negotiation coursework, we need to know to what
degree the NORM reveals a full and accurate understanding of enrollment demotivators.
Determine if women are underrepresented in negotiation electives.
While women might be reluctant to “ask,” and as this study suggests, many hold
generally unfavorable attitudes and beliefs about the negotiating process, we cannot
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necessarily conclude that these feelings cause them to be less likely to enroll in
negotiation electives. A review of enrollment data from negotiation electives offered by
two local universities suggests that the answer to this question is not so straightforward.
Class rosters from the negotiation electives taught since 2006 at CMU’s Heinz
College and Tepper Graduate School of Business (Appendix BBB) were analyzed.
Enrollment figures indicate that, relative to the gender mix in the student body, women
were overrepresented in three classes and underrepresented in two. Similarly, in the
Heinz College, women were underrepresented in three electives and overrepresented in
one.
Enrollment figures in the negotiation electives taught at the nearby University of
Pittsburgh’s Katz Graduate School of Business present a similarly mixed picture. As seen
in Table 15, female business graduate students were underrepresented in three of the five
classes, but overrepresented in two.
It’s too soon to conclude from these results that women’s generally negative
views on negotiation necessarily translate into their under enrollment in this coursework.
This encourages us to analyze enrollment data from other schools offering negotiation
electives to be able to answer this question definitively.
Table 15. Enrollment in Negotiation Electives Offered by the Katz School
Academic
school year

Percentage of
females in
student body

Percentage of
females in
negotiation elective

Female
over/underrepresentation
in negotiation electives

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

30%
24%
26%
31%
33%

24%
29%
33%
28%
30%

-6%
+5%
+7%
-3%
-3%
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The benefits of a more parsimonious model.
Models present the following paradox; the more complicated they are the more
accurately they can describe behavior, but the less useful they become in actual practice.
While in its present iteration the NORM may provide a detailed explanation of how
women feel about studying negotiation, it may be too complicated to be useful to those
who could benefit from it the most. Further refinements to render the model more
parsimonious may be warranted in order for the results to have more practical
application.
Conclusions
This study allowed for the extension of prior research which had examined
women’s general unwillingness to “ask” by exploring the related but no less important
question of why they might be reluctant to learn how. Awareness that women are
reluctant to negotiate for higher salaries, and searching for the reasons why, served as the
primary incentive for this study, particularly given the role this reluctance may contribute
to the gender wage gap, their underrepresentation in senior levels of management,
diminished opportunities to serve on boards of directors, feelings of unfair treatment, and
compromised organizational effectiveness (Grieg, 2008).
This research suggests that, as compared to men, women generally exhibit more
negative attitudes towards negotiation, and so might be expected to be less willing to
pursue opportunities to improve their skills by being underrepresented in negotiation
electives. However, it is believed that the NORM not only helps identify those attitudes
and beliefs that serve to inhibit females from studying negotiation, but also provides
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practical insight into what needs to be done to encourage more women to take advantage
of opportunities to enhance their negotiation efficacy.
This study has attempted to respond to the need for a deeper understanding of
why women don’t “ask,” along with ways to encourage a greater willingness to learn
how. In spite of the significant body of research that has been done on gender differences
in the field of negotiation, much work remains to be done to further explore differences in
willingness to improve and to isolate the causes of these differences and their potential
impact on women’s ability to more effectively advocate for their own interests.
Most assuredly, efforts to help overcome women’s reluctance to pursue
opportunities to improve their negotiation skills will have to be a multi-faceted effort that
starts early in life, and is reinforced throughout the entire educational process and
beyond. With the support and encouragement of significant others in their life,
particularly parents and teachers, girls may be particularly receptive to overcoming
initially negative attitudes (Epstein & Becker,1982; Yee et al.,1986; Fehrmann et al.,
1987), although the impact of role models on women’s feelings about negotiation has not
found support in prior studies.
Many believe that societal expectations and socialization in childhood create
obstacles to women’s confidence and limits their expectations in negotiations. If so, in
addition to dealing with the topic in school, any solution must also eliminate those
workplace practices that can serve to reinforce women’s preexisting negative perceptions
about negotiation, raise awareness of the types of unconscious biases and stereotypes that
cause others to unfairly judge women who attempt to negotiate for themselves, and
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expand skill improvement opportunities such as additional training for those women who
wish to become more effective self-advocates.
Although this study does not presume that there are significant, innate gender
differences in negotiating ability present from birth, it does recognize that women hold
more negative attitudes and beliefs about negotiation, like negotiation less, see it as less
relevant to their lives, and lack confidence about their abilities.
And, it must be recognized that even when both males and females are equally
motivated to do well in certain subjects (STEM; negotiation?), girls still remain less
confident that they’ll do well (Lantz & Smith, 1981), are more prone to give up, and feel
insecure about their probability of success (Hudson, 1986).
Because the extant body of research does not allow us to conclude definitively
that any one single factor explains women’s reluctance to “ask,” nor even a similar
reluctance to take advantage of opportunities to learn how, it raises our awareness of the
remaining gaps in current research that warrant further exploration.
Even if particular attitudes and beliefs are eventually confirmed to be the primary
demotivators behind women’s reluctance to improve their negotiation skills, it is
important to keep in mind that the same attitudes may operate differently among students
of differing abilities (Kulm, 1980).
The solution to helping women improve their ability to “ask” will require much
more than simply offering additional negotiation coursework and enrolling greater
numbers of women into those classes. In fact, to the contrary, it should be noted that the
completion of a single negotiation course may be unrelated to female graduate’s
willingness to negotiate job offers, and the starting salaries they are able to secure
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(Gerhart & Rynes, 1991). Whether this indicates that successful completion of a single
negotiation course will be insufficient to lead to a substantive change in women’s
behavior, or that an improvement in increasing their willingness to initiate negotiations
may not be sustainable, remain open questions. However, the successful use of female
role models to increase women’s enrollment in topics that are seen to be stereotypically
“male” (e.g., STEM studies) perhaps implies that role models have a similar role to play
in encouraging women to study other “male” topics like negotiation.
While more work is needed to tease out how the attitudes identified in this study
work in concert with individual and societal factors to influence behavior, it’s hoped that
this research serves to further the public discourse and encourage future avenues of
inquiry so that one day we will not only be able to answer why “women don’t ask,” but
can actually help provide constructive opportunities for women to learn how to overcome
what I have termed the “The Female’s Paradox: Dissed if you negotiate, but
disadvantaged if you don’t.” Should that be accomplished, the world will certainly be a
better place because, as we all know, “If momma ain’t happy, ain’t nobody happy.”
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Appendix A.
Eighty-two Domestic Graduate Schools Invited to Participate in the Survey
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

American - School of International Service and SPA
Arizona State
Brandeis – Heller School
Brigham Young – Marriott School
Brown – Taubman
Carleton-Patterson
Carnegie Mellon – Heinz College
Chicago – Harris
Cleveland State – Levin College
Columbia – SIPA
Cornell – Institute for Public Affairs
CUNY – John Jay
Duke University – Sanford
Florida State – Askew
Georgetown – GPPI and Walsh
George Mason – SPP
Georgia Institute of Technology – Sam Nunn and SPP
Georgia State - Andrew Young
George Washington – Elliott and Trachtenberg
Harvard – Kennedy
Howard University - Bunche
Indiana – SPEA
Indiana University, Purdue - SPEA
Johns Hopkins – SAIS
MIT – Urban Studies & Planning
Naval Postgraduate School
North Carolina State – SPIA
Northern Illinois
Northwestern – IPR
NYU – Wagner
Ohio State - John Glenn
Pepperdine - SPP
Princeton – Woodrow Wilson
Rice University
Rutgers – Bloustein
Rutgers - Newark
Seton Hall – Whitehead School
Stanford - Ford Dorsey
SUNY – Albany – Rockefeller College
Syracuse – Maxwell
Texas A&M - Bush School
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42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Thunderbird – AGSIM
Tufts – Fletcher School
U Arkansas - Clinton
U Arizona – SPAP
U Central Florida – CHPA
U Cincinnati – IPR
U Colorado – Denver – SPA
U Delaware – SUAPP
U Denver – IPPS and Korbel
U Georgia – DPAP
U Illinois - Chicago (College of UPPA)
U Illinois – IGPA
U Kansas - MPA Program
U Kentucky – Martin
U Maryland College Park – SPP
U Mass – Amherst – CPPA
U Mass – McCormack
U Michigan - Ford School
U Minnesota – Humphrey
U Missouri – Truman
U Nebraska - Omaha
UNC - Chapel Hill – DPP
U Oregon – DPPPM
U Pennsylvania – Fels
U Pittsburgh – GSPIA
U Southern Maine – Muskie
U Texas – LBJ
U Utah – IPIA
U Virginia – Batten
U Washington - Evans
University of Texas - Dallas - SSS
U Washington - Jackson
U Wisconsin – LaFollette
UC Berkeley - Goldman School
UCLA – SPA
UC San Diego – GSIRPS
U Southern California – SPPD
Virginia Commonwealth – Wilder
Virginia Polytechnic – SPIA
Wm. & Mary - Thomas Jefferson
Yale – MacMillan
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Appendix B.
Twenty-seven Foreign Graduate Schools Invited to Participate in the Survey
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Fudan-Sirpa
Geneva Graduate Institute
Hertie School of Governance
Higher School of Economics – SPA
ICFAI-SPP
IEP-Sciences PO
International University of Japan-GSIR
KDI-SPMM
Korea-GSIS
London School of Economics
Maastricht-GSIS
Monterrey Institute of International Studies
Nanyang Tech-RSIS
National University of Singapore-YEW
Queen’s-SPS
Seoul National University-GSIS
St. Petersburg-SIR
Stockholm School of Economics
Tech de Monterrey-GGAP
The New School-Milano
University of Bocconi-Public Administration
University Externado de Columbia-FGRI
University of St. Gallen-IAG
University of Toronto-Monk
University of Tsumoni-GSIS
Victoria-Wellington-SG
Yonsei-GSIS
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Appendix C.
Graduate Programs from Whom Survey Responses were Received
Schools

Number of completed or
partially completed surveys
returned

Percent of the total completed or
partially completed surveys
received from all participants

American University
Arizona State University
Brigham Young – Marriott School
Carleton-Paterson School
Carnegie Mellon – Heinz College
Cornell – Institute for Public
Affairs
Duke University – Sanford
Georgetown – GPPI and Walsh
George Washington – Elliot and
Trachtenberg Schools
Indiana University – SPEA
MIT – Urban Studies and Planning
NYU – Wagner
Pepperdine – SPP
Texas A&M – Bush School
University of Central Florida –
CHPA
University of Colorado, Denver –
SPA
University of Minnesota –
Humphrey
University of Pittsburgh – GSPIA
University of Texas – LBJ
University of Wisconsin –
LaFollette
University of California , San
Diego – SGIRPS
School of Participant not identified

22
1
25
1
338
34

2.1%
.1%
2.4%
.1%
32.1%
3.2%

25
60
147

2.4%
5.7%
14%

65
17
2
7
69
20

6.2%
1.6%
.2%
.7%
6.6%
1.9%

34

3.2%

37

3.5%

52
37
23

4.9%
3.5%
2.2%

29

2.8%

5

.5%

Total responses

1116

100%
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Appendix D.
Survey Responses
Category of Response

N

Number of students/alumni who were invited to complete the
survey
Number of students/alumni who actually received the survey
Number of Participants who logged on and began answering the
survey
Number of Participants who logged on and completed the survey
Number of Participants who identified their gender on the survey
Number of Participants who answered the control question
correctly
Number of Participants who completed the survey and answered
the control question correctly
Number of Participants who both identified their gender and
answered the control question correctly

Unknown

272

Unknown
1116
1082
1077
1050
1021
1,016

Appendix E.
Demographic Characteristics of Participants
Age

N

%

20-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
Over 50
Citizenship

314
400
145
57
33
24
39
N

31
39.5
14.3
5.6
3.3
2.4
3.9
%

U.S./lawful resident
Other
Marital Status

897
115
N

88.6
11.4
%

Single
Married
Other
Wage Earner Role

573
333
105
N

56.7
32
10.4
%

Primary
Secondary
Undergraduate Major

781
194
N

76.9
19.1
%

Liberal Arts
S.T.E.M.
Business
Other
Graduate Major

541
178
85
231
N

54.3
17.9
8.5
23.2
%

Public Policy
Public Administration
Management
Technology
International Affairs
Other
Graduate Degree
Pursued
Master’s
Doctorate
Other

386
232
126
82
88
123
N

42.2
25.4
13.8
9
9.6
13.5
%

776
59
52

88.6
6.7
5.9
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Appendix F.
Demographic Characteristics of Participants, Broken Out by Gender (N = 1,016)
Men

Women
N

%

N

%

406

40%

610

60%

N

%

Age
N

%

20-25

112

27.7%

20-25

202

33.2%

26-30

159

39.4%

26-30

241

39.6%

31-35

65

16.1%

31-35

80

13.2%

36-40

20

5%

36-40

3737

6.1%

41-45

16

4%

41-45

17

2.8%

46-50

13

3.2%

46-50

11

1.8%

Over 50

19

4.7%

Over 50

20

3.3%

N

%

Citizenship
N

%

U.S./lawful resident

338

83.7%

U.S./lawful resident

559

91.9%

Other

66

16.3%

Other

49

8.1%

N

%

Single

350

57.6%

Marital Status
N

%

Single

223

55.3%

Married

153

38%

Married

180

29.6%

Other

27

6.7%

Other

78

12.8%

N

%

452
140

76.4%
23.6%

Wage Earner Role

Primary
Secondary
(Table continues)

N

%

330
54

85.9%
14.1%
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Primary
Secondary

Men

Women
Undergraduate Major
N

%

N

%

Liberal Arts

196

49.4%

Liberal Arts

345

57.6%

STEM

108

27.2%

STEM

70

11.7%

Business

36

9.1%

Business

49

8.2%

Other

78

19.6%

Other

153

25.5%

Graduate Major
Men

Women
N

%

N

%

Public Policy

140

37.7%

Public Policy

246

45.3%

Public Administration
Management

84
61

22.6%
16.4%

Public Administration
Management

148
65

27.3%
12%

Technology

62

16.7%

Technology

20

3.7%

International Affairs
Other

47
37

12.7%
10%

International Affairs
Other

41
86

7.6%
15.8%

N

%

Graduate Degree Being Pursued
N

%

Master’s

315

89.5%

Master’s

461

88%

Doctorate

27

7.7%

Doctorate

32

6.1%

Other

14

4%

Other

38

7.3%

Appendix G.
Gender Mix of Graduate Students Enrolled in U.S. Programs in Public Policy
Master’s Programs
School Year
2009-2010

Females

Males

56%

44%

Doctoral Programs
School Year
2009-2010

Females

Males

38%

62%
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Appendix H.
Undergraduate Majors of Participants Compared to Undergraduate Majors in General
(N = 996)
Females
Survey
NCES –
Response
National
%
Average of
All Female
Undergrads
57.6%
32.9%

Males
Survey
Response
%

196

49.4%

NCES –
National
Average of All
Male
Undergrads
27.3%

9.7%

108

27.2%

25.5%

8.2%

20.3%

36

9.1%

27.6%

25.5%

37%

78

19.6%

19.7%

Total
599
*103.1%
100%
397
*105.3
responses
*Total greater than 100% because some participants indicated multiple majors.

100%

Undergrad
Major

Survey
Response
Count

Liberal Arts

345

STEM
(science,
technology,
engineering,
math)
Business

70

11.7%

49

Other

153

276

Survey
Response
Count

Appendix I.
The Twenty-one Attitudes Hypothesized to Inhibit Women from Studying Negotiation
Beliefs (four factors)
Importance/usefulness

Threats to relationships

277
Concerns with class
methodology

Attitudes underlying this belief
I just don’t see myself using negotiation in my personal or professional life.

Question 4

I would rather take elective classes that cover more important or useful topics than
negotiation.
I’m not sure if studying negotiation would be useful in my career.
I don’t need to study negotiation because I’m already an effective negotiator.

Question 9
Question 13
Question 18

I’m not really sure what negotiation is.
I’m concerned that if I negotiate others may see me as too “pushy” or assertive.

Question 20
Question 6

I don’t have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice negotiating in front of
a class.
Negotiation is a competitive process and I’m not really all that competitive.
Negotiation is risky and I don’t like to take risks.
When I negotiate with someone, I would be concerned if I took advantage of that person.
I don’t know enough about negotiation to be comfortable taking an elective class on the
subject.
I would have questions and concerns about the methodology used to teach an elective
class in negotiation.
I just have little or no interest in studying how to become a more effective negotiator.

Question 3

Negotiation skills can’t be taught in a classroom setting.
I would only take an elective class in negotiation if my friends did.
Taking an elective class in negotiation is unnecessary because one can learn to negotiate
on their own.
(Table continues)

Survey statement*

Question 22
Question 12
Question 2
Question 17
Question 14
Question 1
Question 16
Question 19
Question 8

Beliefs (four factors)

Attitudes underlying this belief

It’s not polite to brag about one’s accomplishments or abilities when discussing starting
salary.
When interviewing for a new job, I prefer to let the prospective employer determine
what’s a fair starting salary.
I’m intimidated by the thought of negotiating with a member of the opposite sex, and/or
those who have more power/status/rank than I.
Negotiating a good deal is as much about luck as it is about one’s negotiating ability.
I’ve not had role models in my life who can help me understand the importance of being a
good negotiator.
*Statement #7 was a control question and so is not listed here.
External locus of control

Survey statement*
Question 21
Question 10
Question 15
Question 11
Question 5
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Appendix J.
“Have you ever negotiated your starting salary, i.e., countered a prospective employer's
initial salary offer with a higher amount?” (N = 1011)
N

%

Yes

455

45%

No

556

55%

Broken out by gender and student status
Females “Yes”

Males “Yes”

N

%

N

%

Current student

279

45.8%

176

43.8%

Alumnus

330

54.2%

226

56.2%

Appendix K.
“When interviewing for a job, what percentage of prospective employers, do you believe
have more money to give than their initial offer?” (N = 1003)
All responses
Response

N

%

0%

8

.8%

1-10%

33

3.3%

11-20%

36

3.6%

21-29%

50

5%

30-39%

68

6.8%

40-49%

56

5.6%

50-59%

142

14.2%

60-69%

112

11.2%

70-79%

135

13.5%

80-89%

113

11.3%

90+%

250

24.9%

279

Appendix L.
“When interviewing for a job, what percentage of prospective employers do you believe
have more money to give than their initial offer?” (N = 1003)
Female responses

Male responses

Response

N

%

N

%

0%

4

.7%

4

1%

1-10%

17

2.8%

16

4%

11-20%

20

3.3%

16

4%

21-29%

37

6.1%

13

3.3%

30-39%

38

6.3%

30

7.6%

40-49%

31

5.1%

25

6.3%

50-59%

88

14.5%

54

13.6%

60-69

67

11.1%

45

11.3%

70-79%

86

14.2%

49

12.3%

80-89%

68

11.2%

45

11.3%

90+%

150

24.8%

100

25.2%

Total
responses

606

100%

397

100%

280

Appendix M.
“If a job candidate counters a prospective employer's initial salary offer with a higher
amount, what do you believe is the probability that the job offer will be retracted?” (N =
1005)
N

%

0%

70

7%

1-10%

302

30%

11-20%

166

16.5%

21-29%

125

12.4%

30-39%

104

10.3%

40-49%

62

6.2%

50-59%

101

10%

60-69

32

3.2%

70-79%

28

2.8%

80-89%

5

.5%

90+%

10

1%
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Appendix N.
“If a job candidate counters a prospective employer's initial salary offer with a higher
amount, what do you believe is the probability that the job offer will be retracted?” (N =
1005)
Female responses

Male responses

N

%

N

%

43

7%

27

7%

1-10%

190

31.3%

112

28.2%

11-20%

97

16%

69

17.4%

21-29%

70

11.5%

55

13.9%

30-39%

67

11%

37

9.3%

40-49%

37

6%

25

6.3%

50-59%

57

9%

44

11.1%

60-69

21

3.5%

11

3%

70-79%

17

3%

11

3%

80-89%

3

.5%

2

.5%

90+%

6

1%

4

1%

608

100%

397

100%

0%

N

282

Appendix O.
“If you’re currently enrolled as a student in your graduate program, was an elective class
in negotiation offered during this current school year? Or, if you're not a student but are
an alumnus, was an elective negotiation class offered in your program while you were
enrolled as a student?” (N = 906)
N

%

Yes

529

58.4%

No

377

41.6%

Appendix P.
“If you’re a current student and an elective class in negotiation is offered in your program
did you take the class? Or, if you're an alumnus, and a negotiation elective was offered
while you were a student, did you take the class?” (N = 524)
N

%

Yes

308

58.8%

No

216

41.2%

Appendix Q.
“If you’re a current student and an elective class in negotiation is offered in your program
did you take the class? Or, if you're an alumnus, and a negotiation elective was offered
while you were a student, did you take the class?” (N = 524)
Student

Alumni

Yes

Females
(N = 197)
95
48%

Males
(N = 159)
93
58.5%

Females
(N = 104)
75
72%

Males
(N = 64)
45
70.3%

No

102

66

29

19

52%

41.5%

283

28%

29.7%

Appendix R.
“If you're a current student and an elective class in negotiation was not offered in your
program during the current academic year (2008-2009) but were to be offered while you
were still in school, would you take the class? Or, if you're an alumnus, and a negotiation
elective was not offered while you were a student, would you have taken the class had an
elective in negotiation been offered?” (N = 363)
Negotiation elective was not offered, but respondent would
take/would have taken the class if given the opportunity
N = 363
%
Yes

236

65%

No

127

35%

Appendix S.
“If you're a current student and an elective class in negotiation was not offered in your
program during the current academic year (2008-2009) but were to be offered while you
were still in school, would you take the class? Or, if you're an alumnus, and a negotiation
elective was not offered while you were a student, would you have taken the class had an
elective in negotiation been offered?” (N = 363)

Yes
No

Negotiation elective was not offered, but respondent would take/would
have taken the class if given the opportunity
Student
Alumni
Females
Males
Females
Males
(N = 141)
(N = 80)
(N = 84)
(N = 58)
91
64.5%
48
60%
58
69%
39
50

35.5%

32

40%

284

26

31%

19

67.2%
32.8%

Appendix T.
“I just have little or no interest in studying how to become a more effective negotiator.”
(N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
205
176
166
33
18
12

%
33.6%
28.9%
27.2%
5.4%
3.0%
2.0%

(N = 406)
146
120
92
22
16
10

%
36.0%
29.6%
22.7%
5.4%
3.9%
2.5%

2.21

100%

2.19

100%

2.20

Appendix U.
“When I negotiate with someone, I would be concerned if I took advantage of that
person.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
21
35
138
241
133
42

%
3.4%
5.7%
22.6%
39.5%
21.8%
6.9%

(N = 406)
14
43
88
152
87
22

%
3.4%
10.6%
21.7%
37.4%
21.4%
5.4%

3.91

100%

3.79

100%

285

3.86

Appendix V.
“I don't have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice negotiating in front
of a class.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Disagree very strongly
Disagree strongly
Disagree
Agree
Agree strongly
Agree very strongly

Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)

%

(N = 406)

%

34
77
206
183
78
32
3.48

5.6%
12.6%
33.8%
30.0%
12.8%
5.2%
100%

58
86
145
75
33
9
2.92

14.3%
21.2%
35.7%
18.5%
8.1%
2.2%
100%

3.25

Appendix W.
“I just don't see myself using negotiation in my personal or professional life.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female
(N = 610)
239
169
164
32
5
1
2.01

%
39.2%
27.7%
26.9%
5.2%
.8%
.2%
100%

286

Overall
average

Male
(N = 406)
178
121
89
16
2
0
1.87

%
44%
29.8%
21.9%
3.9%
.5%
0%
100%

1.96

Appendix X.
“I’ve not had role models in my life who can help me understand the importance of being
a good negotiator.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
66
72
228
157
63
24

%
10.8%
11.8%
37.4%
25.7%
10.3%
3.9%

(N = 406)
24
81
131
104
54
12

%
5.9%
20%
32.3%
25.6%
13.3%
3%

3.25

100%

3.29

100%

3.27

Appendix Y.
“I’m concerned that if I negotiate others may see me as too “pushy” or assertive.”
(N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
26
65
181
214
87
37

%
4.3%
10.7%
29.7%
35.1%
14.3%
6.1%

(N = 406)
31
66
125
135
41
8

%
7.6%
16.3%
30.8%
33.3%
10.1%
2.0%

3.63

100%

3.49

100%

287

3.49

Appendix Z.
“Taking an elective class in negotiation is unnecessary because one can learn to negotiate
on their own.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
102
142
287
73
5
1

%
16.7%
23.3%
47%
12%
1%
.2%

(N = 406)
51
122
178
52
3
0

%
12.6%
30.0%
43.8%
12.8%
.7%
0%

2.57

100%

2.60

100%

2.58

Appendix AA.
“I would rather take elective classes that cover more important or useful topics than
negotiation.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
69
989
261
129
36
17

%
11.3%
16.1%
42.8%
21.1%
5.9%
2.8%

(N = 406)
43
69
177
76
29
11

%
10.6%
17.0%
43.8%
18.7%
7.1%
2.7%

3.03

100%

3.03

100%

288

3.03

Appendix BB.
“When interviewing for a job, I prefer to let the prospective employer determine what’s a
fair starting salary.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
51
95
242
191
23
8

%
8.4%
15.6%
39.7%
31.3%
3.8%
1.3%

(N = 406)
38
69
172
115
8
4

%
9.4%
23.4%
39.9%
21.4%
5.4%
.5%

3.10

100%

3.00

100%

2.93

Appendix CC.
“Negotiating a good deal is as much about luck as it is about one’s negotiating ability.”
(N = 1,016)
Female

Answer options
Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
46
125
279
140
18
2

%
7.5%
20.5%
45.7%
23%
3%
.3%

(N = 406)
38
95
162
87
22
2

%
9.4%
23.4%
39.9%
21.4%
5.4%
.5%

2.94

100%

2.92

100%

289

2.93

Appendix DD.
“Negotiation is risky and I don’t like to take risks.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
34
104
283
164
22
3

%
5.6%
17%
46.4%
26.9%
3.6%
.5%

(N = 406)
37
103
180
79
6
1

%
9.1%
25.4%
44.3%
19.5%
1.5%
.2%

3.07

100%

2.80

100%

2.96

Appendix EE.
“I’m not sure studying negotiation would be useful in my career.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
147
199
203
53
7
1

%
24.1%
32.6%
33.3%
8.7%
1.1%
2%

(N = 406)
106
134
130
32
4
0

%
26.1%
33%
32%
7.9%
1%
0%

2.31

100%

2.25

100%

290

2.28

Appendix FF.
“I would have questions and concerns about the methodology used to teach an elective
class in negotiation.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
45
84
246
189
39
7

%
7.4%
13.8%
40.3%
31%
6.4%
1.1%

(N = 406)
24
53
140
144
38
7

%
6%
13%
34.5%
35.5%
9.4%
2%

3.19

100%

3.34

100%

3.25

Appendix GG.
“I’m intimidated by the thought of negotiating with a member of the opposite sex, and/or
those who have more power/status/rank than me.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
71
93
139
198
77
32

%
11.6%
15.2%
22.8%
32.5%
12.6%
5.2%

(N = 406)
67
98
119
90
29
3

%
16.5%
24.1%
29.3%
22.2%
7.1%
.7%

3.35

100%

2.82

100%

291

3.14

Appendix HH.
“Negotiation skills can’t be taught in a classroom setting.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Female

Overall
average

Male

Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6

(N = 610)
81
153
292
70
8
6

%
13.3%
25.1%
47.9%
11.5%
1.3%
1%

(N = 406)
56
112
181
45
9
3

%
13.8%
27.6%
44.6%
11%
2.2%
1%

Average rating out of 6

2.65

100%

2.63

100%

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2

2.64

Appendix II.
“I don’t know enough about negotiation to be comfortable taking an elective class on the
subject.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
134
123
289
53
10
1

%
22%
20.2%
47.4%
8.7%
1.6%
.2%

(N = 406)
92
108
174
28
3
1

%
22.7%
26.6%
42.9%
6.8%
.7%
.2%

2.48

100%

2.37

100%

292

2.44

Appendix JJ.
“I don’t need to study negotiation because I’m already an effective negotiator.”
(N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
102
162
312
31
3
0

%
16.7%
26.6%
51.1%
5.1%
.5%
0%

(N = 406)
57
123
195
28
3
0

%
14%
30.3%
48%
6.9%
.7%
0%

2.46

100%

2.50

100%

2.48

Appendix KK.
“I would only take an elective class in negotiation if my friends did.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
229
124
222
29
3
3

%
37.5%
20.3%
36.4%
4.7%
.5%
.5%

(N = 406)
159
101
123
20
1
2

%
39.2%
24.9%
30.3%
4.9%
.2%
.5%

2.12

100%

2.04

100%

293

2.09

Appendix LL.
“I’m not really sure what negotiation is.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
210
128
220
47
3
2

%
34.4%
21%
36.1%
7.7%
.5%
.3%

(N = 406)
136
97
140
28
5
0

%
33.5%
23.9%
34.5%
6.9%
1.2%
0%

2.20

100%

2.18

100%

2.19

Appendix MM.
“It’s not polite to brag about one’s accomplishments or abilities when discussing starting
salary.” (N = 1,016)
Answer options

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Female

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
75
150
256
99
25
5

%
12.3%
24.6%
42%
16.2%
4.1%
.8%

(N = 406)
42
83
169
80
21
11

%
10.3%
20.4%
41.6%
19.7%
5.2%
2.7%

2.78

100%

2.97

100%

294

2.85

Appendix NN.
“Negotiation is a competitive process and I’m not really all that competitive.” (N =
1,016)
Answer options

Female

Disagree very strongly = 1
Disagree strongly = 2
Disagree = 3
Agree = 4
Agree strongly = 5
Agree very strongly = 6
Average rating out of 6

Overall
average

Male

(N = 610)
61
137
222
148
33
9

%
10%
22.5%
36.4%
24.3%
5.4%
1.5%

(N = 406)
56
91
158
87
12
2

%
13.8%
22.4%
38.9%
21.4%
3%
.5%

2.97

100%

2.79

100%

2.90

Appendix OO.
Average Scores on Twenty-one Survey Statements
GENDER COMPARISON OF AVERAGE SCORES - QUESTIONS 1-21
6
5.5

Average Score

5
4.5
4
3.5
3

2.5
2
1.5
1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Women 2.21 3.91 3.48 2.01 3.25 3.63 2.57 3.03
Men

2.19 3.79 2.92 1.87 3.29 3.28 2.59 3.03

9
3.1
3

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

2.94 3.07 2.31 3.19 3.35 2.65 2.48 2.46 2.12
2.92

295

2.8

2.25 3.34 2.82 2.63 2.37

2.5

19
2.2

20

21

2.78 2.97

2.04 2.18 2.97 2.79

Appendix PP.
Independent Samples T-Test (Male v. Female Responses)
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

296

I just have little or no
Equal variances
interest in studying how to assumed
become a more effective Equal variances
negotiator.
not assumed
When I negotiate with
Equal variances
someone, I would be
assumed
concerned if I took
Equal variances
advantage of that person. not assumed
I don't have enough
Equal variances
confidence in my
assumed
negotiation skills to
Equal variances
practice negotiating in
not assumed
front of a class.
I just don't see myself
Equal variances
using negotiation in my assumed
personal or professional Equal variances
life.
not assumed
I've not had role models in Equal variances
my life who can help me assumed
understand the importance Equal variances
of being a good
not assumed
negotiator.
(Table continues)

T-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

T

Df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

.662

.416

-9.311

966

.000

-.759

-9.506

489.439

.000

.643

966

.647

.167

.346

7.743

.003

.683

.556

.005

.955

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower

Upper

.082

-.919

-.599

-.759

.080

-.916

-.602

.521

.053

.082

-.109

.215

475.746

.518

.053

.082

-.108

.214

-4.505

966

.000

-.399

.089

-.573

-.225

-4.552

479.390

.000

-.399

.088

-.572

-.227

-7.636

966

.000

-.515

.067

-.648

-.383

-7.188

420.531

.000

-.515

.072

-.656

-.374

-.721

966

.471

-.065

.089

-.240

.111

-.730

480.688

.466

-.065

.088

-.238

.109

Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

297

I'm concerned that if I
Equal variances
negotiate others may see assumed
me as too "pushy" or
Equal variances
assertive.
not assumed
Taking an elective class in Equal variances
negotiation is unnecessary assumed
because one can learn to Equal variances
negotiate on their own.
not assumed
I would rather take
Equal variances
elective classes that cover assumed
more important or useful Equal variances
topics than negotiation. not assumed
When interviewing for a Equal variances
new job, I prefer to let the assumed
prospective employer
Equal variances
determine what's a fair
not assumed
starting salary.
Negotiating a good deal is Equal variances
as much about luck as it is assumed
about one's negotiating
Equal variances
ability.
not assumed
Negotiation is risky and I Equal variances
don't like to take risks.
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
I'm not sure if studying
Equal variances
negotiation would be
assumed
useful in my career.
Equal variances
not assumed
(Table continues)

T-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

T

Df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

.013

.909

-2.434

966

.015

-.207

-2.440

471.805

.015

966

11.183

Lower

Upper

.085

-.373

-.040

-.207

.085

-.373

-.040

.000

-.852

.062

-.973

-.730

.000

-.852

.061

-.972

-.731

.000

-1.334

.070

-1.471

-1.197

-18.669 450.212

.000

-1.334

.071

-1.475

-1.194

-5.442

966

.000

-.398

.073

-.541

-.254

-5.820

540.196

.000

-.398

.068

-.532

-.263

-3.917

966

.000

-.279

.071

-.418

-.139

-4.202

543.627

.000

-.279

.066

-.409

-.148

-4.105

966

.000

-.274

.067

-.404

-.143

-4.228

498.259

.000

-.274

.065

-.401

-.146

966

.000

-.783

.066

-.912

-.654

.000

-.783

.068

-.916

-.649

.001 -13.735

-13.859 477.943
1.158

1.182

11.020

.159

1.495

.282 -19.088

.277

.001

.690

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference

.222 -11.911

966

-11.530 441.717

Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances
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I would have questions
Equal variances
and concerns about the
assumed
methodology used to teach Equal variances
an elective class in
not assumed
negotiation.
I’m intimidated by the
Equal variances
thought of negotiating
assumed
with a member of the
Equal variances
opposite sex, and/or those not assumed
who have more
power/status/ rank than I.
Negotiation skills can't be Equal variances
taught in a classroom
assumed
setting.
Equal variances
not assumed
I don't know enough about Equal variances
negotiation to be
assumed
comfortable taking an
Equal variances
elective class on the
not assumed
subject.
I don't need to study
Equal variances
negotiation because I'm assumed
already an effective
Equal variances
negotiator.
not assumed
I would only take an
Equal variances
elective class in
assumed
negotiation if my friends Equal variances
did.
not assumed
(Table continues)

T-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

T

Df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

.387

.534

-6.368

966

.000

-.471

-6.672

516.493

.000

-2.856

966

-2.847

.498

23.220

13.411

4.749

4.232

.481

.000

.000

.030

.040

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower

Upper

.074

-.616

-.326

-.471

.071

-.609

-.332

.004

-.272

.095

-.458

-.085

466.708

.005

-.272

.095

-.459

-.084

-6.637

966

.000

-.450

.068

-.584

-.317

-6.808

494.134

.000

-.450

.066

-.581

-.320

-7.009

966

.000

-.487

.070

-.624

-.351

-7.093

480.788

.000

-.487

.069

-.622

-.352

-4.924

966

.000

-.302

.061

-.422

-.182

-4.929

470.621

.000

-.302

.061

-.422

-.182

-5.286

966

.000

-.381

.072

-.523

-.240

-5.198

454.844

.000

-.381

.073

-.526

-.237

Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

I'm not really sure what
negotiation is.
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Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
It's not polite to brag
Equal variances
about one's
assumed
accomplishments or
Equal variances
abilities when discussing not assumed
starting salary.
Negotiation is a
Equal variances
competitive process and assumed
I'm not really all that
Equal variances
competitive.
not assumed

T-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

T

Df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

.057

.812

-3.832

966

.000

-.284

-3.801

462.367

.000

-1.247

966

-1.261

2.982

.024

.085

.877

95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower

Upper

.074

-.430

-.139

-.284

.075

-.431

-.137

.213

-.099

.079

-.254

.057

480.429

.208

-.099

.078

-.252

.055

-2.991

966

.003

-.237

.079

-.393

-.082

-2.959

459.814

.003

-.237

.080

-.395

-.080

Appendix QQ.
Interfactor Correlation Matrix of the Four Hypothesized Factors
Factor 1 –
Importance/Usefulness

Factor 2 –
Threats to
relationships

Factor 3 –
Concerns with
class
methodology

Factor 4 –
External
locus of
control

Factor 1 –
Importance/Usefulness

_____

.61

.90

.72

Factor 2 –
Threats to relationships

.61

_____

.57

.95

Factor 3 –
Concerns with class
methodology

.90

.57

Factor 4 –
External locus of control

.72

.66
_____

.95

300

.66

_____

Appendix RR.
Comparison of Average Scores on Survey Statements

Statement

Female’s
average
score

Male’s
average
score

Gender differential
female vs. male

1

Not interested in studying negotiation

2.21

2.19

0.02

2

Concern with taking advantage of
counterpart

3.91

3.79

0.12

3

Lack confidence when negotiating

3.48

2.92

0.56

4

Don't see myself using negotiation

2.01

1.87

0.14

5

Lack negotiation role models

3.25

3.29

-0.04

6

Concern with pushback

3.63

3.49

0.14

7

Can learn to negotiate on my own

2.57

2.60

-0.03

8

Negotiation is not important/ useful

3.03

3.03

0.0

9

Employer determines salary

3.10

3.00

0.10

10

Negotiation outcomes are due to luck

2.94

2.92

0.02

11

Negotiation involves risk

3.07

2.80

0.29

12

Not sure if negotiation is useful

2.31

2.25

0.06

13

3.19

3.34

-0.15

14

Concerns about taking a class in
negotiation
I lack power when negotiating

3.35

2.82

0.53

15

Negotiation can't be taught

2.65

2.63

0.02

16

I don't know enough about
negotiation
I'm already an effective negotiator

2.48

2.37

0.11

2.46

2.50

-0.04

2.12

2.04

0.08

2.20

2.18

0.02

17
18
19

Would take class in negotiation if
friends did
Not sure what negotiation is

20

Shouldn't self-promote when you
negotiate

2.78

2.97

-0.19

21

I'm not competitive but negotiation is

2.97

2.79

0.18

301

Appendix SS.
The Three Models Tested by CFA
Model One (Original Hypothesized Model)
Factor

Importance/Usefulness

Threats to relationships

302
Concerns with class methodology

External locus of control

(Table continues)

Underlying attitudes (items) hypothesized to load on each factor
I just don’t see myself using negotiation in my personal or professional life.
I would rather take elective classes that cover more important or useful topics than negotiation.
I’m not sure if studying negotiation would be useful in my career.
I don’t need to study negotiation because I’m already an effective negotiator.
I’m not really sure what negotiation is.
I’m concerned that if I negotiate others may see me as too “pushy” or assertive.
I don’t have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice negotiating in front of a class.
Negotiation is a competitive process and I’m not really all that competitive.
Negotiation is risky and I don’t like to take risks.
When I negotiate with someone, I would be concerned if I took advantage of that person.
I don’t know enough about negotiation to be comfortable taking an elective class on the subject.
I would have questions and concerns about the methodology used to teach an elective class in negotiation.
I just have little or no interest in studying how to become a more effective negotiator.
Negotiation skills can’t be taught in a classroom setting.
I would only take an elective class in negotiation if my friends did.
Taking an elective class in negotiation is unnecessary because one can learn to negotiate on their own.
It’s not polite to brag about one’s accomplishments or abilities when discussing starting salary.
When interviewing for a new job, I prefer to let the prospective employer determine what’s a fair starting salary.
I’m intimidated by the thought of negotiating with a member of the opposite sex, and/or those who have more
power/status/rank than I.
Negotiating a good deal is as much about luck as it is about one’s negotiating ability.
I've not had role models in my life who can help me understand the importance of being a good negotiator.

Model Two (Randomly Generated Model)
Factor

Importance/Usefulness

Threats to relationships

303

Concerns with class
methodology

External locus of control

(Table continues)

Underlying attitudes (items) hypothesized to load on each factor
I just don’t see myself using negotiation in my personal or professional life.
When interviewing for a new job, I prefer to let the prospective employer determine what’s a fair starting salary.
I would have questions and concerns about the methodology used to teach an elective class in negotiation.
I would only take an elective class in negotiation if my friends did.
It’s not polite to brag about one’s accomplishments or abilities when discussing starting salary.
I’m concerned that if I negotiate others may see me as too “pushy” or assertive.
I don’t have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice negotiating in front of a class.
Negotiation is a competitive process and I’m not really all that competitive.
I’m not sure if studying negotiation would be useful in my career.
When I negotiate with someone, I would be concerned if I took advantage of that person.
I don’t need to study negotiation because I’m already an effective negotiator.
I’m intimidated by the thought of negotiating with a member of the opposite sex, and/or those who have more
power/status/rank than I.
I just have little or no interest in studying how to become a more effective negotiator.
I don’t know enough about negotiation to be comfortable taking an elective class on the subject.
I’m not really sure what negotiation is.
I would rather take elective classes that cover more important or useful topics than negotiation.
When I negotiate with someone, I would be concerned if I took advantage of that person.
Negotiating a good deal is as much about luck as it is about one’s negotiating ability.
Negotiation is risky and I don’t like to take risks.
I've not had role models in my life who can help me understand the importance of being a good negotiator.

Factor

Importance/Usefulness

Threats to relationships

304

Concerns with class
methodology

External locus of control

Model Three (Final Model)
Underlying attitudes (items) hypothesized to load on each factor
I just don’t see myself using negotiation in my personal or professional life.
I would rather take elective classes that cover more important or useful topics than negotiation.
I’m not sure if studying negotiation would be useful in my career.
Negotiation skills can’t be taught in a classroom setting.
I don’t need to study negotiation because I’m already an effective negotiator.
I’m concerned that if I negotiate others may see me as too “pushy” or assertive.
I don’t have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice negotiating in front of a class.
Negotiation is a competitive process and I’m not really all that competitive.
Negotiation is risky and I don’t like to take risks.
When I negotiate with someone, I would be concerned if I took advantage of that person.
I've not had role models in my life who can help me understand the importance of being a good negotiator.
I don’t know enough about negotiation to be comfortable taking an elective class on the subject.
I would have questions and concerns about the methodology used to teach an elective class in negotiation.
I just have little or no interest in studying how to become a more effective negotiator.
I would only take an elective class in negotiation if my friends did.
Taking an elective class in negotiation is unnecessary because one can learn to negotiate on their own.
It’s not polite to brag about one’s accomplishments or abilities when discussing starting salary.
When interviewing for a new job, I prefer to let the prospective employer determine what’s a fair starting salary.
I’m intimidated by the thought of negotiating with a member of the opposite sex, and/or those who have more
power/status/rank than I.
Negotiating a good deal is as much about luck as it is about one’s negotiating ability.

Appendix TT.
Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Measures Used in the Study
LI
L

L
A
1

A
LC

L
WU

W

.

1

.
180**
.
106**
.
106**
.
269**
.
.017
.
036
.
180**
.
025
.
190**
.
027
.
011
.
180**
.
055
.
092**
.
.081**

.

1

.
379**
.
298**
.
404**
148**
.
218**
.
297**
.
190**
.
411**
.
245**
.
132**
.
487**
.
198**
.
377**
.259**

.
.
268**
.
303**
.
288**
.
376**
.
316**
.
279**
.
357**
.
493**
.
183**
.
278**
.
266**
.
432**
022

.
358**
.
.002
.
096**
.
203**
.
139**
.
265**
.
076*
.
067*
.
268**
.
074*
.
233**
.
.174**

.

1

095**
.
187**
.
334**
.
221**
.
472**
.
176**
.
084**
.
465**
.
172**
.
230**
.169**

.
.
641**
.
246**
.
234**
.
147**
.
496**
.
309**
.
054
.
334**
.
346**
351**

.

1

.
335**
.
272**
.
228**
.
553**
.
370**
.
163**
.
373**
.
393**
.
250**

.

1

.
335**
.
434**
.
325**
.
174**
.
312**
.
306**
.
281**
.
.011

.

1

.
333**
.
305**
.
196**
.
208**
.
304**
.
265**
091**

.
.
314**
.
138**
.
459**
.
218**
.
334**
.
.085**

.
280**
.
183**
.
381**
.
464**
271**

.

1

.
136**
.
308**
.
272**
.
173**

.
.
225**
.
316**
.
.196**

.
401**
217**

.
112**

.

1

.
275**
.
329**
.
218**
.
393**

.
045
.
254**
.
180**
.
299**

.
120**
.
296**
.
266**
.
416**

.
284**
.
199**
.
056
.
114**

.
296**
.
234**
.
111**
.
191**

.
228**
.
254**
.
309**
.
363**

.
226**
.
259**
.
184**
.
265**

.
235**
.
300**
.
287**
.
536**

.
374**
.
308**
.
191**
.
281**

.
124**
.
191**
.
119**
.
090**

.
163**
.
280**
.
261**
.
459**

.
214**
.
244**
.
146**
.
207**

.
363**
.
442**
.
209**
.
329**

.
206**
.
.017
.
.022
.
.168**

.

.
090**
.
131**
.
227**

.
185**
.
354**
.
179**
.
393**

.

.

.

.

-

.

-

-

.

223**

071*

.018

146**

.009

.001

053

013

LRM

L
PB

P
UN

U
NI

N
DA

D
ELC

E
R

R
UU

U
CM

C
I

I
CBT

C
LK

L
AE

A
F

F
U

U
NPB

N
NC

N
G

G

LI
A
LC
WU

O
099**
L
147**
W
328**
L

LRM

PB
UN
NI
DA
ELC
R
UU
CM

305

I
CBT
LK
AE
F
U
NPB
NC

039
P
130**
U
295**
N
377**
D
195**
E
185**
R
158**
U
388**
C
137**
I
075*
C
226**
L
246**
A
163**
F
213**
U
178**
N
078*
N
167**
G

G

008

.
036

052

1
.

1

1

.
146**

1
.

.
030

1

.
.074*

199**

1
.

1
.

.

.

014

056

1

.

319**
231**
230**
-

.023

039

1
.

1

.
261**
.
324**

.

.
006

.
349**
.
.088**

1
.

1

-

.

082**

NOTES:**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Pearson correlations calculated (two-tailed).
Domains are LI = Lack Interest, A = Advantage, LC = Lack Confidence, WU = Won't Use, LRM = Lack Role Models, PB = Pushback, UN = Unnecessary, NI = Not Important,
DA = Don't Ask, ELC = External Locus of Control, R = Risk, UU = Unsure About Usefulness, CM = Concerns About Methodology, I = Intimidated, CBT = Can't Be Taught,
LK = Lack Knowledge, AE = Already Effective, F = Friends, U = Unsure, NPB = Not Polite to Brag, NC = Not Competitive, G = Gender.

1

Survey Statement Reflecting Each Attitude

Summary of Attitude

Legend

I just have little or no interest in studying how to become a more
effective negotiator.

Lack interest

LI

When I negotiate with someone, I would be concerned if I took
advantage of that person.

Advantage

A

Lack confidence

LC

Won’t use

WU

Lack role models

LRM

I’m concerned that if I negotiate others may see me as too “pushy” or
assertive.

Pushback

PB

Taking an elective class in negotiation is unnecessary because one can
learn to negotiate on their own.

Unnecessary

UN

I would rather take elective classes that cover more important or useful
topics than negotiation.

Not important

NI

Don’t ask

DA

External locus of control

ELC

Risk-averse

RA

Unsure about usefulness

UU

I would have questions and concerns about the methodology used to
teach an elective class in negotiation.

Concerns about
methodology

CM

I’m intimidated by the thought of negotiating with a member of the
opposite sex, and/or those who have more power/status/rank than I.

Intimidated

I

Can’t be taught

CBT

Lack knowledge

LK

Already effective

AE

Friends

F

Unsure

U

It’s not polite to brag about one’s accomplishments or abilities when
discussing starting salary.

Not polite to brag

NPB

Negotiation is competitive process and I’m not really that competitive.

Not competitive

NC

(Gender)

(G)

I don’t have enough confidence in my negotiation skills to practice
negotiating in front of a class.
I just don’t see myself using negotiation in my personal or professional
life.
I’ve not had role models in my life who can help me understand the
importance of being a good negotiator.

When interviewing for a new job, I prefer to let the prospective
employer determine what’s a fair starting salary.
Negotiating a good deal is as much about luck as it is about one’s
negotiating ability.
Negotiation is risky and I don’t like to take risks.
I’m not sure if studying negotiation would be useful in my career.

Negotiation skills can’t be taught in a classroom setting.
I don’t know enough about negotiation to be comfortable taking an
elective class on the subject.
I don’t need to study negotiation because I’m already an effective
negotiator.
I would only take an elective class in negotiation if my friends did.
I’m not really sure what negotiation is.

(Gender)
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Appendix UU.
Descriptive Statistics for Each Factor in the Proposed Model
CFA Regression Analysis of Final Model (Male and Female Cumulative Responses)
Beliefs

Internal consistency

Regression coefficient

R2

Mean

Standard
deviation

.73
.66
.31
.79
.54

.53
.44
.10
.61
.26

3.03
1.96
2.48
2.64
2.28

1.145
.962
.845
.96
.972

.29
.62
.45
.67
.75
.73

.08
.34
.20
.45
.58
.53

3.86
3.25
3.27
3.49
2.96
2.90

1.136
1.231
1.213
1.168
.931
1.087

.53
.66
.42
.44
.30

.28
.45
.17
.44
.30

2.09
2.44
3.25
2.58
2.20

1.011
.976
1.049
.922
1.193

.45
.64
.46
.60

.21
.41
.21
.36

2.85
3.14
2.93
3.06

1.081
1.314
.980
1.019

Attitudes
.68

Factor 1 Importance/Usefulness

Other electives more important/useful
Don’t’ see myself using
Don’t need – already effective
Negotiation can’t be taught
Not sure studying negotiation would be useful
.72
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Factor 2 –
Threats to
relationships

Concerned about taking advantage of the other person
Lack confidence in negotiating skills
Lack negotiation role models
Would be seen as too pushy
To negotiate is too risky
I’m not competitive
.68

Factor 3 Concerns with class
methodology

Friends don’t take the class
Don’t know enough about negotiation to take a class
Concerned how class would be taught
Don’t need to take a class – can teach myself
Not interested in studying
.58

Factor 4 –
External locus of
control

Not polite to brag
Lack power
Negotiation is more about luck than skill
I let employers tell me what I’m worth

Appendix VV.
Agreement with Statement Regarding Willingness to Take a Negotiation Elective

I just have little or no interest in studying
how to become a more effective negotiator.
When I negotiate with someone, I would be
concerned if I took advantage of that person.
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I don't have enough confidence in my
negotiation skills to practice negotiating in
front of a class.
I just don't see myself using negotiation in
my personal or professional life.
I've not had role models in my life who can
help me understand the importance of being
a good negotiator.
I'm concerned that if I negotiate others may
see me as too "pushy" or assertive.
Taking an elective class in negotiation is
unnecessary because one can learn to
negotiate on their own.
I would rather take elective classes that
cover more important or useful topics than
negotiation.
(Table continues)

Student willing to
take a negotiation
class

Number of
participants

Mean

Std. deviation

Std. error of
the mean

Yes

705

1.95

1.142

.043

No

263

2.71

1.091

.067

Yes

705

3.87

1.145

.043

No

263

3.81

1.129

.070

Yes

705

3.13

1.235

.047

No

263

3.53

1.207

.074

Yes

705

1.80

.897

.034

No

263

2.32

1.025

.063

Yes

705

3.25

1.247

.047

No

263

3.32

1.215

.075

Yes

705

3.43

1.177

.044

No

263

3.63

1.170

.072

Yes

705

2.36

.863

.032

No

263

3.21

.846

.052

Yes

705

2.65

.954

.036

No

263

3.98

1.002

.062

Student willing to
take a negotiation
class

Number of
participants

Mean

Std. deviation

Std. error
of the mean

When interviewing for a new job, I prefer to
let the prospective employer determine
what's a fair starting salary.

Yes

705

2.96

1.048

.039

No

263

3.35

.904

.056

Negotiating a good deal is as much about
luck as it is about one's negotiating ability.

Yes

705

2.86

1.022

.039

No

263

3.14

.876

.054

Yes

705

2.87

.938

.035

No

263

3.14

.879

.054

Yes

705

2.07

.891

.034

No

263

2.85

.957

.059

Yes

705

3.13

1.050

.040

No

263

3.60

.948

.058

Yes

705

3.07

1.314

.049

No

263

3.34

1.323

.082

Yes

705

2.53

.953

.036

No

263

2.98

.901

.056

Yes

705

2.30

.969

.036

No

263

2.79

.944

.058

Yes

705

2.39

.849

.032

No

263

2.69

.847

.052

Negotiation is risky and I don't like to take
risks.
I'm not sure if studying negotiation would
be useful in my career.
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I would have questions and concerns about
the methodology used to teach an elective
class in negotiation.
I'm intimidated by the thought of negotiating
with a member of the opposite sex, and/or
those who have more power/status/rank than
I.
Negotiation skills can't be taught in a
classroom setting.
I don't know enough about negotiation to be
comfortable taking an elective class on the
subject.
I don't need to study negotiation because I'm
already an effective negotiator.
(Table continues)

I would only take an elective class in
negotiation if my friends did.
I'm not really sure what negotiation is.
It's not polite to brag about one's
accomplishments or abilities when
discussing starting salary.
Negotiation is a competitive process and I'm
not really all that competitive.

Student willing to
take a negotiation
class

Number of
participants

Mean

Std. deviation

Std. error of
the mean

Yes

705

1.96

.989

.037

No

263

2.35

1.025

.063

Yes

705

2.13

1.022

.039

No

263

2.41

1.040

.064

Yes

705

2.86

1.102

.042

No

263

2.96

1.075

.066

Yes

705

2.83

1.090

.041

No

263

3.07

1.117

.069
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Appendix WW.
Average Female’s Participants’ Score Differential
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Statement

Group 1 - Original
survey participants
(N = 604)

Group 2 Extra credit participants
(N = 137)

I don't know enough about negotiation
Not sure what negotiation is
Would take class in negotiation if friends did
Not sure if negotiation is useful
Don't see myself using negotiation
Can learn to negotiate on my own
Shouldn't self-promote when you negotiate
Negotiation can't be taught
Not interested in studying negotiation
Concerns about taking a class in negotiation
Employer determines salary
I'm already an effective negotiator
Negotiation outcomes are due to luck
Lack negotiation role models
I'm not competitive but negotiation is
Negotiation is not important/ useful
Lack confidence when negotiating
Negotiation involves risk
Concern with taking advantage of counterpart
I lack power when negotiating
Concern with pushback

2.48
2.20
2.12
2.31
2.01
2.57
2.78
2.65
2.21
3.19
3.10
2.46
2.94
3.25
2.97
3.03
3.48
3.07
3.91
3.35
3.63

3.36
2.96
2.85
3.02
2.66
3.18
3.36
3.10
2.58
3.56
3.37
2.72
3.18
3.48
3.18
3.18
3.56
3.13
3.86
3.31
3.60

*Indicating greater agreement with each attitude statement.

Group 2 Statements where Group 2
participant’s scores are
higher (as hypothesized)*
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Score differential
between the two groups
(Group 2-Group 1)
.88
.76
.73
.71
.65
.61
.58
.45
.37
.37
.27
.26
.24
.23
.21
.15
.08
.06
-.05
-.04
-.03

Appendix XX.
“Have you ever negotiated your starting salary, i.e., countered a prospective employer's
initial salary offer with a higher amount?”
Group 1
Original female survey participants
(N = 604)
Yes
No
50.4%

Group 2
Extra credit participants
(N = 97)
Yes
No

49.6%

29.2%

312

70.98%

Appendix YY.
Starting Salaries Self-reported by 2012 Graduates of Heinz College
Women

Men

Took a negotiation elective?
No

Yes

No

Negotiated the offer?

Negotiated the offer?

Negotiated the offer?

Negotiated the offer?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Starting salary

Starting salary

Starting salary

Starting salary

60,000
n =3

---

67,666
n=3

64,860
n=5

44,250
n=2
75,500
n=2
84,300
n = 18

34,375
n=4
29,000
n=4
86,880
n = 10

---

---

---

---

90,300
n = 34

92,500
n = 33

---

---

---

---

85,000
n=1
80,000
n=1

68,600
n=1
91,200
n=3

---

MSISPM

72,500
n=2
120,000
n=1

68,800
n=3

50,000
n=1

---

---

---

MSIT
MSPPM

69,000
n=9

78,200
n=4

60,000
n=1

80,666
n=3

Yes
Major
HCPM
MAM

MEIM
MISM
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MPM

Took a negotiation elective?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Starting salary

Starting salary

Starting salary

Starting salary

65,000
n=1

68,500
n=2

---

63,000
n=1

51,600
n=9
45,850
n=6
86,300
n =11

---

---

80,000
n=1
---

MSBTM
--MSISPM

Major

HCPM

--MAM

---

---

--MEIM

101,600
n=9

87,600
n = 22

93,000
n =30

40,000
n=1
75,000
n=1
70,000
n=1

---

---

70,000
n=1
86,900
n=2

70,000
n=1
54,000
n=1

---

---

51,950
n=2

---

MSIT
MSPPM

71,250
n=4

79,200
n=7

MISM

MPM

74,800
n=2

60,100
n=6

MSBTM

NOTE: HCPM = Master in Health Care Policy & Management; MAM = Master in Arts Management; MEIM = Master in Entertainment Industry Management; MISM = Master in Information
Systems Management; MPM = Master’s in Public Management; MSBTM = Master of Science in Biotechnology & Management; MSISPM = Master in Information Security & Policy Management;
MSIT = Master of Science in Information Technology; MSPPM = Master of Science in Public Policy & Management.

Appendix ZZ.
Reason Participants in Group 2 (Students/alumni who said they did not/would not
take a negotiation class) Gave for Not Taking a Negotiation Elective

What is/was the primary reasons you will not/did not take a negotiation elective at CMU?

Women (N = 43)
Question

Men (N = 212)
%

Conflicted with the schedule of
mandatory classes in my major.
Felt other electives were more
important/useful.
Not interested in the topic.
Other.
Concerned I wouldn’t do well in the
class.
Negotiation skills can’t be taught.

29.9%

Too self-conscious to practice in front
of other students.
Don’t/didn’t see myself using
negotiation.
My negotiation skills are/were already
proficient.
Intimidated by the thought of
negotiating.
Don’t/didn’t like the way the class was
taught.

2.9%

29.2%
13.1%
10.2%
4.4%
3.6%

2.2%
2.2%
1.5%
.7%

Question

%

Felt other electives were more
important/useful.
Conflicted with the schedule of
mandatory classes in my major.
Not interested in the topic.
Other.
Negotiation skills can’t be taught.

30.7%

My negotiation skills are/were already
proficient.
Don’t/didn’t see myself using
negotiation.
Too self-conscious to practice in front
of other students.
Don’t/didn’t like the way the class was
taught.
Concerned I wouldn’t do well in the
class.
Intimidated by the thought of
negotiating.

2.8%
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23.6%
16.5%
15.6%
3.3%

1.9%
1.9%
1.4%
1.4%
.9%

Appendix AAA.
Compendium of negotiation coursework offered by eighty-five select U.S. graduate
schools of public policy/administration/international affairs during the 2010-2011 school
year*
Schools meeting
all five criteria*

School
1

American University – School of Int’l Service

2

American University – Public Administration

3

Arizona State University

4

Brandeis

5

Brigham Young University

6

Brown University

7

Carleton

X

8

Carnegie Mellon University

X

9

Chicago – Harris School of Public Policy

10

Cleveland State

11

Columbia

12

Cornells

13

CUNY – Baruch

14

CUNY – John Jay

15

Duke

16

Florida State University

17

George Mason

18

Georgetown – Public Policy

19

Georgetown – Walsh

20

Georgia Tech – International Affairs

21

Georgia Tech – Public Policy

X

22

George Washington – Elliott

X

23

George Washington – Trachtenberg

24

Harvard

25

Howard University

26

Indiana – School of Public & Environmental
Affairs

27

Indiana – Purdue

X

28

Johns Hopkins

X

29

MIT

X

30

Naval Postgraduate School

31

North Carolina State University

32

Northern Illinois

33

Northwestern

34

NYU

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
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(Table continues)
Schools meeting
all five criteria*

School
35

Ohio State University

X

36

Pepperdine

X

37

Princeton

X

38

Rutgers

X

39

Rutgers – Newark

X

40

Seton Hall

X

41

Stanford

X

42

SUNY – Albany

X

43

Syracuse

X

44

Texas A&M

45

Tufts

X

46

University of Arizona

X

47

Arkansas

48

University of Central Florida

49

University of Cincinnati

50

University of Colorado

51

University of Delaware

52

University of Denver – Public Policy

53

University of Denver – Josef Korbel

54

University of Georgia

55

University of Illinois - Chicago

56

University of Illinois – Institute of Government

57

University of Kansas

58

University of Kentucky

59

University of Maryland

60

University of Massachusetts – Amherst

61

University of Massachusetts – McCormick

62

University of Michigan

63

University of Minnesota

64

University of Missouri

65

University of North Carolina

66

University of Nebraska

67

University of Oregon

68

University of Pennsylvania

69

University of Pittsburgh

70

University of South Maine

71

University of Tennessee – School of Economics

72

University of Tennessee – Lyndon Johnson

73

University of Maryland- College Park

X

316

(Table continues)
Schools meeting
all five criteria*

School
74

Virginia

X

75

University of Washington

X

76

University of Wisconsin

X

77

University of Wisconsin – LaFollette

X

78

UC Berkeley

79

UCLA

80

UC San Diego

81

University of Minnesota

82

Virginia Commonwealth

83

Virginia Tech

84

William & Mary

85

Yale

X

* Only 31/85 schools (36.5%) offered a negotiation class that met all of
the following five criteria: Offered during that school year; had
“negotiation” in the title; focused on improving individual skills; taught in
the graduate program itself rather than in another department on campus;
and offered on an elective basis.
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Appendix BBB.
Female Enrollment in CMU Negotiation Electives

Tepper
Graduate
School of
Business

Heinz
College

School year

F-M gender
mix of Tepper
student body

F-M gender
mix of
negotiation
elective

Percent of female
over (+) or under (-)
representation

2007-2008

21:79

23:77

+2%

2008-2009

28:72

23:77

-5%

2009-2010

21:79

23:77

+2%

2010-2011

21:79

35:65

+14

2011-2012

23:77

26:74

+3%

School year

F-M gender mix
of Heinz
student body

F-M gender
mix of
negotiation
elective

Percent of female
over (+) or under (-)
representation

2006-2007

50:50

50:50

0%

2007-2008

52:48

46:54

- 6%

2008-2009

54:46

39:61

- 15%

2009-2010

39:61

39:61

0%

2010-2011

41:59

40:60

- 1%

2011-2012

42:58

55:45

+ 13%
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Appendix CCC.
First E-mail Inviting Schools to Participate in the Study
Dear _________________:
I'm writing to invite your participation in a very important research project.
A few years ago the book "Women Don't Ask" by Heinz College professor of economics, Linda Babcock,
revealed how female graduate students receive substantially lower starting salaries than their male
counterparts, primarily because they negotiate differently than men. Because the gender wage gap is an
important issue to all career services professionals, we would like to explore the question, "If women don't
easily negotiate for salary gain, would they also be reluctant to learn how, and if so, why?"
To help us answer this question, we are asking a select number of ranked graduate programs in public
policy/administration/international affairs to participate in a brief, on-line study that includes two separate
sections:
(a) A School Questionnaire; and (b) A Student/Alumni Survey.
Section (a): School Questionnaire
To help us collect the necessary data, you are asked to log on and complete the School Questionnaire,
As a token of our appreciation, all participating schools will receive a free copy of the book "Just Ask For
It", a recent publication by one of our faculty members that explores how women can improve their
negotiating skills.
To complete the School Questionnaire, please click on to the following link:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=wF_2b4jQthlP7QI7hO7nONVg_3d_3d
In the event you need others to help you collect the necessary data, a second email will immediately follow
this one containing a PDF version of the Questionnaire which you can print out and distribute to others to
help assemble the necessary data before you enter it into the on-line questionnaire. Please note: it *is*
possible to leave the Questionnaire and return. To do so click on the "leave survey" button on the top right
of the page. When you return using the link below, just key in your school from the drop down menu, and
click forward to again begin entering your responses.
Section (b): Student/Alumni Survey
We would also ask you to "cut and paste" and "forward" the email at the end of this message to your
students/alumni asking them to log on and complete the Student/Alumni Survey.
This e-mail explains the purpose of the study, solicits student and alumni participation, and provides them
the link to log on to the Survey.
It is hoped that this data will enable us to identify what keeps graduate students (particularly female
students) from searching out ways to improve their negotiating skills, which can in turn, encourage our
schools to consider the importance of including negotiation coursework in our curriculum, as well as
helping us better target our student advising.
The results of this research will be shared with all participating schools for use in student advising and
curriculum planning. I know that you share my commitment to prepare our graduates for successful entry
into the labor market, and this study will improve our ability to do just that. Again, thank you for your
anticipated willingness to help in this important initiative. Should you have any questions please don't
hesitate to contact my office. We very much look forward to your forthcoming response.
Sincerely,
Martin Black
Director, Career Services, School of Public Policy & Management
H. John Heinz III College -- Carnegie Mellon University
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/careers
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Appendix DDD.
Second E-mail to the Schools Invited to Participate in the Study Questionnaire
Greetings!
As promised, please find the PDF version of the School Questionnaire attached to this email. Feel free to
print it out and use as necessary to collect the required data before assembling it and entering it into the online Questionnaire.
Again, we thank you for your participation!
Sincerely,
Martin Black
Director, Career Services, School of Public Policy & Management
H. John Heinz III College -- Carnegie Mellon University
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/careers
______________________________________________________________________________________
Are You Getting What You're Worth?-Invitation to Participate in a Salary Negotiation Survey
Dear Student/Alumnus:
I am writing to request your help in a first-of-its-kind study of graduate students' attitudes towards learning
how to improve their negotiation skills.
You have been contacted because your school was one of the programs that recognized the importance of
this study and agreed to participate.
Research has shown that public policy/administration/ international affairs graduates who are willing and
able to negotiate their job offers secure appreciably higher salaries than graduates who do not. But, until
now, no research has been done on students' willingness to learn how to improve their negotiation skills.
This, of course, can disadvantage career services offices when they are helping to advise students how to
successfully navigate their career entry and progression.
This important study, being led by the Heinz College at Carnegie Mellon University, will explore factors
that encourage/discourage students from taking negotiation coursework that is/ may be offered to improve
their
individual negotiating skills.To make the results of the study useful, it is critically important that as many
students/alumni as possible complete the survey. Therefore, because a high response rate is vitally
important to a successful study, we strongly encourage you to log on today to the link below leading to the
brief on-line survey.
While responses will be both anonymous and confidential, aggregated results will be shared with your
school to help them improve their curriculum planning and student advising.
Many thanks, in advance, for your time, attention and assistance! If you have any questions or comments
about this study, please don't hesitate to contact me at cs77@andrew.cmu.edu.
Please click on the following link to access the brief on-line survey:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=lP_2bF6ayblFRVN9hnWy9RdQ_3d_3d
It will take you approximately 5 minutes to complete the survey. We thank you very much in advance for
helping us collect data that we hope will in turn be used by your school to help you in your career!
Martin Black
Director, Career Services, School of Public Policy & Management
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Appendix EEE.
Second E-mail to Schools Who Had Not Yet Participated
Dear _________________:
I'm following up on an April 17, 2009 e-mail I sent you inviting your school’s participation in a very
important research project. It appears that female graduate public policy/administration students receive
substantially lower starting salaries than their male counterparts, primarily because they negotiate
differently than men.
Because the gender wage gap is an important public policy issue, we are exploring the question, "If women
don't easily negotiate for salary gain, would they also be reluctant to learn how, and if so, why?"
Your school was one of a select number of ranked graduate programs invited to participate in this research
by completing an on-line School Questionnaire, and forwarding a link to a Survey for your students and
alumni to complete.
If you are in the process of completing the Questionnaire but have simply not yet had the opportunity to
submit your data, we look forward to receiving your response! However, if you have not yet had the
opportunity to begin collecting and entering your data, please note that because only a select number of
programs were invited to participate, it’s vitally important that every school and their students/alumni
respond in order to ensure a successful study.
School Questionnaire
To complete the School Questionnaire, simply click on the following link:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=wF_2b4jQthlP7QI7hO7nONVg_3d_3d
A PDF version of the Questionnaire is also attached in the event that you need to print it out and distribute
it to your staff to help assemble the necessary data before completing the on-line Questionnaire.
[Please note: it *is* possible to leave the Questionnaire and return. To do so just click on the "leave survey"
button on the top right of the page. When you return, using the link below, just key in your school from the
drop-down menu, and click forward to resume entering your data].
Student/Alumni Survey
And, if you have not yet done so, we would also remind you to "cut and paste" and "forward" the email at
the end of this message to your students/alumni asking them to log on and complete the brief
Student/Alumni Survey.
The results of this research will not only be shared with all participating schools, but schools will also
receive a complimentary copy of "Just Ask For It", a recent best-seller by one of our faculty members that
discusses how women can improve their negotiating skills.
It is hoped that this data will enable us to identify what keeps graduate students (particularly female
students) from searching out ways to improve their negotiating skills, encourage schools to consider the
importance of including negotiation coursework in their curriculum, and improve the quality of student
advising.
Should you have any questions please, don't hesitate to contact my office. We very much look forward to
receiving your school’s data in the very near future!
Sincerely,
Martin Black
Director, Career Services, School of Public Policy & Management
H. John Heinz III College -- Carnegie Mellon University
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/careers
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Appendix FFF.
The Survey
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